REINVENTING CRITICAL THEORY

Amílcar Cabral

TRANSLATED BY DAN WOOD

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY REILAND RABAKA

resistance and decolonization

Resistance and Decolonization

Reinventing Critical Theory

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Part I

Amílcar Cabral and Critical Theory

Introductions, Investigations, and Interpretations

Chapter One

The Weapon of *Critical* Theory

Amílcar Cabral, Cabralism, and Africana Critical Theory

Reiland Rabaka

The Cape Verdean and Bissau-Guinean revolutionary Amílcar Lopes da Costa Cabral connects with and contributes to the Africana tradition of critical theory in several poignant, provocative, and extremely profound ways. First, it should be mentioned that "[a]lthough he did not start out or train as a philosopher," Cabral, according to the Nigerian philosopher Olufemi Taiwo (1999), "bequeathed to us a body of writings containing his reflections on such issues as the nature and course of social transformation, human nature, history, violence, oppression and liberation" (6). Second, and as eloquently argued by the Eritrean philosopher Tsenay Serequeberhan (1991), Cabral's ideas led to action (i.e., actual cultural, historical, social, and political transformation, and ultimately revolutionary decolonization, revolutionary re-Africanization, and national liberation) and, therefore, "represents the zenith" of twentieth-century Africana revolutionary theory and praxis (20).[1] Third, and finally, Cabral's writings and reflections provide us with a series of unique contributions to radical politics and critical social theory, which—à la W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, Claudia Jones, George Padmore, Jean Price-Mars, Léon-Gontran Damas, Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor, Louise Thompson Patterson, Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, Ella Baker, Stokely Carmichael, Angela Davis, Walter

Rodney, the Black Panther Party, and the Combahee River Collective, among others—seeks to simultaneously critique the incessantly overlapping, interlocking, and intersecting nature of racism, sexism, capitalism, and colonialism in contemporary society.

Cabral's biography has been ably documented by Mario de Andrade (1980), Patrick Chabal (2003), Ronald Chilcote (1991), Mustafah Dhada (1993), Oleg Ignatiev (1975a, 1990), and Jock McCulloch (1983) and, consequently, need not be rehearsed in its entirety here. That being said, here at the outset of *Resistance and Decolonization* what I am specifically interested in are those aspects of his life and legacy that impacted and influenced his contributions to the Africana tradition of critical theory. As Patrick Chabal observed in his pioneering *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (2003), Cabral's revolutionary theory and praxis are virtually incomprehensible without critically engaging his gradual and often extremely interesting growth from nonviolent student militant to internationally acclaimed revolutionary leader.[2] Hence, here I have been tasked with introducing Cabral and his key contributions to the Africana tradition of critical theory, where in the chapter to follow Dan Wood will contextualize and critically engage the two works, *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* and "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence," which constitute the conceptual core and *raison d'être* of *Resistance and Decolonization.*

CABRAL—HIS BACKGROUND AND HUMBLE BEGINNINGS: THE ETHICAL AND INTELLECTUAL FORMATION OF A FUTURE REVOLUTIONARY

Cabral was born to Cape Verdean parents in Bafata, Guinea-Bissau, on 12 September 1924. His parents exerted an enormous influence on him. His father, Juvenal Antonio da Costa Cabral, was born on São Tiago Island, Cape Verde. Cabral senior's family was primarily made up of landowners and, therefore, considered "well-to-do" by local socioeconomic standards. As a result, he was afforded a "proper education," as with the other members of his family (Chabal 2003, 29). Juvenal Cabral had early ambitions to become a priest and, as a consequence, was sent to seminary in Portugal following a glowing stint in secondary school.

It is not clear whether Juvenal's studies in Portugal awakened his sense of anticolonialism and *Africanité*, or whether it was the racial climate and rigid religious curriculum of seminary. However, what is certain is that he became a "politically conscious man who did not hesitate to speak his mind" (30). For instance, on one occasion he sent a letter to the Minister of Colonies deploring what he understood to be the complete absence of government assistance in alleviating the catastrophic effects of drought, going so far as to suggest several remedies. Juvenal's environmental interests and critique of environmental racism should be noted, as they seem to have been handed down to his precocious son Amílcar, who, as Wood's subsequent chapter strongly stresses, was "[d]eeply moved by Cape Verdean droughts and the massive toll taken on lumpenproletarianized and racialized lives." In fact, Wood ultimately argues that Cabral was "always quick to point out that the devastation caused by these droughts was not merely 'natural' in any simplistic sense, but largely a result of colonial policy." On another occasion, Juvenal wrote an article expressing his disdain with the colonial government after a house collapsed in an overcrowded part of Praia, the capital of Cape Verde. He went further to criticize the inhuman conditions in which Cape Verdeans had to live because they were forced to flee the countryside and come to the already overcrowded city in search of food, shelter, and work.

Chabal persuasively argued that it was Amílcar Cabral's father who gave him his first lessons in political education, a point further corroborated by Mustafah Dhada (1993, 139–140). Juvenal Cabral also instilled in Amílcar a profound sense of the shared heritage and struggle of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. He wrote poetry, polemics, and expressed an uncommon and long-lasting interest in the agricultural problems of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. Juvenal, ultimately becoming a renowned and well-respected schoolteacher, possessed a deep "sense of intellectual curiosity and rigor, a respect for academic pursuits and for the written word," which he consistently stressed to Amílcar and his siblings (Chabal 2003, 30). While it cannot be said that Juvenal Cabral was a revolutionary nationalist by any measure, it does seem clear that he may have planted, however nascent, the seeds of nationalism in the fertile soil of his young son's heart and mind.

As it was with his father, Cabral's mother, Iva Pinhal Evora, was born on São Tiago Island, Cape Verde. However, unlike his father, she was born into a poor family—a family that strongly stressed hard work and piety. If Cabral's father bequeathed to him political education, a

love of poetry, and an interest in agriculture, then it can be argued that his mother provided him with a very special sense of self-determination, discipline, purpose, personal ethics, and an unshakeable iron will. For a time, Mrs. Cabral made a good living and was an entrepreneur, the proprietor of a shop and a small *pensão* (boardinghouse).

When Iva and Juvenal Cabral separated in 1929, things took a turn for the worse financially. She lost her business and worked as a seamstress and laborer in a fish-canning factory to support her family. Even still, her earnings were "barely sufficient to feed the family and there were days when they went without food." Chabal (2003) poignantly observed that although "Amílcar's family did not starve like so many Cape Verdeans, they were very poor" (31). He went on to importantly emphasize, "Cabral never forgot the difficulties of his early years and later spoke of poverty as one of the reasons which had led him to revolt against Portuguese colonialism" (31). The hardships he witnessed his mother endure and overcome while caring for him and his siblings undoubtedly influenced Cabral's views on gender justice and, most especially, women as cultural workers and bona fide revolutionary comrades in the national liberation struggle.[3]

CABRAL AND THE CABO VERDIANIDADE MOVIMENTO: FROM INNOCUOUS ANTICOLONIAL STUDENT ACTIVISM TO REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST AFRICAN NATIONALISM

In discussing Cabral's early life, and especially the influence of his parents on the evolution of his thought, it is also important to point out that he was homeschooled until the age of twelve. Although he did not enter primary school until he was twelve, Cabral is reported to have "thrived on education and from the very beginning he was clearly an excellent student." One of his former primary school classmates, Manuel Lehman d'Almeida, recalled that Cabral was "by far the best student and that he passed his secondary school entrance exam with distinction" (Chabal 2003, 31). His school records support d'Almeida's claims and lucidly illustrate that Cabral completed his studies at the *liceu* by the age of twenty, which would mean that he finished four years of primary school and seven years of secondary school in an astonishing eight years! During the last couple of years of his studies at the *liceu*, Cabral became aware of the Cape Verdean literary renais-

sance and cultural movement commonly known as the Cabo Verdianidade Movimento (the Cape Verdeanness Movement), which was primarily an outgrowth of the journal *Claridade* (Clarity). In many senses, the Cabo Verdianidade Movimento was the Cape Verdean and Lusophone version of the Harlem Renaissance, Negritude Movement, and Negrismo Movement, each of which significantly influenced the Cabo Verdianidade writers.[4]

Cabo Verdianidade was unique in that its writers, for the most part, broke with Eurocentric models and themes and, in a move that must be understood to be extremely bold for the time, turned their attention to Cape Verdean subjects, particularly ordinary people's life-worlds and life struggles: from drought to hunger, from migration to mild critiques of colonial miseducation, and from starvation to other forms of deprivation. Even so, more similar to the Negritude Movement than the Harlem Renaissance, Cabo Verdianidade was limited by its intentional aim at readers well-versed in colonial history and culture, and, to make matters worse, it was essentially escapist, expressing an intense cultural alienation that did not in any way promote anticolonial consciousness or decolonization, nonviolent or otherwise. Much like the early issues of Negrismo's *Atuei* or Negritude's *Présence Africaine*, then, Cabo Verdianidade's *Claridade* explored ethnic, racial, and cultural politics in a vacuum, as opposed to connecting the intersections and political economy of ethnicity, race, racism, and colonialism with the machinations of modern capitalism and class struggle.[5]

The first generation of Cabo Verdianidade writers established their journal, *Claridade*, in the 1930s, but by the 1940s, a new cohort of Cape Verdean writers founded the journal *Certeza*. The *Certeza* writers introduced two elements into Cape Verdean consciousness that foreshadowed the future emphasis on national liberation, national culture, and national identity. The first element involved their unapologetic calling into question of Portuguese colonialism in Cape Verde and an unswerving emphasis on the necessity for political action, although not necessarily decolonization as later conceived by Cabral and his revolutionary nationalist comrades. For the *Certeza* writers, Marxism, rather than neo-realism, provided their theoretical framework and political orientation. The second element, connected in several ways to the first, revolved around this group's stress on *returning* Cape Verdeans *to the source* of their history, culture, and struggle: Africa.[6]

As we have witnessed with the writers of the Cabo Verdianidade Movimento, at this time most Cape Verdeans understood themselves to

be Europeans (Portuguese in particular) and the Cape Verdean archipelago to be Portugal's most prized overseas islands (à la Honório Barreto, whom Cabral and Wood discuss in greater detail in the chapters to follow). The *Certeza* writers went beyond the *Claridade* collective by unequivocally emphasizing their African ancestry and long-standing connections with continental African history, culture, and struggle (and Guinea-Bissua's history, culture, and struggle, in particular). Ironically, Cabral had completed his studies and had left Cape Verde by the time this new movement was underway. Nevertheless, he eagerly kept track of it from abroad and noted that it had the potential to lead to anticolonial consciousness and an openness to nationalist (if not binationalist) ideas.

In the autumn of 1945, at the age of twenty-one, Cabral trekked to Portugal to pursue a five-year course of study at the Instituto de Agronomia da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa (the Agronomy Institute at the Technical University of Lisbon). He attended university on a scholarship provided by the Cape Verdean branch of the Casa dos Estudantes do Império (CEI) (the House of Students from the Empire) a colonial government–financed social development center for students from Portugal's colonies. His scholarship remitted his tuition and supplied him with a very modest stipend of 500 escudos, which was later increased to 750 escudos. His meager stipend, of course, was not enough to live on, so Cabral tutored and took various odd jobs to supplement his income, all the while consistently maintaining the highest marks of his cohorts. Even in light of all of this, Cabral found the time to participate in university affairs, metropolitan politics, and sundry extracurricular activities, most notably: the Radio Clube de Cabo Verde (the Radio Club of Cape Verde), Comissão Nacional para Defensa do Paz (CNDP) (the National Commission for the Defense of Peace), Lisbon's Maritime Center and Africa House, the Center for African Studies (CAS), Movimento Anti-Colonialista (MAC) (the Anti-Colonial Movement), and Comité de Liberação dos Territórios Africanos Sob o Domíno Português (CLTASDP) (the Committee for the Liberation of Territories Under Portuguese Domination), among others.

Indeed, Cabral was a multidimensional student activist, although an extremely cautious one. For instance, Mustafah Dhada (1993) contended that Cabral may have "stayed clear of subversive politics, largely for cautionary reasons—perhaps for fear of losing his scholarship or being hounded by the Portuguese secret police, Policía Interncional

pela Defensa do Estado (PIDE)" (the International Police for the Defense of the State), the very same secret police who would, two decades after he earned his degree in agricultural engineering, mercilessly orchestrate Cabral's assassination (141). Perhaps Cabral sensed his imminent future fate, but even still, harassed and hounded by the Portuguese secret police, he managed to graduate at the top of his class on 27 March 1952. This was a real feat, especially considering the fact that he was the only student of African origin in his cohort. Out of the 220 students who began the rigorous five-year course of study with Cabral, only 22 were awarded degrees as agronomists or, rather, agricultural engineers.

One of the students with whom Cabral developed a lasting rapport was Maria Helena Rodrigues, a silviculturist (i.e., a tree specialist) who was born in Chaves, northern Portugal. One of only twenty women admitted in Cabral's initial cohort of 220 students, Rodrigues became Cabral's study partner and, after they earned their degrees, his wife. With his studies completed and a new wife by his side, Cabral applied for a position in the Portuguese civil service and was "ranked as the best candidate," according to Chabal (2003), but "was denied the post because he was black" (39). This insult served as yet another reminder that Portuguese colonialism was inextricable from Portuguese racism. Cabral then did what so many colonial subjects are forced to do when their dreams of escaping the hardships of their colonized homelands have been dashed (à la the triumvirate of the Negritude Movement: Damas, Césaire, and Senghor): he returned to his native land convinced that he could make a special contribution to its development. In a word, he was doggedly determined to decolonize Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

Cabral gained employment as a "grade two agronomist" with the Provincial Department of Agricultural and Forestry Services of Guinea at the Estação Agrária Experimental de Pessubé, a research complex not far from Bissau. He was second in command and, from all the reports, seems to have thrown himself into a Lisbon-based Ministry for Overseas Territories–commissioned agricultural census of Guinea-Bissau. It was through this massive undertaking that Cabral became intimately familiar with the people and land in whose interest he would soon wage a protracted people's war for national liberation. He began the study in late 1953, traveling more than 60,000 kilometers and collecting data from approximately 2,248 peasants. By December 1954, he presented his and his team's findings to the colonial authorities. The

report was subsequently published in 1956 as a 200-page document. It featured statistics and analysis pertaining to Guinea-Bissau's agricultural demography, which the colonial government promised the United Nation's Food and Agricultural Organization it would use to better grapple with droughts and famine, among the other issues, besetting Guinea-Bissau.

Cabral was afforded considerable expertise carrying out the agricultural census. In fact, Chabal went so far to contend, "[f]ew twentieth century revolutionary and guerrilla leaders were in the enviable position of having such a specialized and detailed knowledge of the country in which they proposed to launch a people's war" (53; see also Forrest 1992; Mendy 2006). Along with his work for the colonial government, Cabral made many political contacts with, tellingly, both Cape Verdeans and Bissau-Guineans. Many initially outright rejected his ideas on decolonization, but after he accessibly yet discursively provided examples, often empirical and irrefutable evidence (e.g., disenfranchisement, deprivation, starvation, lack of education, and violent government repression), and typically over a prolonged period of time (i.e., usually several weeks or months), they were persuaded to seriously contemplate radical political alternatives and serious-minded solutions to the problems of Portuguese colonialism, and European imperialism more broadly speaking. It is here that Cabral excelled, in time clandestinely making contacts with civil servants and entrepreneurs, as well as urban workers, peasants, and rural villagers.

Emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that initially Cabral was open to using every available legal means of bringing about an end to Portuguese colonialism. To this end, in 1954 he formed a sports, recreational, and cultural club for local youngsters with the ultimate aim of using it as a front to promote nationalism, political education, and anti-colonial consciousness-raising, as had been successfully done in "British" and "French" Africa.[7] For instance, after a game of football, Cabral and his colleagues would retire to a more private place, supposedly to discuss how each player could improve their skills. On the contrary, the discussions centered on neither athletics nor other leisure activities. What really took place were intense and eye-opening conversations about African history, culture, and struggle, and the nefarious nature of Portuguese colonialism and racism. The club and its secret meetings gained considerable notoriety in and around Bissau and, as a result, were insidiously infiltrated by the Portuguese secret police's informers and swiftly terminated on government orders. Consequently, Cabral

was forced to leave Guinea-Bissau and was permanently banned from residing in his homeland again. He petitioned for, and was eventually granted, annual visits to briefly see his mother and other family members during holidays.

At this point the die was cast, and Cabral let go of any lingering hope that Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau could be liberated using the constitutional or legal decolonization path (à la Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, etc.). It was, therefore, on one of his colonial government–sanctioned visits to Guinea-Bissau on 19 September 1956 that Cabral, Luiz Cabral (his brother), Aristides Pereira, Fernando Fortes, Julio de Almeida, and Eliseu Turpin founded the Partido Africano da Independência e União dos Povos da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIUPGC), the African Party for the Independence and Unity of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Later the name was slightly altered to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) (the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde). Over the next seventeen years of his turbulent life, Amílcar Cabral would not only bring Portuguese colonialism to its knees and lead the people of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde through decolonization to national liberation, but he would also reconstruct and redefine what it means to be a revolutionary nationalist *and* revolutionary humanist. Although there are many who argue that Cabral was not necessarily a theorist, but more a guerilla leader and military strategist whose work is confined to the national liberation struggle of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, much like my volume *Concepts of Cabralism*, *Resistance and Decolonization* unambiguously challenges these assertions and illustrates several of the ways in which Cabral's "organic intellectual" life and political legacy continues to contribute to radical politics, critical social theory, and revolutionary praxis in general, and the Africana tradition of critical theory in particular.[8]

In *Social Movements, 1768–2004* (2004), noted political sociologist Charles Tilly essentially argued that social movements are most often made up of ordinary people, rather than members of the politically powerful and intellectually elite, and it is these "ordinary people," these "organic intellectuals"—à la Antonio Gramsci's provocative work in his *Prison Notebooks*—who collectively think, act, and speak in the best interest of, and in concert with, everyday average people—the so-called "masses." Gramsci (1971) famously contended that "[a]ll men are intellectuals," but "not all men have in society the function of intellectuals" (9). It is extremely important to emphasize this point

because neither the African masses nor the squalid shacks and shantytowns they have been callously quarantined to have been recognized for their intellectual activities and positive social, political, and cultural contributions.

Although "one can speak of intellectuals," Gramsci declared, "one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist." In point of fact, "[t]here is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: *homo faber* cannot be separated from *homo sapiens*." Which is to say, the "primitive man" (*homo faber*) cannot be completely divorced from the evolution of the much-vaunted "wise man" or "civilized man" (*homo sapiens*). Intellectuals do not simply inhabit college campuses and highbrow cafés—they can also be found in each and every country in Africa, including the villages, slums, ghettoes, and shantytowns. Right along with "men of taste," Gramsci included "philosophers" in his conception of "organic intellectuals," contending: "Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a 'philosopher,' an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought" (9; see also 3–43).[9] Africana critical theorists, and Amílcar Cabral in particular, may not be understood to be "philosophers" in the Eurocentric sense of the term, but no mistake should be made about it: *the Africana tradition of critical theory, a tradition predicated on the pronouncements and practices of continental and diasporan African organic intellectuals, is undeniably philosophical in that it articulates and actively helps to bring into being a new "conception of the world" and "new modes of thought" free from Eurocentrism, racism, sexism, heterosexism, colonialism, and capitalism, as well as other forms of modern and postmodern fascism and imperialism.*

CONCEPTIONS OF CABRALISM: THE FIVE STAGES OF CABRAL STUDIES

My current conception of "Cabralism" or, rather, *Cabralist critical theory and praxis*, evolved out of the sixth chapter of my book *Africana Critical Theory*, which is entitled "Amílcar Cabral: Using the Weapon of Theory to Return to the Source(s) of Revolutionary Decolonization

and Revolutionary Re-Africanization." In *Africana Critical Theory*, I critically engaged what I understood then (circa 2003 to 2009) to be Cabral's seminal contributions to the discourse and ongoing development of the Africana tradition of critical theory. As I was researching and writing that chapter, I developed an intense (perhaps I should say, *even more* intense) affinity with Cabral's insurgent intellectual and radical political legacy, one that I have now come to conceive as a major turning point in my insurgent intellectual and radical political development. Cabral, it seemed to me then and it remains so now, offers the Africana tradition of critical theory not only radical political paradigms and critical theoretical points of departure, à la C. L. R. James, Léon-Gontran Damas, Aimé Césaire, and Léopold Senghor, but above and beyond the aforementioned and more along the lofty lines of W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, Amílcar Cabral, in his shamefully short although incredibly remarkable life, also contributed a virtual treasure trove of innovative insights, critical theories, and revolutionary praxes that extend far beyond the borders and boundaries of the critique of racism, colonialism, and capitalism, and consciously developed dialectical discourses on democratic socialism, revolutionary nationalism, and revolutionary humanism in the anti-imperialist interests of the wretched of the earth as well.[10]

When Cabral's critiques of racism, colonialism, capitalism, Eurocentric Marxism, African socialism, and African nationalism are brought into the ever-widening orbit of *Africana critical theory*, which is to say that when Cabral's discourse on cultural imperialism, cultural racism, religious racism, racial violence, racial colonization, extreme capitalist economic exploitation, and what it means to really and truly *be* and *become* "human"—although thoroughly racialized and colonized—are analyzed for their contribution to the discursive deepening and ongoing development of the Africana tradition of critical theory, something unprecedented in the annals of Africana intellectual history happens: *five distinct stages of Cabral studies arise* or, rather, *five distinct conceptions of Cabralism emerge.* The first conception of Cabralism was represented by the various appraisals and applications of, as well as reactions to, Cabral's critical theory by radicals, liberals, and conservatives during the last decade of his life, roughly between 1962 and 1972. Some of the more memorable work at the initial stage of Cabral studies was contributed by Adriano Araújo (1962), Gerard Chaliand (1964, 1967, 1969), William Zartman (1964, 1967), Romano Ledda (1967), Ronald Chilcote (1968), Basil Davidson (1964, 1969),

Justin Vieyra (1965, 1966), David Andelman (1970), Bruno Crimi and Uliano Lucas (1970), Bernard Magubane (1971), Bruno Crimi (1972), and Cruz Pinto (1972), among others.

The second conception of Cabralism was grounded in and grew out of several posthumously published biographical works on Cabral by Anatoliĭ Nikanorov (1973), Oleg Ignatiev (1975a, 1975b), Aquino de Bragança (1976), Arménio Vieira (1976), and Mario de Andrade (1980), among others. Although of varying quality and ideological orientations, each of these works provided the first wave of Cabralists with insight into Cabral's life, intellectual evolution, and unique revolutionary praxis based on the distinct historicity and cultural specificity of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau. In many ways, the critical biographical works on Cabral published in the immediate aftermath of his assassination in January 1973 set the tone for the subsequent stages of Cabral studies by often interweaving his biography with makeshift multidisciplinary discussions of his unique relationships with many of the major theories and political praxes of his epoch: from African nationalism and African socialism to Marxist-Leninism and Third Worldism.

The third conception of Cabralism centers on the significance of Cabral's work for social theory and political praxis, with major contributions being offered by Aijaz Ahmad (1973), Maryinez Hubbard (1973), Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira (1973, 1974), Gerard Chaliand (1973), Yusuf Dadoo (1973), Steve Goldfield (1973), Sulayman Nyang (1975, 1976), Henry Bienen (1977), Jay O'Brien (1977), Carlos Comitini (1980), Patrick Chabal (1980, 1983), Daniel Fogel (1982), Dessalegn Rahmato (1982), Charles McCollester (1973), Jock McCulloch (1983), Basil Davidson (1981, 1984), Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (1984), Rostislav Ulyanovsky (1984), Carlos Lopes (1987, 2010), Oleg Ignatiev (1984, 1990), Ronald Chilcote (1991), Tom Meisenhelder (1993), Mustafah Dhada (1993), Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood (2003), John Fobanjong (2006), Guy Martin (2012), Firoze Manji and Bill Fletcher (2013), and the present author's *Concepts of Cabralism* (2014), among others. These works collectively demonstrate the distinctiveness of Cabral's radical political theory and praxis, while simultaneously intimating the ways in which his work has import for history, geography, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, agricultural science, and military science, among other disciplines.

The fourth conception of Cabralism revolves around the rise of studies treating Cabral's contributions to African literature and what has come to be called the "African Renaissance," with work by Eugene

Perkins (1976), Gerald Moser (1978), Russell Hamilton (1979), Maurice Vambe and Abede Zegeye (2006, 2008), Maurice Vambe (2010), and Monica Rector and Richard Vernon (2012) being among the most noteworthy. From his early interest in the Cabo Verdianidade Movimento, avid reading of *Claridade* and *Certeza*, and affinity with the aesthetics and poetics of both the Negritude Movement and Negrismo Movement, it can be said that—similar to W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, Léon Damas, Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor, and Frantz Fanon—Cabral had a lifelong love affair with what Eugene Perkins (1976) termed the "literature of combat." In his pioneering work, Perkins observed that although often overlooked, "many of the leaders of African liberation movements are, themselves, poets whose works have served as empirical testimonies to the nature of African liberation struggles" (228). For example, he importantly continued:

> Sekou Toure, Amílcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, Marcelino Dos Santos, Agostinho Neto, and even Patrice Lumumba are but a few examples of African liberation leaders who have also gained recognition as poets. Whether or not this correlation of poetic skills and political advocacy is by circumstance or because of some other unexplained relationship, I cannot say. But it is interesting to note that so many African liberation leaders are poets whose dedication to their struggles is reflected by both their words and deeds. (228)

Indeed, Cabral can be situated within *the African liberation leader-poet-politico paradigm*, although most Cabral studies scholars have given little or no attention to Cabral's poetry and poetics. As Gerald Moser asserted in his groundbreaking "The Poet Amílcar Cabral" (1978), "Amílcar Cabral is universally known as the most successful of all the leaders in the African struggles for independence from Portuguese colonial rule during the 1960s and 1970s" (176). However, "only a few persons, who had been his classmates or his close associates in African student groups, knew until recently that this man of action was also a poet."

In 1978, five years after his assassination, Moser published ten of Cabral's poems written between 1945 and 1946. They are, to say the least, breathtakingly beautiful and provide Cabralists with a rare glimpse into the emotional and intellectual landscape of a young Cabral, who was already questioning and becoming increasingly critical of Portuguese colonialism and racism. Consequently, as with almost every other major figure in the Africana tradition of critical theory,

Cabral's critical theory and radical politics are, however loosely, linked to his poetics and broader concern with African aesthetics and culture.

The fifth, and final, stage of Cabral studies consists of engagements with Cabral's thought in the interest of developing Africana studies in general, and Africana philosophy in particular. The purpose of the fifth conception of Cabralism is neither to deify nor demonize Cabral, but instead to dispassionately explore the ways in which his life and legacy contribute to the discursive formations and discursive practices of Africana studies. Major works that fall within the fifth stage include Robert Blackey (1974), Adele Jinadu (1978), Amady Dieng (1978), Yolande Van Eeuwen (1979), Tetteh Kofi (1981), Bert Thomas (1982), Maulana Karenga (1982, 1985), Enoch N'Djock (1983), Américo Moreira (1989), Shubi Ishemo (1993, 2004), Tsenay Serequeberhan (1994, 2000, 2004, 2006), David Birmingham (1995), Olufemi Taiwo (1999), Pablo Idahosa (2004), Amílcar Lopes (2006), Ibrahim Abdullah (2006), Deirdre Meintel (2006), Richard Lobban (2006), John Fobanjong and Thomas Ranuga (2006), Biodun Jeyifo (2007), Charles Peterson (2007), Nicholas Creary (2012), Guy Martin (2012), Firoze Manji and Bill Fletcher (2013), and the present author's aforementioned *Concepts of Cabralism* (2014), among others.

A core characteristic of the works within the fifth stage of Cabral studies is that even in books or articles where Cabral's name is prominent in the title, the overarching intellectual agenda is essentially aimed at contributing to "Africana studies," in the most general, albeit critical, sense of the term. It is, therefore, with this in mind that I openly acknowledge that my conception and articulation of Cabralism or, rather, "Cabralist critical theory" is deeply rooted in and decidedly grows out of the fifth stage of Cabral studies. However, it is doubly distinguished from other engagements of Cabral's thought and texts—that is, the collective work of all five conceptions of Cabralism—in that my conception and articulation of Cabralism is the first to consciously examine his contributions to Africana studies *and* critical theory or, rather, *the Africana tradition of critical theory*. To state it outright: my conception and articulation of Cabralism identifies and analyzes Cabral's contributions to the deconstruction and reconstruction of Africana studies, radical politics, and critical social theory in the interests of the wretched of the earth of the twenty-first century.

In highlighting Cabral's unique "solutions" to the "problems" of racism, colonialism, capitalism, Marxism, Leninism, nationalism, and humanism, I reiterate, *five distinct concepts of Cabralism materialize*,

which enable us to intensely reinterpret the ways in which much of his work remains quite relevant in efforts aimed at relieving the wretchedness of the wretched of the earth of the twenty-first century *and* deconstructing and reconstructing Africana studies, radical politics, and critical social theory in their anti-imperialist interests. In my Cabral studies, then, I understand myself to be in critical dialogue with Cabral, earnestly asking his corpus critical questions and seeking from it crucial answers, which also means that I have made up my mind to work *with* and *through* Cabral in my ongoing quest(s) to search for viable solutions to the ever-increasing problems of racism, colonialism, capitalism, Marxism, Leninism, nationalism, and humanism. My Cabral studies, in short, keeps with Cabral's own predilection for connecting critical theory to revolutionary praxis by utilizing his thought and texts as paradigms and points of departure to deepen and further develop the Africana tradition of critical theory.

What has long bothered me about the five stages of Cabral studies, and one of the main reasons I duly decided to research and write on Cabral, is the long-standing tendency to downplay and diminish Cabral's contributions to Africana studies, or the dimwitted disposition that seems to always and everywhere sever Cabral from Africana studies or, worst of all, the inclination to render Africana studies utterly invisible or altogether nonexistent. Immediately after admitting all of this, however, I want to make it perfectly clear that I do not in any way wish to fall into, or continue, the prickly practice of what the Caribbean American philosopher Lewis Gordon (2006) has correctly called "disciplinary decadence." In his own words:

> *Disciplinary decadence* is the ontologizing or reification of a discipline. In such an attitude, we treat our discipline as though it was never born and has always existed and will never change or, in some cases, die. More than immortal, it is eternal. Yet as something that came into being, it lives, in such an attitude, as a monstrosity, as an instance of a human creation that can never die. Such a perspective brings with it a special fallacy. Its assertion as absolute eventually leads to no room for other disciplinary perspectives, the result of which is the rejection of them for not being one's own. Thus, if one's discipline has foreclosed the question of its scope, all that is left for it is a form of "applied" work. Such work militates against thinking. (4–5, emphasis in original)

What is in question here are the borders and boundaries of disciplinary knowledge and the ways in which many, if not most, academi-

cians have repeatedly and unrepentantly rejected *discipline-transcending* or, rather, *transdisciplinary knowledge*—that is to say, knowledge which *transgresses, transcends*, and *transverses* disciplines or specific fields of scholarly inquiry. This is also, I should add, symptomatic of what we could call *epistemic closure*, where one is only open to, or seriously engages knowledge emanating from, their respective discipline or field and, in the most closed-minded and claustrophobic manner imaginable, xenophobically considers knowledge from "outside" of their discipline or field pure folly, "foreign" foolishness, as it were. Continuing his groundbreaking discourse on disciplinary decadence, Gordon importantly concludes:

> Disciplinary decadence, as we have seen, is the process of critical decay within a field or discipline. In such instances, the proponent ontologizes his or her discipline far beyond its scope. Thus, a decadent scientist criticizes the humanities for not being scientific; a decadent literary scholar criticizes scientists and social scientists for not being literary or textual; a decadent social scientist sins in two directions—by criticizing either the humanities for not being social scientific or social science for not being scientific in accord with, say, physics or biology. And, of course, the decadent historian criticizes all for not being historical; the decadent philosopher criticizes all for not being philosophical. The public dimension of evidence is here subordinated by the discipline or field's functioning, literally, as the world. Thus, although another discipline or field may offer evidence to the contrary, it could, literally, be ignored simply on the basis of not being the point of view of one's discipline or field. (33)

When I register my complaint concerning the fact that many, if not most, of the works of the five stages of Cabral studies have consistently either, at best, overlooked Cabral's contributions to Africana studies or, at worst, rendered his contributions to Africana studies in and of themselves invisible or entirely nonexistent, I am not putting into practice that awful ideology or foul "perspective" that "brings with it a special fallacy" that Gordon touched on above. Quite the contrary, I am pointing to something altogether different, something a little more elusive or subtle that has seemed to slip through the cracks and crevices of the scholarship on Cabral. This, therefore, is not a simple case of "disciplinary decadence," where I incorrigibly argue that "my discipline is better than yours, you ignoramus!" and where I sanctimoniously believe that my discipline is the end-all and be-all or, rather, the definitive "last word" in terms of human studies.

What I wish to do here is circumvent the very tired tendency to read or, rather, misread Cabral in reductive disciplinary terms, where his thought is validated and legitimated only insofar as it can be roguishly reframed and/or forced to fit into the arbitrary and artificial academic confines of this or that decadent discipline. Employing Africana critical theory as *an epistemological, methodological, and praxeological framework*, my Cabral studies seek to consciously avoid a decadent disciplinary approach or, rather, reproach to Cabral in favor of a more philosophically flexible and epistemically open *human scientific* (re)interpretation of his thought and texts in light of the key crises and conundrums confronting the wretched of the earth, radical politics, and critical social theory in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. From the Africana critical theoretical frame of reference, it is foolhardy and completely fallacious to criticize or condemn a theorist because his or her ideas (and/or actions) do not fit nicely and neatly into the, again, arbitrary and artificial academic categories and conceptual confines of one's respective (or, rather, *irrespective*) decadent discipline. Cabral was not simply a "military strategist" or "philosopher" or "revolutionary," but, even more, he was an extremely innovative and complex *organic intellectual activist* whose intellectual history-making dialectical discourse appropriated the wide range of epistemic resources—whether from the social sciences or the humanities, or the life-worlds and life struggles of the wretched of the earth—at his disposal, and these epistemic resources, however unorthodox, became integral parts of his ever-evolving *weapon of theory* and *intellectual arsenal* without any regard whatsoever for the arbitrary and artificial academic and disciplinary borders and boundaries of Europe's insidious ivory towers and the apartheid-like absurdities of the American academy.

It is in this sense, then, that I argue that Cabral can be considered a *transdisciplinary critical social theorist* and that he contributed *the weapon of critical theory* to the Africana tradition of critical theory in particular, and the wider world of critical theory more broadly speaking. Furthermore, it is also in bearing the foregoing in mind that I remind my readers that when viewed from the epistemically open Africana critical theoretical framework, Cabral's thoughts and actions, however "critical" and "radical," are not found to be faultless, and that he, therefore, is not presented throughout my work as the pristine and preeminent critical theorist of the twentieth (or, let it be solemnly said, the twenty-first) century. I honestly believe that what we—that is to say, Africana and other critical theorists—need is to critically return to

Cabral, as opposed to Eurocentric, vulgar Marxist, bourgeois feminist, postmodernist, and postcolonialist interpretations or, rather, often mind-blowing misinterpretations of Cabral's thought and texts.

If racial colonialism continues to be perfectly pathological, sorely sadistic, and viscously violent—as I understand it to be and as I have argued that it is in all of my work—then we need the insurgent intellectual and radical political resources of what remains one of the most profound and provocative critiques and confrontations of not simply racial colonialism, but also of the ways in which racism and colonialism incessantly overlap, interlock, and intersect with capitalism, Marxism, nationalism, Third Worldism, and, even more ironically, humanism—that which acutely occurs throughout the passionate pages of Cabral's *Our People Are Our Mountains*, *Revolution in Guinea*, *Return to the Source*, *Unity and Struggle*, and the present volume. It is for these seemingly forgotten reasons that my Cabral studies not only advocate that authentic Cabralists critically return to Cabral, but that I sincerely seek to accent the fact that many of Cabral's most famous, if not "infamous," theories are more relevant now than they were during his lifetime.

For instance, Cabral's theory of the sociopathological impact of the simultaneous racialization and colonization of the wretched of the earth, his theory of the interconnections and inextricability of colonialism and capitalism, his dialectical theory of cultural racism and cultural imperialism, his theory of the dialectic of revolutionary decolonization and revolutionary re-Africanization, and his theory of the dialectic of revolutionary nationalism and revolutionary humanism are undoubtedly more needed now than ever before, and especially with regard to the dialectical deconstruction and reconstruction of Africana studies, radical politics, and critical social theory in the anti-imperialist interests of the wretched of the earth.[11] In the pages to follow, Wood makes an original contribution to Cabralism by highlighting how Cabral's *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* and "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence" (both translated and published in the present volume) turns Cabralists' attention to heretofore unknown or otherwise unengaged aspects of Cabral's critical theory, namely: 1) his critical genealogy and "dismantling of colonial regimes of historical representation," 2) his critique of religion in both colonial and anticolonial politics, and, lastly, 3) his revolutionary anticolonial *mesology* (a synonym for ecology, which, according to Wood, "signifies the attempt to understand the relations of living things to their environments").

Racial colonial capitalist pathology is not simply, as Jürgen Habermas and the Habermasian critical theorists would have it, "colonization of our life-worlds by the capitalist system," although capitalism is most certainly an important aspect of such a pathology, but it also includes the overlapping, interlocking, and intersecting systems of violence, exploitation, and oppression in the guileful guises of racism and colonialism as well.[12] It is here then, too, that the Africana critical theoretical (re)interpretation of Cabral critically returns to Cabral's thoughts and texts and intensely emphasizes that Africana studies' distinct *transdisciplinary human scientific research methods and modes of analysis* may have or, rather, indeed, do have much to offer the, as of late, frequently stunted field of Cabral studies. In most of my books, especially *Africana Critical Theory*, *Against Epistemic Apartheid*, *Forms of Fanonism*, *Concepts of Cabralism*, and *The Negritude Movement*, I have discussed my conception of Africana studies, and it, therefore, need not be rehearsed here. However, here it will be important to elaborate on how my articulation of Africana studies circumvents the "disciplinary decadence" discussed above.

On a deeper, perhaps, even more discursively dangerous level, I am saying, first and foremost, that Africana studies is not a discipline but, rather, a *transdisciplinary human science* that rejects the rules of the *epistemic apartheid* of the European and European American ivory towers of academia. Secondly, Africana studies, on principle, deems those academics and/or academic disciplines that do not critically dialogue with, or leave "no room for other disciplinary perspectives" or human sciences, the upholders (or, rather, "downpressors," to use Peter Tosh's terse term) of *epistemic apartheid* and extremely intellectually insular academic enterprises that "discipline and punish" (to use Michel Foucault's famous phrase) intellectual insurgency and intellectual innovations in the anti-imperialist interests of the wretched of the earth.[13] And, finally, utilizing its own distinct critical theoretical framework—that is to say, Africana critical theory—Africana studies sidesteps and solemnly challenges the lazy line of illogic that ideologically and/or *a priori* repudiates the intellectual insurgency and intellectual innovations from other disciplines because they are not "one's own" with its unique emphasis on *epistemic openness*, as opposed to *epistemic closure*, which is precisely the issue that Gordon's conception of "disciplinary decadence" identifies, exposes, and, if truth be told, ingeniously elegizes above.

Cabral has been half-heartedly hailed as a philosopher, sociologist, political scientist, African nationalist, Marxist, and military strategist, but never as a transdisciplinary critical social theorist with concrete radical political commitments not simply to eradicating the wretchedness of the wretched of the earth, revolutionary decolonization, and revolutionary democratic socialism, but also to the multicultural masses, transethnic working-classes, and revolutionary humanism. He has been regularly praised and criticized by legions of scholars who have interpreted and rigorously reinterpreted his work, often overlooking its deep critical theoretical dimensions—partly because Africana critical theory does not in each and every instance epistemologically and methodologically mirror Eurocentric (including Frankfurt School) conceptions of critical theory. In fact, Africana critical theory is most often at odds with Eurocentric conceptions of critical theory and, much like Cabral's thought, hinges on a high level of *insurgent intellectual independence* and *uncompromising commitment to the wretched of the earth*. This, of course, is readily apparent in the pages to follow when Wood, in the most full-throated manner imaginable, asserts that Cabral's unique "occupation of so many subject positions—student, diplomat, organic intellectual, poet, agronomist, general secretary, revolutionary, and so forth—gave rise to a critical discourse and praxis that performatively puts into question the limits of white, armchair critical theory."

Consequently, here Cabral's multifarious and ever-evolving critical social theory is situated at the center and examined, à la *Concepts of Cabralism*, for its significance for contemporary Africana studies, radical political thought, and revolutionary social movements. I simply could not agree with Wood more when he strongly stresses that the "flexibility of Cabral's concepts, his translation of the problems and strategies of anticolonial politics between peasants and diplomats, and his connection of other (e.g., Vietnamese and Algerian) anti-imperialist struggles with those of West Africa suggest that one should adopt a similarly malleable theoretical and discursive openness to the critique of society and imperialism while rethinking critical theory alongside Cabral." If nothing else, *Resistance and Decolonization* is a humble, twenty-first-century effort aimed at "rethinking critical theory alongside Cabral."

AFRICAN CRITICAL THEORY: CABRAL'S CRITICAL THEORY OF NATIONAL HISTORY, NATIONAL CULTURE, AND NATIONAL LIBERATION

In order for us to really and truly grasp and grapple with Amílcar Cabral's conception and articulation of critical theory, as well as his innovative contributions to the Africana tradition of critical theory, we must carefully consider: (1) Cabral's critical theory of national history; (2) Cabral's critical theory of national culture; and, finally, (3) Cabral's critical theory of national liberation. That being understood, we should begin our discussion by openly acknowledging and emphasizing that Cabral's concept of culture was inextricable from his understanding of history. History, for Cabral, is the narrative of the "imbalances and conflicts (economic, political and social)" that historically and contemporarily shape and characterize the development of a society. And culture is a series of "dynamic syntheses which have been developed and established" to solve and resolve social and political conflicts at each stage in the evolution of a society. Cabral (1979) emphasized the elasticity and durability of culture even in the face of colonialism: "One of the most serious mistakes, if not the most serious mistake, made by the colonial powers in Africa, may have been to ignore or underestimate the cultural strength of African peoples. This attitude is particularly clear in the case of Portuguese colonial domination" in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, which, he underscored, "was not content with denying absolutely the existence of cultural values of the African and his condition as a social being, but has persisted in forbidding him any kind of political activity" (147–148).

The colonizers confused *repression* with *destruction*. To repress the colonized peoples' culture is not to destroy their culture. It is quite simply, among other things, an attempt to denounce, denude, and degrade the culture of the colonized. But denying something or, even more, distorting something does not destroy it. It merely means that one has chosen, perhaps, to ignore or negatively characterize an actually existing, concrete fact or form or force. However, in response to this conundrum, Cabral contended that the capacity for "cultural resistance" by African (and other racially colonized) people "was not destroyed" (148). On the contrary, "African culture, though repressed, persecuted and betrayed by some social categories [or social classes] who compromised with colonialism, survived all the storms, by taking refuge in the

villages, in the forests, and in the spirit of generations of victims of colonialism" (148).

It was Cabral's impassioned belief that the real potential for anti-colonial revolution, which is to say "national liberation," rested on the ironic fact that the great majority of the racially colonized people, the wretched of the earth, had only marginally been affected, if at all, by colonial culture. Deep in the forests, in the most rural and remote parts of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, the semi-colonized retained and, often, re-created their cultures and reinvented ethnic identities. Cabral asserted that it was these untapped aspects of pre-colonial and traditional culture that should be built on in the interest of developing anti-colonial, cultural, and a new "binational" transethnic consciousness.

The development of consciousness, in Cabral's conceptual universe, is inextricable from ideological development and critical conceptual generation. Cabral—in some senses similar to Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and other European and European American critical theorists—comprehended that just as the ruling race, gender, and/or class produces ideas and theories, which support their oppressing, exploiting, and alienating established (dis)order, racially colonized and dominated groups can and often *do*, as Patricia Hill Collins (1996, 227; 1998, x) relates, produce "alternative" and "oppositional" knowledges and ideologies. For Cabral, as Carlos Lopes (1987) has pointed out,

> ideology was above all knowing what one wanted in one's own particular circumstances . . . ideological strength is built by knowing what must be done in each specific situation. This does not prevent, but rather requires, a drawing on the scientific laws of historical evolution of societies. But one must always be alert to the *concrete reality of the moment*. (57–58, emphasis in original)

This is a point that has direct relevance for the discussion at hand concerning Cabral's contributions to, and the discursive development of, Africana critical theory. First, one of the greatest challenges Cabral presents to Africana critical theory is that it constantly and self-reflexively *concretize*, *historicize*, and *politicize*, as well as attempt to grasp and grapple with the world as it actually exists—that is to say, "always be alert to the *concrete reality of the moment*." Which is also to say, following the best that W. E. B. Du Bois, Léon-Gontran Damas, Angela Davis, Walter Rodney, and bell hooks, among others, offer to radical politics and critical social theory: *contemporary Africana critical theorists must be willing and able to decidedly break with abstract academ-*

ic, disciplinary decadent, epistemically insular, and often almost exclusively European- and European American–derived discourses. If, and I humbly pray *when*, this is done, it is hoped that workers in Africana critical theory will produce critical thought and texts that will prompt and promote critical consciousness-raising and radical political activity that, ultimately, leads to *revolutionary praxis* that will enable us not to simply describe and interpret the world but, in the spirit of Amílcar Cabral, to positively and progressively engage and alter it in the best interests of continental and diasporan Africans and the wider world of the wretched of the earth.

Secondly, Cabral's concept of ideology was concrete and situation-specific. Which is, of course, why he remarked and reminded us: "Marx . . . was not a member of a tribal [read: traditional African or racially colonized African] society" and that, in point of fact, "Marxism is not a religion, and Marx did not write about Africa" (Cabral 1971, 21–22). That being said, Cabral to a certain extent acknowledged that he took Fanon's challenge in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1968) very seriously when he asserted: "Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem. Everything up to and including the very nature of pre-capitalist society, so well explained by Marx must here be thought out again" (40).

Cabral comprehended, as Douglas Kellner (1995) claims the Frankfurt School and other European and European American critical theorists understand, that first and foremost, "there has never been a unitary Marxian theory that has been the basis for socialist [or any other purportedly 'democratic' and/or egalitarian type of] development" (6). Also, Marxist and/or any other so-called "radical" theory must, of necessity, be open to revision and reconstruction as new historical, cultural, social, and political situations and circumstances present themselves to local and global, national and international societies and civilizations. And, finally, Cabral understood—considering the "deficiencies" in and of Marxist theory—that it may very well be that our "new times" (to borrow from Stuart Hall [1996, 223–238]) require not merely revision and reconstruction of "modern" and/or "postmodern" theory, but an altogether "new" critical theory to speak to the special needs of contemporary society and the world of the twenty-first century.

In advocating a "new" critical theory, I essentially have in mind *a contemporary descriptive and proscriptive, dialectical and discerning, praxis-promoting sociopolitical theory* that does not simply chronicle and critique current crises, situations, and circumstances, but acknowl-

edges the necessity of its own internal discursive development, self-critique, and self-correction in light of these novel crises, situations, and circumstances. It is an epistemically and existentially open-ended theory of contemporary society, which sidesteps the intellectual insularity of much of European and European American critical theory (what Wood calls "white, armchair critical theory" in the ensuing essay), and attempts to engage and eradicate our current social ills—say, for instance, racism, sexism, capitalism, colonialism, homophobia/heterosexism, and religious intolerance, among other elements of contemporary imperialism. This "new" critical theory should build on and go beyond not solely European and European American critical theory, but must also, out of exigency, be willing and able to engage the critical theory produced by, and on behalf of, the non-European and non-white world, its organic intellectuals, radical political activists, critical social theorists and, most importantly, its working classes and masses. In somewhat plainer English: the "new" critical theory, which our "new times" demand, should base its descriptions, prescriptions, and proscriptions on *all* available radical and revolutionary sources and, if truth be told, both European *and* non-European traditions of critical theory have much to offer—as does, to reiterate, the non-white working class's and masses' traditions of critical theory, especially as expressed in popular music and popular culture, key aspects of which I have humbly chronicled and critically engaged in *Hip Hop's Inheritance* (2011), *Hip Hop's Amnesia* (2012), and *The Hip Hop Movement* (2013).

As Stuart Hall (1996) has correctly observed, our "new times" make it mandatory that contemporary critical theorists be conscious of changes "out there" *and* "in here" (226). "[O]ut there," meaning, perhaps, "out there" in the jungles of "'post' everything" (224); or, "out there" in the world of white hegemony and (subtle) white supremacy, "ethnic absolutism," and "cultural racism" (468, 442); or, "out there" where "cultural bureaucracies" attempt to administer all aspects of public and private life, as well as human thought and behavior (470). And, by "in here," we are wont to take Hall to mean, "in here" where political boundaries are often blurred, and some critical theorists remain undaunted and bold enough to contest and combat "cultural racism," "cultural hegemony," and "cultural bureaucracies" (468, 470); "in here" where there exist those whose critical theories represent a very real "ethnicization," "feminization," and "sexualization" of radical theory and politics; and, perhaps, "in here" where it is understood that

there can be "no simple 'return' or 'recovery' of the ancestral past which is not re-experienced through categories of the present: no base for creative enunciation in a simple reproduction of traditional forms which are not transformed by the technologies and identities of the present" (448).

Contemporary critical theory should, among other things, get involved in the "debate[s] about how society is changing" and "offer new descriptions and analyses of the social conditions it seeks to transcend and transform" (223). Also, critical theories of contemporary society should, on one hand, hear and solemnly heed Cabral (1979), especially when he asserts: "Experience of the struggle shows how utopian and absurd it is to seek to apply schemes developed by other peoples in the course of their liberation struggle and solutions which they found to the questions [and problems] with which they were or are confronted, without considering local reality (and especially cultural reality)" (151). We must also be cognizant of Cabral's contention that anything that is wont to be labeled "critical" *and* "theory" needs to be an ongoing synthesis, drawing from, and hopefully contributing to, the best of contemporary radical politics *and* radical economics (i.e., "heterodox economics"), as well as critical social theory *and* critical social praxis.

On the other hand, the "new" critical theory should, to a certain extent, acknowledge and advocate with Max Horkheimer and Douglas Kellner that, first, critical theory must "never aim simply at an increase of knowledge as such. Its goal is man's emancipation from slavery" (Horkheimer 1972, 245). And, second, with that understood, contemporary critical theory must come to accept that "classical" and orthodox Marxists and Marxism exaggerated the primacy of class and, in almost every instance, downplayed the salience of race, gender, sexuality, and other cultural and identity issues, areas, and/or arenas. In Kellner's (1995) candid words:

> Clearly, oppression takes place in many more spheres than just the economic and the workplace, so a radical politics of the future should take account of gender and race as well as class. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to ignore the centrality of class and the importance of class politics. But, a radical politics today should be more multicultural, race and gender focused, and broad-based than the original Marxian [and Western European critical] theory. (20)

Cabral contributes to Africana *and* European critical theory in light of the fact that his thought accents and emphasizes the ways in which

national liberation—what Horkheimer above phrased "man's emancipation from slavery"—is predicated on the struggling peoples' understanding that "both in colonialism and in neocolonialism the essential characteristic of imperialist domination remains the same—denial of the historical process of the dominated people, by means of violent usurpation of the freedom of the process of development of the national productive forces" (Cabral 1979, 129–130). It is the "denial of the historical process of the dominated people," in economic, cultural, social, political, and other areas, that validates and legitimates the national liberation struggle. This is because the national liberation struggle is nothing other than the phenomena and process(es) through which a social, political, economic, and cultural group or *nation-class* rejects the denial and derogation of its history and heritage. Recall, it was Cabral who audaciously asserted: "self-determination for all peoples, each people must choose their destiny, [and] take it into their own hands" (63). In other words, "the national liberation of a people is the regaining of the historical personality of that people, it is their return to history through the destruction of the imperialist domination to which they were subjected" (130).

Deconstruction and reconstruction, as I noted in *Africana Critical Theory* (2009) and *The Negritude Movement* (2015), are leitmotifs in Africana philosophical and critical theoretical discourse, and as the famed African American philosopher Lucius Outlaw (1996) observed, considering the "European incursions into Africa" and the subsequent "enslavement and colonization" of African peoples, and the "domination by Europeans of African lands and resources," efforts to fashion an "African"—and I would add "Africana"—philosophy, "pose both deconstructive and reconstructive challenges" (52–53). In my view, Cabral's critical theory of national liberation puts forward such challenges because it is simultaneously *an act of history* and *an act of culture*. With regard to national liberation as a pivotal historical moment, Cabral (1979) stated that the "basis of national liberation, whatever the formulas adopted in international law, is the inalienable right of every people to have their own history; and the aim of national liberation is to regain this right usurped by imperialism, that is to free the process of development of the national productive forces" (130). Concerning national liberation as an act of culture, Cabral understands that imperialist domination, by "denying . . . the dominated people their own historical process, necessarily denies their cultural process" (142). This is so because "every moment of the life of a society (open or closed), culture

is the result, with more or less awakened consciousness, of economic, and political activities, the more or less dynamic expression of the type of relations prevailing within that society, on the one hand, and on the other hand, among individuals, groups of individuals, social strata or classes" (141).

In light of the above, it is important here to critically engage Cabral's extremely elastic concept of culture. Culture, according to Cabral, is "simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history, by the positive or negative influence it exerts on the evolution of relations between man and his environment and among men or human groups within a society, as well as different societies" (141). Imperialism, in the form of racial colonialism, represents—to employ terms used by Cabral to describe this phenomenon—the "paralysis," "stagnation," "regression," "deviation," and "halting" of the dominated people's human agency. In other words, it intentionally blocks their capacity, ontologically speaking, to *become* and make themselves known, to each other and to other human groups, on their own terms and in their own culturally distinct way (128–130).

Tsenay Serequeberhan (1994) has argued that colonialism "petrifies the subjugated culture," and the same may be said of its effect(s) on the dominated groups' history (101). If, therefore, history and culture are understood as Serequeberhan—closely following Cabral's lead—comprehends them, then history and culture can be comprehended as "the actuality of engagements, intellectual (artistic/spiritual) and material, in which a people unveils its existence" (102). History and culture, then, are "always and unconditionally to be understood in the *plural*, as the various modes of being and doing of human existence" (103, emphasis in original). Cabral (1979) consistently emphasized the need to not only acknowledge but also to challenge one-dimensional and racial essentialist interpretations of Africa's histories, cultures, and struggles:

> A profound analysis of cultural reality removes the supposition that there can be continental or racial cultures. This is because, as with history, culture develops in an uneven process, at the level of a continent, a "race" or even a society. The coordinates of culture, like those of any developing phenomenon, vary in space and time, whether they be material (physical) or human (biological and social). The fact of recognizing the existence of common and special traits in the cultures of African peoples, independently of the color of their skin, does not necessarily imply that one and only one culture exists on the continent. In the same way that from the economic and political point of view one

> can note the existence of various Africas, so there are also various African cultures. (149)

When and where history and culture are comprehended in this way—in the *plural* and, as Serequeberhan said, as "the various modes of being and doing of human existence"—then, and perhaps only then, is Cabral's call for a "return to the source" most comprehensible. For Cabral, Africa, which is to say Africa's histories, cultures, and peoples, is much more complex, the cultures more wide-ranging and diverse than previously noted by colonial anthropologists, ethnologists, missionaries, and others, including European-educated (or, rather, European-*miseducated*) Africans and their all-encompassing theories of Africa's ancient and glorious past. This, of course, is not in any way to imply that Africa did not have an ancient and glorious past, but only to emphasize that not everything in Africa's past was paradisiacal and that contemporary Africana critical theorists should employ Cabral's distinct dialectical and historical materialism when approaching Africa's histories, cultures, and struggles. Additionally, Cabral argued—in some senses very similarly to Fanon (1965, 1968, 1969)—that it must always be borne in mind that the national liberation struggle, or any struggle against imperialism, raises consciousness, transforms and brings into being new traditions, and introduces new cultural elements, if not completely new African cultures and values. One of the "new traditions" (i.e., "new," conceptually speaking) that Cabral's radical politics and revolutionary praxis historically and currently contributes to is what I have come to call *the Africana tradition of critical theory* or, more simply, *Africana critical theory*.[14]

CABRAL'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFRICANA CRITICAL THEORY: RADICAL POLITICS AND CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERESTS OF THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As observed above, Amílcar Cabral presents Africana critical theory with several significant challenges, and throughout the course of this introduction, it has been important to accent and amplify the ways in which his lifework necessitates a fundamental rethinking of critical theory in general and, more specifically, the discourse and development of Africana critical theory. Cabral's thought serves as a cue and calls

for a *concrete philosophy*, an *Africana philosophy of praxis*: a historically nuanced, culturally grounded, and politically charged form of critical social theory that speaks to the special needs of continental and diasporan Africans. Eschewing the scholasticism and abstract system-building of the bulk of European- and European American–trained philosophers of African descent, Cabral constantly developed accessible critical theories of the changing conditions of contemporary society; the prospects of Pan-African democratic socialist revolution; revolutionary decolonization; revolutionary re-Africanization; revolutionary nationalism; and revolutionary humanism. He was ever concerned to utilize *theory as a weapon against imperialism*, and to unite it not only with *the emancipatory aspirations* but also with *the actual emancipatory efforts* of the people of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, as well as the other wretched of the earth struggling against imperialism around the globe.

Cabral, also, always admonished intellectual-activists to be critically cognizant of our particular circumstances and situations, but, as revolutionary humanists, to remain open to learning what we can from the lived experiences and experiments (e.g., social, political, and cultural experiments) of others. In his own weighted words:

> The experience of others is highly significant for someone undergoing any experience. The reality of others is highly significant for one's reality. Many folk do not understand this, and grasp their reality with the passion that they are going to invent everything: "I do not want to do the same as others have done, nothing that others have done." This is a sign of ignorance. If we want to do something in reality, we must see who has already done the same, who has done something similar, and who has done something opposite, so that we can learn something from their experience. It is not to copy completely, because every reality has its own questions and its own answers for these questions . . . there are many things which belong to many realities jointly. It is essential that the experience of others benefit us. We must be able to derive from everyone's experience what we can adapt to our conditions, to avoid unnecessary efforts and sacrifices. This is very important. (Cabral 1979, 49–50)

Here, Cabral sets down several of the core characteristics of Cabralism and what it essentially contributes to the Africana tradition of critical theory. In good dialectical fashion, Cabral suggested that we start with our own circumstances and situations, but maintain an *epistemic* and *experiential openness*, and be willing and able to appropriate

and adapt the advances or breakthroughs of others as they pertain to our circumstances and situations, as these advances and breakthroughs could in many instances aid us in avoiding "unnecessary efforts and sacrifices." He firmly warns us "not to copy completely," because our lived reality, that is to say, our concrete conditions and unique historical happenings, are distinct from those of any people in any other age. We are to always remember that "every reality has its own questions and its own answers for these questions."

The above caveat should also be connected to Cabral's earlier discussion of *the plurality of African histories, cultures, and struggles*. Indeed, Cabral and his comrades provided solutions to many problems, crucial answers to several critical questions, but contemporary critical theorists must keep cognizant of the fact that Cabral and his comrades provided solutions to the particular problems they were faced with in their specific historical moment, as they were confronting the conundrums of an extremely particular, if not peculiar, form of racial colonialism: Portuguese colonialism. It should be recalled that Cabral (1972) critically contended: "We, peoples of Africa, who are fighting against Portuguese colonialism, have suffered under very special conditions, because for the past forty years we have been under the domination of a fascist regime" (78). He importantly continued, "Portugal is an economically backward country, in which about 50% of the population is illiterate, a country which you will find at the bottom of all the statistical tables of Europe." Point-blank: "Portugal is a country in no position at all to dominate any other country."

This means, then, that it is equally important for contemporary critical theorists, Africana or otherwise, to bear in mind that however attractive Cabral's thought, no matter how fervently we believe it to speak to the special issues we are confronted with in the twenty-first century, his contributions to critical theory cannot provide us with the concrete and nuanced historico-cultural understandings necessary to develop revolutionary political praxis and revolutionary social movements—which is to say, national *and* international decolonization *and* liberation struggles aimed at altering the novel social and political problems of the present. There simply is no substitute for contemporary critical theorists practicing *conceptual generation* and *intellectual innovation*. There is no problem-solving proxy for our earnest development of *new praxis-promoting theory* geared toward not only gauging but actually changing contemporary societies, bringing into being a new humanity, new societies, and, perhaps even, a new world culture and

civilization grounded in and growing out of various transnational traditions of revolutionary decolonization, revolutionary humanism, critical multiculturalism, democratic socialism, racial justice, gender justice, women's liberation, freedom of sexual orientation, and respect for diverse religious affiliations, among others.

However, even in light of all the critical observations above, I continue to believe that Cabral's theoretic-strategic framework—which is to say, *Cabralism*—is extremely useful for those critical theorists concerned with, not merely colonialism, neocolonialism, and postcolonialism, but also racism, critical race theory, revolutionary nationalism, revolutionary humanism, decolonization, re-Africanization, and the critique of capitalism and class struggles in contemporary society. Cabralism, indeed, does offer critical concepts and innovative analytical categories. It does, in fact, provide a wide range of principles and prospects that make intelligible the constantly changing character of contemporary colonialism, capitalism, and racism. Further, it seems to prophetically prefigure and point to new, untapped types of revolutionary movement, and even goes so far to suggest several distinct directions for future radical politics, critical social theory, and revolutionary praxis.

Cabralism is distinctive in that it audaciously challenges contemporary theorists to actually, ontologically speaking, *be* simultaneously "critical" *and* "theorists," "intellectuals" *and* "activists." It explicitly asks that "critical theorists" embrace the dialectical task of transforming themselves *and* their societies, which, once again, are situated in specific historical moments, with concrete conditions, and particular social and political problems. Corroborating Cabral and, in a sense, updating his thesis that "every reality has its own questions and its own answers for these questions," the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1995) has stated: "Philosophers belonging to a given culture or era or tradition select those concepts or clusters of concepts that, for one reason or another, matter most and that therefore are brought to the fore in their analysis" (7). These "concepts and clusters of concepts" are employed insofar as specific philosophers understand them to offer the most compelling and comprehensive means to alter contemporary societies and, even more, contemporary "souls," following the fundamental thrust of Du Bois's contributions to critical theory.[15] Gyekye (1997) commented further:

> [I]f one were to examine the cultural and historical setting of the intellectual focus, concerns, and direction of the individual thinker, one would be convinced, beyond doubt, that philosophy is a conceptual response to the basic human problems that arise in any given society in a given epoch. Such an examination would reveal that philosophers grapple at the conceptual level with problems and issues of their times, even though this does not mean that the relevance of their ideas, insights, arguments, and conclusions is to be tethered to those times; for, more often than not, the relevance of their insights and arguments—or at least some of them—transcends the confines of their own times and cultures and, thus, can be embraced by other cultures or societies or different generational epochs. In other words, a philosophical doctrine may be historical, that is, generated originally in response to some historical events or circumstances, without our having to look on it as historicistic, without our having to confine its significance simply to those times of history when it was actually produced . . . the fact that the philosophers who produced the ideas and arguments were giving conceptual response and attention to the experiences of their times needs to be stressed and constantly borne in mind: it was the problems of the time that constituted the points of departure for their reflective analyses. (19)

Cabral impels Africana critical theory to consider the concrete conditions of philosophical settings, reminding us that it may be extremely useful to acknowledge and engage the fact that, and the manner in which, philosophy is inextricable from notions of, most especially, "tradition," but also "history" and "heritage" as well. Another Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu (1991), has asserted that "[t]he philosophy of a people is always a tradition," and that a tradition "presupposes a certain minimum of organic relationships among (at least some of) its elements" (92). He goes on to observe: "If a tradition of modern philosophy is to develop and flourish in Africa, there will have to be philosophical interaction and cross-fertilization among contemporary African workers in philosophy" (92).

Inasmuch as it is reputedly a "return" to the history and culture of African peoples, Cabral's critical return to the source(s) suggests in no uncertain terms that Africana critical theory of contemporary society concern itself with the deconstruction of European-derived continental and diasporan African philosophical discourse, and the reconstruction of a radically decolonized and re-Africanized critical theory and revolutionary praxis tradition—that is to say, what I have been referring to as *the Africana tradition of critical theory and revolutionary praxis*.

The deconstruction of European-based continental and diasporan African philosophy presupposes that modern workers in Africana philosophy, and Africana studies in general, have the analytical skills and intellectual tools—not to mention the *intellectual audacity*—to undertake such an endeavor. Furthermore, this endeavor, being nothing less than what has been identified and articulated in all of my work as *Africana critical theory*, must always and at its core—as a critical self-conscious and critical self-reflective effort—be willing and able to critique and correct its own subjective settings, concrete conditions, and insidiously inherited Eurocentric philosophical influences, as well as other imperialist intellectual influences, which in many, if not in most, instances keeps it from *doing* what Gyekye (1997), among others, understands the fundamental tasks of philosophy to be: (1) provide people with "a fundamental system of beliefs to live by;" (2) determine "the nature of human values and how these values can be realized concretely in human societies;" (3) speculate about "the whole range of human experience" by providing "conceptual interpretations and analysis of that experience, necessarily doing so not only by responding to the basic issues and problems generated by that experience but also by suggesting new or alternative ways of thought and action;" and, finally, (4) offer "conceptual responses to the problems posed in any given epoch for a given society or culture" (15, 23, 24, 27).

To speak of an Africana critical theory in the contemporary moment means nothing less than speaking of, and actively engaging in, the critique, appreciation, appropriation, and disruption—if need be—of hitherto "traditional" or, even more, abstract academic and Eurocentric, European-influenced forms of continental and diasporan African philosophy and intellectualism. As Cabral's critical theory suggests, the engagement of any form or field of knowledge should always and ever be not for scholasticism, abstract system-building, or simply nostalgia's sake, but in the interest of real, living, suffering, and struggling women, men, and children—in other words, not knowledge for knowledge's sake, but *knowledge for life and liberation's sake*. Again, Gyekye offers Africana philosophers advice: "philosophical knowledge and insight should benefit the society as a whole, not [merely] the philosophers personally" (18). As philosophers of African descent continue to rescue and rediscover, as well as critically engage and (re)interpret various philosophical systems and traditions, we must be vigilant, remaining consistently conscious of the fact that no matter which form or field of philosophy we feel compelled to engage, it is our solemn duty,

as "philosophers," even more as critical theorists of contemporary society, to do so—in the spirit of Amílcar Cabral—seeking solutions to the enigmatic issues of our epoch, always and ever willing and able to criticize and offer alternatives and correctives to contemporary crises and conundrums.

CONCLUSION: *CABRALISMO CONTINUA! UNIDADE, LUTA, PROGRESSO! ESTA É A NOSSA PÁTRIA BEM AMADA!*

Amílcar Cabral did not initiate the Africana tradition of critical theory, but, as the foregoing demonstrated, he was certainly influenced by it and significantly contributed to it. In summary, then, it must be openly admitted that the theoretical tensions noted in the previous sections point to and produce an extremely uneasy combination of criticisms and interpretations that defy simple synopsis or conventional conceptual rules. Consequently, most of Cabral's critics have heretofore downplayed and diminished the real brilliance and brawn of his work by failing to grasp its antinomies, and they have, therefore, put forward a divided and distorted Cabral, who is *either*, for example, a Pan-Africanist *or* Marxist, an African nationalist *or* revolutionary humanist, and on and on *ad infinitum*. As a matter of fact, even if readers only compare and contrast Wood and the present author's conceptions and articulations of Cabralism in the volume at hand, each of the aforementioned superficial ascriptions are revealed to fall short, shamefully short, of capturing the complex and chameleonic character of Cabral's critical theory and the difficulties involved in interpreting it while employing the one-sided, single-subject theoretical, and monodisciplinary discursive devices that his research, writings, and radicalism consistently transgressed, transcended, and transversed.

Many dismiss Cabral and charge his work with being overly simplistic because it typically employs straightforward language easily understood by the masses. Others, such as Wood and I, are attracted to his work because it is theoretically thick, rich in both radicality and originality, and boldly crosses so many academic, theoretical, and political boundaries. No matter what one's ultimate attitude toward Cabral, I honestly believe that the fact that his thought and texts continue to cause contemporary controversies, and that his ideas have been discussed and debated *across the disciplines* for more than five decades, in

some degree points to the multidimensionality and transdisciplinarity of Cabralism, which offers enigmatic insights for everyone either to embrace enthusiastically or demur definitively. Hence, the dialectic of attraction and repulsion in Cabral studies can partly be attributed to the ambiguities inherent in his—admittedly sprawling—thought and the monodisciplinary anxieties of many of the interpreters (and misinterpreters) of his work. If, indeed, this is the case, then several previous studies of his thought are seriously flawed because they have sought to grasp and grapple with Cabral's oeuvre using monodisciplinary instead of multidisciplinary methods and models.

Whatever the deficiencies of his thought and the problems with his approach(es) to critical issues confronting African and other oppressed people, as any serious reader of *Resistance and Decolonization* will discover, Cabral forces his readers to think deeply, to criticize thoroughly, and to move beyond the imperialist impulses of the established order. Many critics have made solid criticisms of various aspects of Cabral's thought but, when analyzed objectively, his lifework and insurgent intellectual legacy are impressive and awe-inspiring, as is his loyalty to the most radical politics and revolutionary praxes in Africana and world history. His impact and influence have been widespread, not only cutting across academic disciplines, but setting aglow several radical political programs and revolutionary social movements.

Where some theorists dogmatically hold views simply because they are fashionable or politically popular, Cabral's work draws from a diverse array of often eclectic and enigmatic sources and, therefore, offers no closed system or absolute truths. Throughout this introduction, I have desperately attempted to demonstrate that his thought was constantly epistemically open and routinely responsive to changing historical and cultural conditions, especially in Africa and its diaspora. There are several, sometimes stunning, transformations in his critical theory that are in most instances attempts to answer conundrums created by changing sociopolitical, historical, and cultural conditions. In conclusion, then, I would like to suggest that it is the epistemic openness and consistently non-dogmatic radicalism and revolutionary praxis of Cabral's project, the richness and wide range and reach of his ideas, and the absence of any finished system or closed body of clearly defined truths that can be accepted or rejected at ease, which constitute both the contemporary philosophical fascination with, and continuing relevance of, Amílcar Cabral's radical politics, critical social theory, and revolutionary praxis. *Cabral lives and will never die! Cabralism continues!*

Unity, Struggle, Progress! This is Our Beloved Homeland! Cabral viva e nunca vai morrer! Cabralismo continua! Unidade, Luta, Progresso! Esta é a Nossa Pátria Bem Amada!

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NOTES

1. Arguably one of the leading Cabralists, Serequeberhan extends and explicates the thesis that Cabral "represents the zenith" of twentieth-century continental African anticolonial political philosophy in *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy* (1994), and specifically in chapter 4, "The Liberation Struggle: Existence and Historicity" (87–116). Cabral is also a primary preoccupation in his volume entitled *Our Heritage* (2000), and specifically in chapter 6, "The Heritage of the Idea: Violence, Counter-Violence, and the Negated" (59–72). The influence of Serequeberhan on my conception of Cabral's critical theory, and Cabralism more generally speaking, simply cannot be overstated.

2. As I am here only concerned with Cabral insofar as his intellectual life and political legacy are understood to connect with and contribute to the discourse and ongoing development of the Africana tradition of critical theory, I shall forgo a detailed discussion of his biography. Readers seeking more thorough treatments of Cabral's

biography, besides the main sources listed in the text, are also admonished to consult: Chabal (1980, 1983), Comitini (1980), Dadoo (1973), Davidson (1969, 1981, 1984), Fobanjong and Ranuga (2006), Goldfield (1973), Lopes (1987, 2006, 2010), McCulloch (1983), Nikanorov (1973), Rahmato (1982), Sigrist (2010), and Taiwo (1999).

3. Beyond what his texts tell us, primarily Cabral (1979, 70–71, 86, 104), it is important to note that his major biographer, Patrick Chabal (2003, 107, 118), emphasized Cabral's uncompromising commitment to women's liberation, and gender justice more generally. However, even before Chabal, Stephanie Urdang's groundbreaking study *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau* (1979) was arguably the first work to emphasize Cabral's progressive gender politics (see also Urdang 1975, 1978). Along with Urdang and Chabal's work, Horace Campbell's "Revisiting the Theories and Practices of Amílcar Cabral in the Context of the Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of African Liberation" (2006) and Crispina Gomes's "The Women of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in the Struggle for National Independence" (2006) both make significant contributions to our understanding of the ways in which Cabral's gender politics were deeply intertwined with and virtually inextricable from his overarching radical politics and revolutionary praxis.

4. For further discussion of *Claridade* and the Cape Verdean literary renaissance and cultural movement, and for the works which influenced my interpretation here, see Alfama and Laban (2006), Bettencourt and Silva (2010), Brennand (1996), M. Ferreira (1986), Hamilton (1975), Moser (1992), and Rector and Vernon (2012).

5. For further discussion of the Negritude Movement and the Negrismo Movement, and for the works which influenced my interpretation here, see Badiane (2010), Roy-Fèquière (2004), Luis-Brown (2008), and the present author's volume *The Negritude Movement* (2015).

6. For further discussion of the *Certeza* writers in relationship to the Cape Verdean literary renaissance and cultural movement, and for the works which influenced my interpretation here, see Afolabi (2001), Afolabi and Burness (2003), Araujo (1966), Arenas (2011), Batalha (2004), Burness (1981), Chabal (2003), Peres (1997), and Vambe and Zegeye (2006).

7. For further discussion of the ways in which athletic, recreational, and cultural clubs were used in anticolonial efforts in "British" and "French" Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, and for the works which influenced my interpretation here, see Alegi and Bolsmann (2010), Black and Nauright (1998), Darby (2002), and Koonyaditse (2010).

8. For further discussion of Cabral's social and political thought, as well as his conceptions of revolutionary nationalism and revolutionary decolonization, and for the works which influenced my interpretation here, see Abdullah (2006), Bienen (1977), Chilcote (1991), Fobanjong (2006), A. Lopes (2006), C. Lopes (1987, 2010), Magubane (1971), McCollester (1973), McCulloch (1983), Mendy (2006), Nyang (1975, 1976), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2006), Rahmato (1982), Rudebeck (2006), Vambe and Zegeye (2008), and Wick (2006).

9. For further discussion of Antonio Gramsci's life and legacy, especially his conception of the "organic intellectual," and for the works which influenced my interpretation here, see Adamson (1980), Boggs (1976), Fiori (1990), Francese (2009), Germino (1990), Gramsci (1977, 1978, 1985, 1995, 1996, 2000), Holub (1992), and S. J. Jones (2006).

10. Here, then, I should openly acknowledge that this introduction represents a continuation of the deep, discursive dialogue I initiated with Cabral in my aforementioned book, *Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition, from W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral* (2009), which was essentially a critical examination of the theories and praxes of half a dozen carefully chosen major Africana intellectual-activist ancestors. In *Africana Critical Theory*, I endeavored to (re)introduce, chronicle, and analyze several of the significant features of

the Africana tradition of critical theory. Beginning with W. E. B. Du Bois's radical, and later revolutionary, theory and praxis, and then time-traveling and globe-trotting from C. L. R. James to the Negritude Movement to Frantz Fanon, and, finally, concluding with Amílcar Cabral, that volume chronicled and critiqued, revisited and revised the black radical tradition with an eye toward the ways in which classical black radicalism informs or, rather, *should* inform not only contemporary black radicalism but contemporary efforts to create a new *antiracist, antisexist, anticapitalist, anticolonialist, and sexual orientation–sensitive critical theory of contemporary society*, what I have come to call *Africana critical theory*. However, here it is equally important to highlight that *Africana Critical Theory* was the intellectual archaeological aftermath of long, hard, and even, at times, harsh years and years of Du Bois, Fanon, Cabral, Negritude, radical political, and critical theoretical studies, which ultimately yielded: *W. E. B. Du Bois and the Problems of the Twenty-First Century* (2007), *Du Bois's Dialectics: Black Radical Politics and the Reconstruction of Critical Social Theory* (2008), *Against Epistemic Apartheid: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Disciplinary Decadence of Sociology* (2010), *Forms of Fanonism: Frantz Fanon's Critical Theory and the Dialectics of Decolonization* (2010), *Concepts of Cabralism: Amílcar Cabral and Africana Critical Theory* (2014), and *The Negritude Movement: W. E. B. Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and the Evolution of an Insurgent Idea* (2015). In other words, for more than a decade my primary intellectual preoccupation has been to widen the world of ideas of critical theory. Although critical theory has long been associated with the Frankfurt School, and specifically the intellectual lives and legacies of Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Jürgen Habermas, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, I have audaciously endeavored to identify and critically explore the contributions of several other significant critical social theorists, and specifically the insurgent intellectual lives and radical political legacies of black radicals and revolutionaries. It is, therefore, not in any way an overstatement to say that this introduction is part of an ongoing conversation on the Africana tradition of critical theory that I have been intensely involved in for quite a while and intend to continue for the foreseeable future (*Insha'Allah* or, rather, God willing). Here, then, what I endeavor to do is shift the critical dialogue and discourse from Du Bois, Fanon, and the Negritude Movement as the primary critical theoretical points of departure and paradigmatic intellectual-activist ancestors to Cabral and Cabralism as a paradigm and point of departure. As will be witnessed in the works to follow, Cabral's corpus ingeniously points to problems and provides solutions that simultaneously help to (re)establish and continue the Africana tradition of critical theory in ways which are discursively distinct from W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, the Negritude Movement, and Frantz Fanon's pioneering contributions.

11. For further discussion of Cabral's theory of the sociopathological impact of the simultaneous racialization and colonization of the wretched of the earth, his theory of the interconnections and inextricability of colonialism and capitalism, his dialectical theory of cultural racism and cultural imperialism, his theory of the dialectic of revolutionary decolonization and revolutionary re-Africanization, and his theory of the dialectic of revolutionary nationalism and revolutionary humanism, see the present author's aforementioned study, *Concepts of Cabralism*.

12. Habermas (1984, 1987a), as is well known, asserts the "colonization of the lifeworld" within capitalist societies thesis in his much-touted magnum opus, *Theory of Communicative Action*. However, because of the staggering scope of Habermas's critical theory of contemporary society, several of his other works should also be consulted, as they are in many senses inextricable from, and necessary for, an informed understanding of his distinct discourse. Hence, see also Habermas (1975, 1979, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2006, 2009, 2012).

13. For further discussion of my conception of *epistemic apartheid*, see my book *Against Epistemic Apartheid* (2010). Moreover, here I would be remiss not to refer my readers to Peter Tosh's excellent boxed set, *Honorary Citizen: Poet, Philosopher, Preacher, Prophet* (1997), where there is a dictionary of sorts entitled "Words of the Herbalist Verbalist," in which many of Tosh's more colorful terms, such as "downpressor," are defined for the uninitiated (55). Clearly, by "downpressor," Tosh meant *one who oppresses and pushes the poor down to the lowest social, political, and economic level* (see also N. Campbell 1992). With regard to Michel Foucault, I am, of course, referring here to his watershed work, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1979).

14. I advance this essay, then, as a continuation of the Africana Critical Theory (ACT) intellectual archaeology project, which was initiated with my doctoral dissertation, "Africana Critical Theory: From W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James's Discourse on Domination and Liberation to Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral's Dialectics of Decolonization" (2001). My work here obviously builds on *Concepts of Cabralism*, but it is also an outgrowth of my previous contributions to the Africana tradition of critical theory—that is to say, *W. E. B. Du Bois and the Problems of the Twenty-First Century*, *Du Bois's Dialectics*, *Africana Critical Theory*, *Against Epistemic Apartheid*, *Forms of Fanonism*, and *The Negritude Movement*—insofar as with this essay I endeavor to make a contribution to the resuscitation and reconstruction of contemporary critical theory, what has been referred to elsewhere as "new critical theory," which seeks to bring critical class theory (mostly Marxism and/or neo-Marxism) into deep discursive dialogue with critical race theory, feminist theory, queer theory, postmodern theory, postcolonial theory, and postnational theory, among others. Several works, which fall under the rubric of what is currently being called "new critical theory," are already taking up the challenge of making critical theory speak to more than merely European, European American, patriarchal, and heterosexual crises, cultures, and sociopolitical problems. These works lucidly demonstrate that there are many forms and many traditions of critical theory. For further discussion, see Agger (1992, 1993), Arisaka (2001), P. H. Collins (1998, 2000, 2005, 2006), Cornell (2008), Essed and Goldberg (2001), N. Fraser (1989, 1997), Hames-Garcia (2001), L. Harris (1999), Huntington (2001), Jafri (2004), Malpas and Wake (2006), Mendieta (2007), C. W. Mills (2003), Outlaw (2005), Pensky (2005), Pulitano (2003), L. C. Simpson (2003), Wilkerson and Paris (2001), and Willett (2001). *Africana critical theory*, as an ongoing intellectual archaeology project, has, as mentioned above, previously deeply dialogued with Du Bois, Fanon, and Negritude's contributions to the deconstruction and reconstruction of critical theory, but in this instance I endeavor to take an audacious turn toward Cabral's often-overlooked and/or frequently forgotten contributions to Africana studies, radical politics, and critical social theory in my ongoing effort to advance the Africana tradition of critical theory in the anti-imperialist interests of the wretched of the earth of the twenty-first century. Therefore, calmly and coolly, it need be noted at the outset and in agreement with the British political theorist David Held (1980), "[c]ritical theory, it should be emphasized, does *not* form a unity; it does not mean the same thing to all its adherents" (14, emphasis in original). For instance, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1991) employ the term "critical theory" in a general sense in their critique of postmodern theory, stating: "We are using 'critical theory' here in the general sense of critical social and cultural theory and not in the specific sense that refers to the critical theory of society developed by the Frankfurt School" (33). Further, Raymond Morrow (1994) strongly stressed that the term *critical theory* "has its origins in the work of a group of German scholars [of Jewish descent] (collectively referred to as the *Frankfurt School*) in the 1920s who used the term initially (*Kritische Theorie* in German) to designate a specific approach to interpreting Marxist theory. But the term has taken on new meanings in the interim and can be neither exclusively identified with the Marxist tradition from which it has be-

come increasingly distinct nor reserved exclusively for the Frankfurt School, given extensive new variations outside the original German context" (6). Finally, in his study of Marx, Foucault, and Habermas's philosophies of history and contributions to critical theory, Steven Best (1995) uses the term *critical theory* "in the most general sense, designating simply a critical social theory, that is, a social theory critical of present forms of domination, injustice, coercion, and inequality" (xvii). He, therefore, does not "limit the term to refer to only the Frankfurt School" (xvii). This means, then, that the term "critical theory" and the methods, presuppositions, and positions it has come to be associated with in the social sciences and humanities: (1) connotes and continues to exhibit an *epistemic openness* and style of radical cultural criticism that highlights and accents the historical alternatives and emancipatory possibilities of a specific epoch and/or sociocultural condition; (2) is not the exclusive domain of Marxists, neo-Marxists, post-Marxists, feminists, post-feminists, poststructuralists, postmodernists, and/or Habermasians; and, (3) can be radically reinterpreted and redefined to identify and include *classical and contemporary, continental and diasporan African radical/revolutionary praxis-promoting social theory*. For a few of the more noteworthy histories of the Frankfurt School and their philosophical projects and various sociopolitical programs which have been informative here, please see Bottomore (1984, 2002), Dubiel (1985), Freundlieb, Hudson and Rundell (2004), Friedman (1981), Geuss (1981), Ingram (1990), Jay (1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1996), Kellner (1989), Kohlenbach and Geuss (2005), Marcus and Tar (1984), T. McCarthy (1991), McCarthy and Hoy (1994), Nealon and Irr (2002), Rasmussen (1996), Rasmussen and Swindal (2002, 2004), Slater (1977), Stirk (2000), Therborn (1996), Wellmer (1974), and Wiggerhaus (1995).

15. For further discussion of W. E. B. Du Bois's contributions to critical theory in general, and the Africana tradition of critical theory in particular, see the present author's *W. E. B. Du Bois and the Problems of the Twenty-First Century* (2007), *Du Bois's Dialectics: Black Radical Politics and the Reconstruction of Critical Social Theory* (2008), *Against Epistemic Apartheid: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Disciplinary Decadence of Sociology* (2010), and *W. E. B. Du Bois: A Critical Reader* (2010).

Chapter Two

Imbrications of Coloniality

An Introduction to Cabralist Critical Theory in Relation to Contemporary Struggles

Dan Wood

> To those who view this as being theoretical, we would recall that every practice gives birth to a theory. If it is true that a revolution can fail, even though it is nurtured on perfectly conceived theories, nobody has yet successfully practised Revolution without a revolutionary theory.
>
> —Amílcar Cabral, Havana 1966[1]

The translated speeches of Amílcar Cabral in the present volume prove fascinating, important, and timely for a variety of reasons. First, they provide insight not only into the thoughts of one of Africa's most profound revolutionaries, but they also offer a unique foray into African anticolonial politics more generally. The speeches are significant for any study of the histories of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, for concrete critical analyses of African anti-imperialism, and for the study of political and social revolutions in the twentieth century. Secondly, Cabral offers a wealth of resources for critical-theoretical thinking and praxis. This is not only because he played a leading role in the formation of the PAIGC (The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) and the organization of Guinea and Cape Verde's binationalist decolonial revolution, but also because he reflected on this revolutionary process with others at home and around the world. His occupation of so many subject positions—student, diplo-

mat, organic intellectual, poet, agronomist, general secretary, revolutionary, and so forth[2] —gave rise to a critical discourse and praxis that performatively puts into question the limits of white, armchair critical theory. Cabral's directives found in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, translated here for the first time, along with "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence," afford students and specialists of African politics, advocates of contemporary anti-racist struggles, and anti-imperialist activists with the critical thoughts of a revolutionary who perspicaciously understood and successfully directed a mass political program around such issues. Since a number of masterful histories and analyses of decolonization in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde already exist, I will instead briefly locate both of these texts historically and politically, and then take up a variety of critical-theoretical themes that can be gleaned from Cabral's thought, but that have not received sufficient attention. Specifically, I bring into relief Cabral's configuration of history, his critique of religion, and his environmental concerns as only three avenues for understanding and further developing anticolonial theory. But the translated texts in this volume suggest alternative possibilities for reinventing critical theory not touched on in this introduction. The reflections below will be necessarily brief and experimental, but I introduce Cabral's thought this way—whether to students, specialists, or activists—with the intuition that the polyphony of these works can open on to wider audiences and thereby encourage further attempts to rethink contemporary (Africana) critical theory and praxis.[3]

HISTORICALLY SITUATING *ANALYSIS OF A FEW TYPES OF RESISTANCE* AND "THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE"

Cabral delivered the directives collected in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* in November 1969, a little over a decade after the Pidjiguiti docks massacre in Bissau. On 2 and 3 August 1959, workers went on strike over wages, and, in retaliation, the Portuguese colonial police killed at least fifty people and wounded even more.[4] The massacre marked the initial shift in PAIGC strategy away from peaceful protest and union organization to a vanguardist mobilization of the peasant masses, with recently decolonized Conakry to the south as their primary hub. While the persuasion and mobilization of various ethnic groups in Guinea's interior proved to be a substantial challenge, by late

1962–63 rural peasants (especially the Balantas) began to join the PAIGC in large numbers. By January 1963, the PAIGC had acquired a sufficient number of supporters, arms, and training to form the first guerilla units in rural Guinea.[5]

The first six years into the PAIGC's armed, binationalist, anti-imperialist, and revolutionary struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea were years of trial and error, successes and failures, and discoveries of unanticipated strengths and weaknesses. Between 1963 and 1969, the PAIGC had begun to grow in numbers, had garnered support through a policy of non-alignment from a wide range of actors, such as the USSR, Sweden, Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, China, and others, had begun to free and maintain control over liberated areas in the south and east of Guinea, and had also more effectively reorganized intra-Party chains of command in order to significantly quell mountaintopism, opportunism, witch hunts, inter-tribal conflicts, and abuses of the local populations.[6] But as Cabral himself frequently points out, no struggle exists without concomitant failure: losses, setbacks, and mishaps are simply part of what it means for something to be considered a struggle. According to Cabral, such setbacks in the protracted revolutionary war included carelessness, magical interpretations of reality, careerism, idleness, and so forth. These included only some of the internal difficulties that he addresses in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, but such problems are of course also compounded by the exogenous difficulties wrought by Portuguese colonialist oppression and crimes against humanity throughout this era.

At the time of Cabral's delivery of *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, Portuguese counter-revolutionary efforts were led by António de Spínola, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Guinea from 1968–1972.[7] Having led a Portuguese force under Franco during the Spanish Civil War and having operated as an observer for the Nazis on the Leningrad front, Spínola now commanded troops in West Africa under the auspices of the Salazarist authoritarian dictatorship in Portugal. This résumé, along with the napalm bombing of hospitals, schools, and granaries, the systematic destruction of refugee camps, and the annihilation of areas cleared by the PAIGC for crop diversification made this "erect and monocled" Governor-General into a near-caricature of the archetypical colonialist.[8] Cabral's directives should be read in the context of Spínola's various counter-revolutionary tactics—whether of intrigue or carpet-bombing—and the PAIGC's forceful resistance to and countering of such ruination. Nevertheless, as *Analysis*

of a Few Types of Resistance demonstrates, Cabral has both larger and smaller problems than a mere tête-à-tête with this roaming steward of fascist warfare. Larger: he rethinks the dialectical role of culture, class, and identity in anti-imperialist politics generally, and continues to create a stronger juridical personality and legitimacy for the PAIGC around the world. And smaller: he manages the day-to-day obstacles confronting the organization of a revolution for binational liberation and the messy banalities that accompany such governance.[9]

As lectures delivered to the Party's cadres, *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* serves didactic, corrective, organizational, and motivational ends. Historian Mustafah Dhada correctly notes that these seldom-examined directives can be understood as helping Cabral "and his movement tackle internal dissent and external challenges related to the armed struggle against Portugal."[10] If some have read the 1966 speech in Havana, "Presuppositions and objectives of national liberation in relation to social structure," as Cabral's analysis of the PAIGC's struggle by means of a critical engagement with Marxism-Leninism, then one might read *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* as in part influenced by Tru'ò'ng Chinh. First of all, we know that Chinh's *The Resistance Will Win* (*La Résistance Vaincra*) existed in Guinea during the revolution and so was almost certainly read by Cabral, which would also explain the various analogies made in the directives between Guinean and Vietnamese anti-imperialist struggles.[11] Secondly, the thematic structure of the directives homologously mirrors portions of Chinh's text—namely, chapters V–VIII: "Resistance in the Military Field," "Resistance in the Political Field," "Resistance in the Economic Field," and "Resistance in the Cultural Field." Cabral not only draws on the form of part of Chinh's text, but also from its content. In so many words, he adopts and redeploys (with the necessary local adjustments and concrete analyses) some of Chinh's holistic formulations, for instance, that "The resistance of our people must be carried out in every field: military, economic, political and cultural."[12] Cabral makes use of Chinh's work (written during the Vietnamese struggle against the French in 1947) to understand Guinea's struggle, and he is also no doubt thinking of Vietnam's Resistance War against the United States in the late 1960s. In this sense Cabral triangulates the past and present anti-imperialist struggles of the Vietnamese—however cursorily—in an attempt to learn from the strengths and weaknesses of these struggles.

In terms even broader than the Party's general watchwords (*palavras gerais*), the four corners of resistance that Cabral analyzes—political, economic, cultural, and armed—outline and reinforce PAIGC strategy in 1969. For Cabral, resistance includes *but cannot be limited to* resilience in the face of colonial oppression. Contrary to the occasional connotation of the term in various contemporary discourses, "resistance" for Cabral does not only consist of the reactionary, pacific, or reformist management of monopoly capitalist and imperialist forces. Instead, various cultural practices of resistance are incorporated within and understood alongside the process of revolutionary decolonization as a whole, which also includes aspects of armed, economic, and political resistance. In this sense, Cabral and the PAIGC's project of revolutionary decolonization is markedly different from the projects of those who would see the formation of practices of cultural resistance alone as sufficient for radical political transformation. The four corners of Cabral's "square of resistance" are inseparable and must be oriented so as to be mutually reinforcing. This is why he does not *only* set up a system of barter and ban the use of Portuguese currency, *only* encourage the establishment of schools and the continuation of forms of dancing, singing, and dress, *only* criticize opportunism and mountaintopism in the armed struggle, or *only* take seriously the need to create revolutionary democratic practices for the sake of future postcolonial governmental accountability.[13] Rather, the revolutionary decolonial struggle requires all of these. And, given shifts in perspective and the complexity and struggles of the postcolonial land to come, each can be considered fundamental (equiprimordial, one might say) from a given vantage point. Economic resistance proves fundamental insofar as Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde could not survive without continually developing the agricultural and productive forces necessary to meet these territories' basic needs. Cultural resistance proves fundamental insofar as a decolonial revolution must draw from local cultural resources to forge a new (national) consciousness, and since a society without a unique, living and breathing culture would not be worth inhabiting. Political resistance is fundamental since it is through political action that Guinea and Cape Verde will be liberated and their independence recognized in the international sphere. And armed resistance is fundamental insofar as the other forms of resistance prove insufficient to reorder the material forces that constitute the struggle between the relevant realities in motion. While these four corners of resistance are often explained in terms of one another, each considered separately constitutes a neces-

sary but insufficient condition for a truly liberating decolonial revolution. And when these aspects conflict with one another, the people should work with party leadership in order to determine how best to proceed.

Cabral later pens "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence" for a different audience, and with special yet contiguous concerns in mind regarding the struggle. The text was written for a UNESCO Meeting of Experts on the Notions of Race, Identity, and Dignity (Paris, 3–7 July 1972) and delivered *in absentia*. In less than seven months' time, an internal conspirator, Inocencio Kani, with the backing and support of PIDE (Portugal's secret police) would assassinate Cabral in Conakry. Thus, this speech represents the late Cabral's attempt to grapple with and synthesize his thoughts on culture, liberation, and anti-imperialist struggles after nearly a decade of protracted struggle. While he intentionally chose to speak simply, clearly, and directly to the illiterate peasant backbone of the local struggle, Cabral's speeches often analyze and generalize larger issues from out of Guinea and Cape Verde's concrete realities. In this way a comparison of the two texts of this volume brings to the fore this revolutionary's ability to both address the concrete concerns of the struggle on the ground and also to reflectively translate these political concerns for an international audience.[14]

Cabral packs quite a number of profound theses into this relatively short piece. To begin, he argues that the adequate grassroots study and comprehension of a culture's effect on and role within revolutionary social change is an epistemic accomplishment of such struggles themselves. Local struggles achieve the articulation of this epistemic linkage between culture and anti-imperialist politics from within the anticolonial context itself. Not only do colonialist empirical and social sciences fail to understand such real, economic, and sociopolitical processes, but even many diasporic elites and petit bourgeois intellectuals misunderstand the role of culture in the struggle for independence. Cabral argues that local cultures do not undergo a sudden renaissance or performative-anachronistic leap back to a pristine origin during decolonization. Even if this cultural return were possible, as only one element of the four corners of the "square of resistance," attempts at such a return would prove politically inept. He writes, "a return to one's origins is not, nor can it be, in itself an *act of struggle* against foreign domination (colonial and/or racist), nor does it necessarily mean a return to traditions."[15] Instead, cultures adapt and persist over time despite colonialist

oppression and enforced stagnation, and colonized cultures have been a constant source of more or less adequate resistance to this domination. The desire by some petit bourgeois elites to return to some original, cultural source only marks, at best, a first negative moment in the dialectic of revolutionary mobilization. And this first negation proves insufficient insofar as it fails to break with and surpass the underlying contradiction of colonialism. This contradiction consists, on one hand, of the white supremacist preservation of autochthonous identities in order to racially divide the rulers from the ruled and, on other the other hand, of the destruction of these same autochthonous identities, social structures, and cultures in order to accumulate raw materials and surplus value.[16]

Any form of anticolonial politics that does not set for itself the overcoming of this basic contradiction leaves it intact—with all of its constitutive and exploitative policies, presuppositions, self-justifications, and delusions. The overcoming of this colonialist contradiction requires the detailed analysis and revolutionary reinvigoration of oppressed cultures—and in the context of national liberation, the unification of these local countercultures occurs through the development of a national consciousness under the direction of a political party. Cabral postulates, "culture is the dynamic synthesis of the material and intellectual reality of society and expresses relations both between man and nature as well as between different groups of men within the same society." But culture does not only relate to national liberation as a mere instrumental precondition. Culture contributes essentially to the liberation struggle, yet the liberation struggle is not only a cultural fact but a factor of culture as well.[17] This means that there exists a reciprocal and nonlinear relation between culture and revolution: cultures must be understood and organized to effectively orient revolutions, yet revolutions themselves alter the dynamic syntheses of material and intellectual realities as expressed by relations between societal groups and nature. This is why one should not be surprised at the porosity of Cabral's notions of armed and cultural resistance as expressed in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*. Armed resistance and cultural resistance are fluid categories precisely because they reflect the plasticity of these social realities: to take up arms is also a form of cultural resistance, a cultural expression.

The flexibility of Cabral's concepts, his translation of the problems and strategies of anticolonial politics between peasants and diplomats, and his connection of other (e.g., Vietnamese and Algerian) anti-impe-

rialist struggles with those of West Africa suggest that one should adopt a similarly malleable theoretical and discursive openness to the critique of society and imperialism while rethinking critical theory alongside Cabral. As Basil Davidson wrote while traveling through Guinea with Cabral, avoiding the NATO-sponsored napalm bombs of Portuguese counter-revolutionary aeropolitics, "But there are also certain ways in which Guiné may be more than interesting in itself, may be microcosmic in meaning—a paradigm of the African situation in the late 1960s: a place not only worth observing for itself but also worth learning from."[18] The speeches in this volume prove to be worth learning from, I contend, for even more than reasons of sheer historical interest. Each text can be reflected upon for the sake of reimagining critical theory outside of the canonical borders by which it often delimits its own terrain. To this end, in the next sections I briefly consider a number of ways in which Cabral assists us in rethinking 1) critical genealogy and the dismantling of colonial regimes of historical representation, 2) the critique of religion in (anti)colonial politics, and 3) revolutionary anticolonial mesology. After this, I will offer suggestions for ways to understand how these facets of Cabralist critical theory overlap with twenty-first-century anti-imperialist political concerns.

CRITICAL GENEALOGY AND THE DISMANTLING OF COLONIAL REGIMES OF HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION

In *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, Cabral configures a critical genealogy of Guinea and Cape Verde's struggle for liberation. This critical genealogy includes historical-material explanations of Portuguese exploration, the beginning and end of the transatlantic slave trade, the historical relation of the PAIGC's struggle to those of other nations, and so forth. But the affirmative aspect of Cabral's account of the anticolonial struggle diverges both from some versions of Marxist-Leninist historical materialism as well as conservative colonial histories of public right. Let us first consider his critical engagement with Marxism-Leninism, which, theoretically speaking, opens up a space to reconfigure local histories in alternative anti-imperialist directions.

In his speech in Havana in 1966, "Presuppositions and objectives of national liberation in relation to social structure," Cabral—thinking of the classless and stateless histories of a variety of African peoples—

tacitly challenges the opening line of the first section of the *Communist Manifesto*:

> [D]oes history begin only from the moment of the launching of the phenomenon of class and, consequently, of class struggle? To reply in the affirmative would be to place outside history the whole period of life of human groups from the discovery of hunting, and later of nomadic and sedentary agriculture, to cattle raising and to the private appropriation of land. It would also be to consider—and this we refuse to accept—that various human groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America were living without history or outside history at the moment when they were subjected to the yoke of imperialism.[19]

World history, then, does not follow the wake of class struggle, nor do peoples become historical by means of European imperialism. On the contrary, Cabral argues that imperialism causes a stagnation, paralysis, and at times regression of local histories.[20] In other words, certain aspects of colonized spacetime—such as productive forces and cultures—slow down, are paralyzed, and stagnate when shoved within the inertial frame of colonialist or imperialist spacetime. The accelerated productive forces imposed by imperialism for the sake of mass extraction and the concomitant imposition of colonialist regimes of historical representation results in the objective slowing down of local productive forces, cultures, and histories. Colonialism does not bring a singular world history to non-historical beings, but stifles and suppresses a plurality of already-existent histories.[21]

But Cabral's decolonization of imperial notions of history goes beyond mere delegitimation and negative critique. For instance, in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, he reassesses the historical and symbolically charged figure of Honório Barreto, a black nineteenth-century governor of Guinea. To understand the significance of Cabral's counter-history, let us first consider an instance of the symbolic function of Barreto in the context of Portuguese imperialist historical narratives around the same time. In 1953, Brigadier Luis Monteiro Nunes da Ponte presented his historical essay *Honório Pereira Barreto: Heróica Governador Negro da Guiné* to the Society of Geography in Lisbon. The brigadier's history—which will come as no surprise to those who study similar texts—simultaneously combines various discursive registers: colonial geography, anecdotes of adventurous travels through Africa, constant praise for the bravery of former colonialists, lionization of fellow military commanders, and grandiloquent notions of imperial

duty and right. Referring to an 1843 text of Barreto, Ponte praises him for recognizing the real, progressive potential of Guinea, namely, the natural resources to be taken advantage of in the Portuguese "pacification" of Senagambia.[22] The author describes Barreto as understanding the belligerent temperament (*índole aguerrida*) of the local peoples, a knowledge that he uses in the dedicated and steadfast service of the nation (Portugal). For Ponte, Barreto embodies a true African and Portuguese hero who effectively draws up advantageous contracts and deals with the "serious financial crisis and economic perturbations" that occurred because of the unfortunate end of the slave trade by getting a number of Portuguese businesses to establish themselves in Bissau. Ponte continues, "So, we are united in the leading figure of Honório Barreto, who personifies the strength of colored men in the foundation of the Overseas Empire, and the greatest exponent of his civilizing action—the theory of the strength of all natives in the assistance of Portuguese colonization, and we pay him significant homage."[23] Barreto, then, comes to symbolize the ideal *assimilado*. His elevation alongside white, Portuguese colonialists functions as a narrative in service of the denial of the structural racism and chauvinism fundamental to all modern European imperial projects. In this imperialist story, Barreto really only operates as a semiotic screen by means of which Ponte and others conceal the basic structural racism of the imperialist architecture within which they serve as agential support-beams.

Among his many other historical considerations, Cabral reassesses the figure of Honório Barreto, recalling reading that he had done in archives in Lisbon. His reassessment in part configures a binationalist critical genealogy of familial and sociopolitical histories in connection to the contemporary anticolonial struggle. His narrative constitutes neither a mere glorification of an African hero (Barreto lamentably cooperated with the colonizers) nor a petit bourgeois "return to the origins" that would serve to account for all of the evils of colonialist practices of assimilation (Cabral calls for a qualified respect for this "man of valor" given his cultural circumstances). He does not idolize Barreto and reminds his listeners that Barreto's "advantageous contracts" eventually were to become injuriously disadvantageous for all of the local indigenous populations—a point that Ponte happens to leave out. Cabral attempts to ascribe a different symbolic function to this colonialist "forefather" in which geo-cultural ambiguities are brought to the fore—ambiguities, however, which nevertheless are not meant to undermine the PAIGC's struggle for internal coherence. The figure of Barreto here

mirrors the identities of Cabral and the PAIGC leadership, who also do not fit without remainder into the imagined communities of Guinea, Cape Verde, or Portugal. The parallels between Barreto and Cabral are suggestive: both, for all of their enormous differences, were born of Guinean mothers and Cape Verdean fathers, lived in Guinea and Cape Verde, and travelled to Portugal to study, eventually returning to Africa. But the history presented in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* can be understood as undoing Barreto's role as a historical symbol of colonial right. Cabral's alternative rendering challenges Barreto's symbolic function as the assimilationist ideal imposed by the militarist racism of official Portuguese regimes of historical representation, as exemplified by Ponte's text.

Could we say that, even if somewhat subconsciously, Cabral's narrative highlights historical continuities concerning mixtures of Guinean, Cape Verdean, and Portuguese histories and identities in order to both link the Cape Verdean and Guinean elements of the PAIGC while simultaneously assuaging nascent, internal binationalist conflicts?[24] This would be in line with Cabral's practical disposition and would also make sense of his extended discussions of history while delivering directives on armed resistance. In any event, Cabral understands that empires tend to consume at ever-increasing rates. And, in the Portuguese case as well as those of other modern empires, this includes the consumption and domestication of Africana history in order to produce imperial histories that are in turn consumed by imperial citizens and subjects. Cabral's concise counter-history of Barreto's life, in other words, functions as one element of his larger critique of and revolutionary struggle against the imperialist assimilation of Africana histories—the latter comprising a set of dispersed human temporalities and the cultural expression/recording of these temporalities. While he retains a broad sense of the historical-material forces at work in the histories of imperialism and anti-imperialism, Cabral's rejection of Eurocentric diffusionism and the proprietary claims that accompany such histories—whether of the left or right—intimate a way in which history and anti-colonial politics might successfully overlap.

A PRAGMATIC SOCIALIST CRITIQUE OF RELIGION

Not unlike Fanon's critique of traditional religious authorities and the problems they multiply,[25] Cabral time and again criticizes religion and

religious authorities (whether of the colonizer or colonized) in Guinea's revolutionary decolonial context. One can contrast this position to other forms of resistance in African history that incorporated aspects of religion for political ends. For example, the Ndebele and Shona resisted European colonization on behalf of spirits and Mwari (God). The leadership of the Maji Maji uprisings against the Germans in Tanganyika considered themselves to be spokesmen of spirits and acted accordingly. A variety of "Ethiopianist" Christian movements in Africa were also predicated on various prophecies. And in the 1964 rebellions led by Pierre Mulele in the Congo, his rural followers believed that charms and spells were sufficient to protect themselves from bullets, to disastrous ends.[26] Cabral rejects such an approach to resistance for the pragmatic reasons that these and similar beliefs prove contrary to the macro- and micro-strategies of the struggle and to good sense.[27] Such beliefs lead to a carelessness with one's own life and those of others while simultaneously inhibiting a sufficiently adequate knowledge of the natural world. Cabral and the PAIGC do not suppress religious beliefs, but discourage them to the extent that they hinder the resistance.

On one hand, Cabral's critique of religion takes local practices as its object. In *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* he discusses the need to overcome the dread of the "wide eyes of the sorcerers in our land" and to dispel the "magical interpretation of reality."[28] Knowledgeable of the local political economy of otherworldly hope and fear in Guinea and Cape Verde, Cabral intervenes in these directives in order to reinforce the *de facto* powerlessness of amulets, curses, sorcerers, spirits, and charms such as animal horns. He does this by recalling humorous anecdotes, by explaining thunderstorms in terms of science, and by contextualizing African religious practices in the context of other religious practices around the world and throughout history. Cabral advances such explanations in order both to counteract religious leaders' claims to legitimate political authority (which often conflict with that of the PAIGC and the well-being of the populace) and also to encourage the study of modern science for democratically self-determined and developmental purposes after independence. The directives collected in this volume demonstrate Cabral's mounting frustration in regard to these matters: "Animal horns don't do anything. But as much as I yell today no one hears me—I don't believe you all. That's why I'm not going to go to the trouble of fighting you on this."[29] At the end of the

day, he attempts to deal with these micro-struggles pedagogically and through persuasion rather than via hard power.

On the other hand, Cabral's critique of religion has Portuguese colonial Catholicism as its object. Portuguese colonialists, as was common among other European colonial powers, attempted to convert local peoples through a host of evangelizing tactics and techniques. While discussing material to be taught in local schools, Cabral recalls,

> At school in my time they taught the birth of Jesus Christ, that the Virgin Mary had a baby while remaining a virgin, and I even respected that, and even seemed to understand it in that time. They taught the miracle of the ascension in the books espoused at that time, miracles like the miracle of roses and whatnot. If in that time they taught miracles to children, why can we not teach our land's greatest miracle—that men and women reunited to mobilize our people for struggle, to put an end to suffering, to misery, to wretchedness, to blows, kicks, forced labor, etc.? Who isn't capable of understanding that? Any little kid is capable of understanding that.[30]

Here Cabral criticizes Portuguese colonial Catholicism as equally inimical to overcoming magical interpretations of reality. Within this context, he uses the term "miracle" in order to pivot between past forms of colonial-ideological pedagogy and the new forms of education being instituted in Guinea's forests, arguing for the need for Guineans and Cape Verdeans to teach one another about the history of the PAIGC and about the basics of the natural sciences. Such instruction, in turn, forms part of a larger project of overcoming inferiority and superiority complexes in the colonial political economy of affective life.[31] Cabral, then, should not be understood as advocating a crude "scientific socialism," if by this one understands the application of Marxist theory as a universal science to African realities combined with bans on religious expression. Rather, he articulates a revolutionary socialism that encourages taking the natural and social sciences seriously in order to understand the complexities of reality, to promote material and intellectual progression, and to provide for the populations' needs after independence. In other words, he attempts to phronetically balance an effective critique of religion with a qualified respect for religious expressions insofar as the latter form part of repressed local cultures.

Cabral does not hold a naïve belief in the potential of forms of religion to effectively resist the continued onslaught of colonial domination. Rather, he names the numerous pragmatic, immediate, and epis-

temic hindrances of religious beliefs and practices to the organization, mobilization, and success of the revolution. This is not an importation of "secularism," but a concrete response to the struggle's actual, recurrent problems. His on-the-ground world-historical contextualization and critique of the colonizing and colonized magical interpretations of reality provides examples of the real pitfalls of spiritual worldviews. One might contrast this to more romantic assessments of resistance in various other critical theories, whether concerning political spirituality, liberation theology, or considerations of divine beings as agents within colonial/anticolonial histories.[32] *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* challenges the status quo of certain cultural and postcolonial studies insofar as it rejects these latter alternatives as viable or formidable means of effective and long-term political transformation and decolonization. In this way, Cabral's work can be read as in part rehabilitating a pragmatic socialist critique of religion in the context of twentieth-century anticolonial politics. And the breadth of his critique evinces one of critical theory's basic working assumptions: there is nothing so sacrosanct that it avoids critical evaluation and possibly even outright contestation—no master, no god, no tradition. The efficacy of Cabral's revolutionary practice (Guinea and Cape Verde are in fact liberated after centuries of Portuguese misrule) challenges those who study anticolonial politics, decolonization, coloniality, and postcolonialism to question the practicality and reliability of romantic and/or theological visions of social, political, and economic transformation.

REVOLUTIONARY ANTICOLONIAL MESOLOGY

In his agronomic article "Acerca da Utilização da Terra na África Negra," Cabral finds it necessary to explain the historical-political factors of colonialism in Africa in order to grasp and contextualize its agricultural challenges. In sync with his other writings on culture, he argues that European colonialism introduced an economy of extraction into the agricultural practices of Africa with unsustainable, destructive effects. This imposition, which did not completely do away with the itinerant cultivation of the land, introduced novel contradictions and new needs in an unfamiliar environment where Europeans failed to attend to Africa's different mesological conditions ("*sem atender à diferença das condições mesológicas*"). Mesology—a synonym for ecology—signifies the attempt to understand the relations of living things to their

environments. The term, however, also at one time meant the study of ways of attaining happiness. Etymologically, mesology refers to a discourse concerning mediality and the betweenness of things, and its historical double signification in regard to ecological and eudemonic matters helps to best characterize Cabral's political thought. The peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde found themselves amidst situations of colonial oppression, in the middle of certain dire ecological circumstances, and suffering because of these contrived and alienating contexts. Cabral responds to each of these aspects of colonialism, and one can group the facets of his anticolonial political project under the concept of "mesology" in its multiple senses: 1) his praxis involves the decolonization of adverse environmental conditions imposed on various forms of human and non-human life, 2) his thought always attempts to understand and situate realities as these exist in relations of resistance between one another in the middle of larger milieus, and 3) his revolutionary project seeks the complete rearrangement of these relations and milieus in order to undermine the continued colonial production of negative affects, that is, to change structures and environments in order to create more significant opportunities for happiness.[33]

While a number of scholars have aptly noted the unique connection between Cabral's political thought and agriculture or "the land,"[34] I want to venture a related but stronger suggestion: Cabral knew the soil, plants, natural environment, and agricultural problems of the sites from which he and the PAIGC mobilized revolution in more depth than any other revolutionaries in recorded history knew their respective, natural environments. I do not intend this as a hagiographic hyperbole, but as a historical hypothesis. As such, this claim remains open to scrutiny. But a number of factors lend it not a little plausibility. For one, Cabral's collected and published *Estudos Agrários*—which totaled nearly eight hundred pages—is comprised of statistics, agronomic analyses, maps, detailed diagrams, and suggestions for more effective cultivation. His transformative role at the Pessubé Experimental Farm (*Estação Agrária Experimental de Pessubé*), his work as the conductor of Guinea's census in 1953, his employment under agronomists in Portugal,[35] and his efforts to collectivize farming during the revolution also add to the plausibility of our hypothesis. Furthermore, Guinea's relatively small size as a territory limits the relevant and necessary knowledge that Cabral and the PAIGC would need in order to understand the complexities of their West Sahelian environment in comparison with other sites of revolution.

Although not replicated with the same precision and technicality as in his professional agronomic articles, we nevertheless see some of Cabral's physical, entomological, agronomic, and meteorological knowledge expressed within the context of revolutionary mobilization in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*. For instance, Cabral delegates the task of looking after the population's hygiene and cleaning up trash in order to preclude inadvertently creating environments suitable for the spread of entomogenic diseases.[36] He also offers a short lesson in the science of thunderstorms, not only to foster a scientific understanding of the natural world, but also to counter the inadequacy of religious explanations of natural phenomena. But Cabral's ecological concerns become eco*political* by means of his movement between ecological and political vocabulary. He encourages the comrades to consider the struggle and themselves in terms of seeds, banana leaves, and cultivation. Elsewhere, he describes the relation of history to culture as analogous to that of a plant to its flower.[37] The opening lines of *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, in fact, compare the decolonial revolution to sowing a few wads of rice.

Obviously, revolutionary politics for Cabral is not "natural" in a romanticist, organicist, or vitalist sense. But, he often discursively mediates revolutionary politics via discussions of nature,

> Take a tree, for example. It is an enormous struggle for a tree to grow, live, bear fruit, seed or another tree. First for its root to pierce the soil and find sustenance in the ground. There is an enormous struggle between the root and the resistance of the ground. Moreover a certain capacity is needed, a certain strength from the dampened soil to the sustenance which enters the plant's root. When the sustenance has been extracted it must be carried to other parts of the plant. There is always a resistance against a resistance. In addition there is resistance to rain and to storms. And the plant has one great disadvantage: the plant cannot move from its position.
>
> Plants, like animals (and even a piece of wood or iron) contain a struggle within, and there may be thousands of such struggles. But the fundamental struggle is between the capacity for preservation and the destruction which time brings to things . . .
>
> Our struggle is the consequence of the pressure (or oppression) which the Portuguese colonialists exert on our society.[38]

Here we see that the concept of resistance is basic to Cabral's thought. Resistance and struggle are basic elements of reality in motion, and reality simultaneously includes the human/political and the

environmental/natural as sites of resistance. Taking Cabral's ontological claims seriously here, we might say that *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* constitutes a concerted and organized intervention into vast networks of resistance. These networks are not only those explicitly named, such as the political, economic, cultural, and armed spheres of action, but also others as well: the networks of resistance between insubordinate militarists and the central PAIGC, between old traditions and culture-in-transformation, between General Spínola's forces and the PAIGC leadership, between the need to produce and the need for rest, between plant and animal diversification and the colonial state's monopsonistic and price gauging control over monocultures, and so forth. These and other tensions form part of the thousands of natural and revolutionary political struggles—the multiple intersections of resistances—that Cabral attempts to address and give form to in the speeches under consideration. To analyze a few types of resistance, then, amounts to bringing into language—for the sake of action, revolution, and struggle—a few aspects of natural and political realities in tension. So Cabral not only extends struggle beyond the confines of class (while recognizing the great importance of class struggles as well) to include horizontally organized groups such as the Balantas, but he also extends the concept of struggle to the realm of nature, the earth, and the environment. The *land* must really be liberated.

RETHINKING CABRALIST CRITICAL THEORY AND PRAXIS IN RELATION TO TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY STRUGGLES

Politically speaking, Cabral's critical discourse and praxis challenge us to reflect on possibilities for anti-imperialist politics in the twenty-first century. The new linkages of racism, monopoly financial capitalism, and imperialism—whether, to name only a few, in regard to Monsanto's biopiratic forms of expropriation, the Chilean state's utilization of Mapuche lands, or the United States' endless (domestic and foreign) militaristic policing of racialized populations and spaces—render Cabral's analyses of similar dynamics all the more relevant for contemporary struggles. While we do not live in his time, many of the same social, historical, cultural, economic, and institutional structures and norms against which he was fighting have merely shifted, sedimented, and/or intensified, thereby giving rise to new formations and producing effects that can be grasped through historical contextualization and

comparison. While there is not sufficient space here to provide a characterization of contemporary imperialism and neocolonialism, there exists a growing body of literature that persuasively, albeit diversely, argues that these concerns have in no way disappeared.[39]

In order to suggest ways in which Cabral's work pertains to contemporary issues, we can take the three brief analyses of his critiques of colonial regimes of historical representation, religion, and imperial ecopolitics as intimations of general sites of contradiction. This allows for the following translation of his anti-imperialism in relation to contemporary imperialism: 1) imperial powers continue to attempt to write objective histories of public right while stifling and suppressing colonized histories, both really and in terms of peoples' representations of the past, 2) the magical interpretations of reality that motivate unilateral and transnational interventions through discourses of peace and security often stoke violent conflict and general insecurity, and 3) imperial powers continue to produce and excite more intense desires of consumption while simultaneously and irreversibly destroying the environmental preconditions by which such desires could continue to be satisfied. One can connect Cabral's work to contemporary anti-imperialist projects, among other ways, by thinking through the continuous and discontinuous connections between these three contradictions and one's own concrete situation. The final portions of this introduction extrapolate some of these possible historical-representational, religious, and mesological linkages.

Cabral's counter-genealogies and critical theory of history, as one finds in his rethinking of the figure of Honório Barreto, challenge practices within history, historiography, and the philosophy of history that are alive and well. Such historical practices include a relentless Occidental diffusionism, whereby valorized entities, processes, or desires are always understood as having originated somewhere within trajectories codified as "Western."[40] Cabral not only brings into relief the many absurdities and contradictions that accompany such presuppositions (such as those that motivate and support Ponte's narrative), but he also provides an example of what grassroots, historical-material reconfiguration might look like. And his denial that imperialists "possess" or serve as the only conduits of world history allows a plurality of world histories to legitimately articulate themselves. Next, Cabral's counter-histories—such as his counter-history against claims that manumission and abolition arose in any way from white generosity—highlights the recurrent political problem of white supremacist domestications of

Africana history. As longtime activist Ajamu Baraka has pointed out, such co-optation and canonization in the US context occurs most obviously by means of conservative appropriations of the figure of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.[41] Finally, Cabral's work underscores the fact that imperialist history and the rightist domestication of Africana histories operate primarily as justificatory tools for teaching and reinforcing colonial public right. Ponte's history of Barreto, for instance, is as much an account of selected details of this governor's life as a politico-semiotic performance that justifies the continued existence of Portugal's overseas territories, civilizing mission, evangelization strategies, and "pacification" efforts at the dawn of Africa's push toward decolonization. When compared to Ponte's account, one can note the critical and epistemic advantages of Cabral's standpoint, critical reflection, and skepticism. His construal of the past assists in a far more realistic and socially beneficial reconfiguration of the present and future than does Ponte's analysis and intervention.

Over the last half-millennium, European and Euro-American imperialisms have supported and pursued political and economic policies, among other ways, by means of a variety of religious and theological assumptions.[42] For this reason, it is no accident that Ponte reminds his audience in Lisbon that he and the other members of the Portuguese military attended mass in Guinea, and that Barreto graciously helped to establish a Catholic church for the local "savages." But the decolonization of Africa has not led to the end of the problematic role of religion in relation to contemporary coloniality. The concept of coloniality, as distinguished from colonialism, denotes the quality of the historical-material sedimentations of former colonial actions, relations, possibilities, and structures. In Nelson Maldonado-Torres's terms, coloniality "refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations."[43] The contemporary coloniality of religious power can be seen at work in George Bush's mobilization of Christian rhetoric and theology for preemptive and unjust wars abroad, in the continued evangelizing missions that move from the Global North to the Global South, and in US Christians' roles in the exportation of homophobia. But the rise of religious violence and witch hunts in Africa and elsewhere in the neocolonial era marks another element of the coloniality of religious power in which Cabral's critique of "magical interpretations of reality" proves more timely than postcolonial theories in which the goodness of

religion is simplistically contrasted to dominating "Western rationality."[44]

The contemporary coloniality of religious power follows many of the same affective, textual, and rhetorical tunes of former religious dimensions of Europe's many civilizing missions, but these are played in new keys. For example, even the final pages of Hardt and Negri's celebrated tome, *Empire*, which gestures toward anticolonial militants as a source of inspiration, nevertheless ends by prefiguring communist militancy through a reflection on St. Francis of Assisi rather than on Mariátegui, Sankara, Nkrumah, or some of the countless revolutionary women who struggle and have struggled to undermine imperialist powers.[45] Unlike the theorists of *Empire*, Cabral does not consider socialism and revolution to be united in the love, simplicity, and innocence of nature as experienced by St. Francis, but analyzes and organizes telluric, cultural, and social realities by means of a down-to-earth socialist vanguardism and revolutionary anticolonial mesology. While perhaps seemingly passé to some, Cabral's revolutionary and pragmatic critique of religion can in fact be read as speaking to the contemporary coloniality of religious power—whether expressed as an appendage of neoimperialism or as a subtle mutation of Christendom inherited by certain leftist traditions. And on this score, Cabral—who found the question of accepting or rejecting the label "Marxist" to be a peculiarly irrelevant and religious question—proves to be quite close to Marx.[46]

Cabral's revolutionary anticolonial mesology—his continual and pragmatic linkage of telluric and political discourses and practices—also aids in reflecting on anti-imperialist politics in the twenty-first century. To understand the relevance of Cabral's revolutionary mesology for contemporary times requires a new analysis of the relations between coloniality, the geography of environmental annihilation, and monopoly capitalism. For example, Portuguese colonial administrations in Guinea extracted enormous amounts of raw materials, established monocultures, and systematically destroyed crops and livestock during the era of decolonization—meeting and giving rise to new metropolitan affects of consumption. But the end of Portugal's grip on Guinea does not mark an end to the imperial destruction of the Sahelian environment, but only an international, ecopolitical modification. In numerous contexts the United States assumes former imperial roles in its rise as a global power after the second great inter-imperialist war.[47] This inadvertent, geopolitical baton passing accompanies certain linguistic, spatial, and ideological shifts in imperialist international rela-

tions, but an underlying linkage between coloniality and environmental destruction remains intact. For example, by 1950, the United States was responsible for 59 percent of global CO_2 emissions and today remains "by far the largest contributor in terms of all-time CO_2 emissions."[48] US environmental destruction and consumption practices gravely and adversely affect former colonies, including Sahelian states such as Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. "Most of these [Sahelian] countries, which include the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), have an insignificant share of the global Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but will suffer more severely from the negative impacts of climate change due to their low adaptive capacity."[49] And peoples that underwent labor-/agropiracy as well as forms of biocolonialism by means of direct and indirect colonial rule often today find themselves with insufficient institutions and resources to deal with this nefarious aspect of coloniality.[50]

Deeply moved by Cape Verdean droughts, famines, and the massive toll taken on lumpenproletarianized and racialized lives, Cabral was always quick to point out that the devastation caused by these droughts was not merely "natural" in any simplistic sense, but largely a result of colonial policy.[51] Cabral's denaturalization of the violence of colonial policies pertains as much to the contemporary imperial politics of mesology (such as the massive desertification, rising evopotranspiration, and concomitant suffering in the Sahel caused by the anthropogenic pollution of industrial countries) as to his own time.[52] In fact, given the substantial increase in the scientific comprehension of global, anthropogenic destruction of the environment since Cabral's time, one should extend the Cabralist charge of responsibility to neocolonial agents in even more forceful and confident terms.

One way to connect Cabral's linkage of revolution and the land to contemporary struggles might consist in reexamining those simultaneously telluric and political double entendres that mobilize his revolutionary discourse, such as *cultura*, *segurança orgânica*, *terra*, and so forth. If we want to translate aspects of past struggles for contemporary concerns, as Cabral himself does time and again, we might heed Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's insight: "To translate is to take up residence in the space of equivocation. Not for the purpose of cancelling it (that would suppose that it never really existed) but in order to valorize and activate it, to open and expand the space imagined not to exist between the (conceptual) languages in contact—a space in fact hidden by equivocation."[53] In Cabral's discourse, there is a clear cross-pollination be-

tween revolutionary struggle and the natural environment. *Cultura*, *segurança orgânica*, and *terra* all interrelate by means of their terrene and political meanings. For instance, to "cultivate resistance" does not harbor a solely poetic meaning for the politics of a predominantly rural and agricultural society. And if culture is the "flower of history,"[54] then it is revolutionary *segurança orgânica* that further cultivates the soil, roots, and stem of this flower. Furthermore, Cabral's terrestrial axiology does not only concern "the land" in its juridical, territorial, and nationalist senses, but also foregrounds agriculture, geography, and the environment. Perhaps we might let Cabral's double entendres speak to us in light of Castro's post-structuralist, decolonial anthropology, but in continuity with the revolutionary axiology that Cabral himself sets forth: 1) *consciência*—cognition should always be linked to conscience; 2) *segurança orgânica*—organizational unity and proactive self-defense from below should not overlook organic, environmental matters of primary importance to the extent possible; 3) *cultura*—one cannot separate social practices and systems of conventions from ecosystems, and the reciprocal interaction between the social and the ecosystemic yield future goods or ills to be harvested; 4) *terra*—the political reclamation of land by deracinated, occupied, or stateless peoples should not overlook humanity's material dependence upon humus, ground, and earth; and 5) *exploração*—some forms of "exploration" would be better described as in fact types of "exploitation."[55] However one might read or critically appropriate Cabral's double entendres to understand variously interwoven aspects of coloniality, anti-imperialism, and revolutionary ecopolitics, his thesis on the insufficiency of attempts to return to pre-colonial or pre-technological origins suggests the adoption of pragmatic, revolutionary means over reformist or idyllic ones.

Cabral's attempt to decolonize the constitutive rules, patterns, and norms of colonialist imperialism makes his critique of forms of historical representation, of magical interpretations of reality, and of colonialist agricultural exploitation specifically *revolutionary*. To label the PAIGC's protracted revolution an "independence revolt" and Antonio de Spínola's coup the "Portuguese Revolution," as *The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions* does, is descriptively and historically misleading—if not characteristically and tiresomely Eurocentric.[56] Reformism, revolt, rebellion, or mere instances of individual de- and re-authorization would not have been considered to suffice as effective options for long-term, substantial social, political, and economic transformation.

This is why early in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance* Cabral says, "Our objective cannot be to go and tend to the governor's palace only to do in our land what the governor would like to do."[57] Instead, the PAIGC's revolutionary political project entailed the organized and sustained effort to decolonize certain rules (such as extortionate Portuguese capitation taxes and lingering colonialist governance via juridical dualism),[58] norms (such as those involving the beating of children and the role of women in society), and patterns (such as affective regularities involving inferiority/superiority/frustration complexes and literacy rates). When successful, the PAIGC, under Cabral's direction, oriented each of the different modalities of resistance toward the end of decolonizing and reconfiguring these and other norms, rules, and patterns that governed political life in Guinea and Cape Verde. And this collective political action involved the creation of heretofore-unseen forms of economic, pedagogical, and agricultural infrastructure, the varied successes and failures of which should be understood against the background of interminable and technologically sophisticated colonialist brutality. But Cabral's revolutionary socialism is first and foremost pragmatic, and not utopian, because the PAIGC's revolutionary denormalization, devaluation, and decolonization under his direction did not presume that independence would lead to an end to all rules, norms, and patterns. This is why Cabral wants the people to know that, while there will be taxes and forms of leadership after independence, these sets of rules will be oriented to the local common good and not to colonialist and metropolitan coffers.

Because contemporary imperialist domination operates at various complex levels within the capitalist world-system, one cannot make simplistic generalizations from Cabral's work to all other contemporary anti-imperialist struggles. Cabral does not offer any panaceas for addressing coloniality. And it would be quite ironic to suggest reading his work uncritically after considering some of the potential contributions of his thought to critical theory. Yet in *Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance*, he was equally aware of the need to avoid the eclipse of pragmatic socialist concerns by grandiose schemes: "We've never gone out to the outside world deluded that we were fighting against every capitalist country. We've never done that. We have combated Portuguese colonialism, and that is our task."[59] But this practical delimitation does not prevent one from locating her struggle in terms of Chinh and Cabral's notions of political, cultural, economic, and armed resistance. Moreover, Cabral's "square of resistance" suggests a working

conceptual framework for unifying struggles that remains pertinent today—whether in urban food deserts or UAV-patrolled deserts.

NOTES

1. "Presuppositions and objectives of national liberation in relation to social structure," in Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 123.

2. See Rabaka, *Concepts of Cabralism*, 7–8; Moser, "The Poet Amílcar Cabral"; Andrade, "Amílcar Cabral: Profil d'un révolutionaire Africain"; and Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*.

3. Throughout this introduction, I will make varying use of critical-theoretical terminology that Cabral himself did not use. On one hand, I see this as an unavoidable function of interpretation and conceptual mediation; different conceptual filters allow one to see things differently and perhaps at times more clearly. Other interpretive approaches of course exist, as demonstrated by Reiland Rabaka's excellent introduction and interpretations. On the other hand, Cabral himself claims that the left has an intellectual responsibility to study Guinea's concrete situations, and so such interpretations should not *a priori* be considered unwarranted. See Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, 74.

4. Lobban and Mendy, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau*, 101; Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 16; Bouamama, *Figures de la révolution africaine: de Kenyatta à Sankara*, 261; and Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 4–5.

5. Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 14; Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 65–66.

6. This reorganization took place largely at the Cassacá Conference of 1964, which was a crucial moment of reorganization and intra-Party disciplinarization. See Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*, 77–83; Lobban and Mendy, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau*, 252; *Warriors at Work*, 19; and Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 73.

7. Bruce, *Portugal: The Last Empire*, 19.

8. Ibid., 91–93 and Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 41–42.

9. See Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, xxxiii–iv. "Cabral had already noted in earlier statements that there was a crucial contradiction to be resolved in his country: while the people had since 1968 possessed political, judicial and administrative, military, social and cultural institutions—hence a State—and were free and sovereign over more than two-thirds of [the] national territory, they did not yet have *juridical personality* at the international level."

10. Dhada, "Cabral: His Thoughts and Actions in the Context of Our Time," in Manji and Fletcher Jr., *Claim No Easy Victories*, 150–51.

11. Chinh's *The Resistance Will Triumph*, Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*, Mao's *Military Writings*, and a special issue of *Partisans* dedicated to Africa were some of the books that Gérard Chaliand notes were available for cadre use and reference. See Chaliand, *Armed Struggle in Africa*, 37.

12. Chinh, *The Resistance Will Win*, 35.

13. Attuned to problems faced by other decolonized African states throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Cabral never romanticizes the various problems likely to face Guinea-Bissau after independence; as he notes in "The State in Africa," "The problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence." See Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, 1. On the PAIGC's revolutionary democracy see Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*, 129.

14. Amílcar Cabral, *Unité et lutte*, 171; Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 34; and Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*, 71. A selection of excerpts from "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence" was published by *Seara Nova* in 1974; see Cabral, "A Cultura e o Combate pela Independência."

15. Cabral, "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence," 26–27.

16. Cabral, "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence," 31–32. Philosophers have also inadequately addressed this basic contradiction; for critical examinations of imbrications of coloniality within philosophy, see Wood, "Revisiting *La Question*" and Wood, "Political Philosophy and the Vestiges of Colonialism."

17. Cabral, "The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence," 30 and 39.

18. Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 10. For more on "*l'aéropolitique*," see Chamayou, *Théorie du drone*, 82ff.

19. Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 124. See also Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, 68. The connections of this text with Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* are substantial, but the many differences and advances that Cabral makes in this speech in his critical appropriation and redeployment of Marxist-Leninist concepts should be foregrounded. For a comparative example of the critical appropriation of Marxism-Leninism in the Maghrebian context, see Wood, "Marxian Displacements in Bachir Hadj Ali's Narrative of Algerian Liberation."

20. Cabral's conception of history might be compared to Memmi's notions of the sociohistorical *enkystement*, *corset imposé*, and *catalepsie* of the colony. See *Portrait du colonisé: précédé de Portrait du colonisateur*, 120.

21. See Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 128 and Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, 78. Reiland Rabaka suggests that when Cabral uses the concept "'productive forces' . . . he is referring to all of the cultural, political and economic resources through which the wretched of the earth (re)enter the open-ended process of their distinct historical development. Consequently, 'productive forces,' as it is used here, encompasses much more than economic issues." See Rabaka, *Concepts of Cabralism*, 192. For more on Cabral's theory of history, see "The Liberation Struggle: Existence and Historicity" in Serequeberhan, *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy*. Since this introduction seeks to demonstrate some of the ways that Cabral's critical thought aids in rethinking critical theory at a broader level, it would be apposite here to note that—in contrast to Cabral's theory of history—various European critical theorists do not significantly break with typical *transitio imperii* narratives of world history codified as "Western." See, for example, "World Spirit and Natural History," in Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*; "The Critique of Universal History" and "'Negative' Universal History" in Adorno, *History and Freedom*; and "Michel Foucault et le zen: un séjour dans un temple zen," in Foucault, *Dits et Écrits III: 1976–1979*.

22. Ponte, *Honorio Pereira Barreto: Heróico Governador Negro da Guiné*, 5. The text referred to is Barreto's text, *Memoria sobre o Estado Actual de Senegambia Portugueza: Causas de sua Decadencia, e Meios de a Fazer Prosperar*.

23. Ponte, *Honorio Pereira Barreto*, 7, 19, and 21.

24. As Bill Fletcher Jr. notes concerning these lands' subsequent identity politics, "Ethnic differences would, after independence, contribute to some of the tensions that ultimately led to Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau separating and forming independent nation-states." "Amílcar Cabral and the Transformation of the African American Left in the United States," in Manji and Fletcher Jr., *Claim No Easy Victories*, 413.

25. Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre*, 66 and 155; and Fanon, "Lettre à Ali Shariati."

26. Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 45–47.

27. See also Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 55–60.

28. Cabral, *Análise de alguns Tipos de Resistência*, 13 and 92–93.

29. Ibid., 77–78.

30. Ibid., 98–99.

31. For a classic analysis of this colonial political economy of affective life, see Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs*.

32. On the gesture toward a "political spirituality" in the context of revolutionary politics, see Foucault, "What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?" in Afary, Anderson, and Foucault, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution*, 209; for the classical text of liberation theology, see Gutierrez, *Teología de la Liberación*; and for an argument for the incorporation of divine agents into anticolonial historical reconstruction, see Chakrabarty, "Translating Life-Worlds into Labor and History," in *Provincializing Europe*.

33. Cabral, *Estudos Agrários*, 248. My characterization of Cabral's conjunction of eudemonic and ecological concerns as broadly mesological, of course, does not mean to suggest that he was explicitly thinking along these philological lines. The term, nevertheless, has the advantage of not being confused with the divergent historical connotations of "ecopolitics." For a discussion of some of these connotations, see Alimonda, "Una Introducción a la Ecología Política Latinoamericana."

34. See, for example, "Las Bases Científicas. Análisis de los Trabajos sobre la Agricultura de Guinea: Dimensión Sociopolítica," in Andrade, *Amílcar Cabral: Ensayo de Biografia Política*; "Grounds of Resistance: Land as Revolutionary Foundation," in Kohn and McBride, *Political Theories of Decolonization*; and Azevedo, "Amílcar Cabral agrónomo," in *Continuar Cabral*.

35. See Silva, "An Agronomist before His Time," in Manji and Fletcher Jr., *Claim No Easy Victories*; Rabaka, *Concepts of Cabralism*, 6; and Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 145–47.

36. Cabral's technical analysis of entomological problems can be found in Cabral and Moreira, "Infestação entomológica em alguns armazéns de cereais," in Cabral, *Estudos Agrários*.

37. "National Liberation and Culture," in Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 142.

38. Ibid., 83–84. See also p 31.

39. See Butler, "Palestine, State Politics and the Anarchist Impasse"; Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival*; Graeber, *Debt*; Cope, *Divided World Divided Class*; Shiva, *Biopiracy*; Chamayou, *Théorie du drone*, Hapke, *Sweatshop: The History of an American Idea*; Mgbeoji, *Global Biopiracy*; Robinson, *Confronting Biopiracy*; Whitt, *Science, Colonialism, and Indigenous Peoples*; Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed*; Hardt and Negri, *Empire*; Bah, *Neocolonialism in West Africa*; Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being"; and Quijano, "Colonality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America."

40. For an excellent treatment of these issues, see Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World*.

41. Baraka, "Amílcar Cabral's Method as a Guide for Reconstructing the Radical Black Political Subject," in Manji and Fletcher Jr., *Claim No Easy Victories*, 438.

42. See Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom."

43. Maldonado-Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept," 97.

44. See Maddox, "The 'Crusade' against Evil: Bush's Fundamentalism"; Gettlemen, "Americans' Role seen in Ugandan Anti-Gay Push"; Federici, "Witch-Hunting, Globalization, and Feminist Solidarity in Africa Today"; and Federici, "Women, Witch-Hunting and Enclosures in Africa Today." For helpful introductions to issues of religious violence, see Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, and Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. For an alternative critical approach to religious power conceived as inner-ecclesial, socio-ecclesial, and theoretico-ecclessial power, see Wood "*Roma Locuta Est, Causa Finita Est*: Power, Discursivity, and the Roman Catholic Hierarchy."

45. Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 412–13. For a few works that treat women's crucial roles in revolutionary anticolonial political struggles, see Amrane, *Des Femmes dans la*

guerre d'Algerie; Lazreg, *The Eloquence of Silence*; Urdang, *Fighting Two Colonialisms*; and the docufictional work by Gomes, *Mortu Nega*.

46. As Cabral states in an interview, "A journalist once asked me: 'Mr. Cabral, are you a Marxist?' Is Marxism a religion? I am a freedom fighter in my country. You must judge from what I do in practice. If you decide that it's Marxism, tell everyone that it is Marxism. If you decide it's not Marxism, tell them it's not Marxism. But the labels are your affair; we don't like those kind of labels . . . Just ask me, please, if we are doing well in the field." Cabral, *Our People Are Our Mountains*, 21–22.

47. I borrow this more accurate renaming of "World War II" from Akuno, "Amílcar Cabral and His Impact and Legacy in the Black Liberation Movement" in Manji and Fletcher Jr., *Claim No Easy Victories*, 417.

48. Henriques and Borowieki, "The Drivers of Long-Run CO_2 Emissions: A Global Perspective since 1800," 12.

49. Kandji, Verchot, and Mackensen, *Climate Change and Variability in the Sahel Region: Impacts and Adaptation Strategies in the Agricultural Sector*, 1.

50. On the notion and scope of biocolonialism, see Whitt, *Science, Colonialism, and Indigenous Peoples*, 22ff.

51. Cabral describes colonial practices of exportation as a weapon of oppression that creates famines. Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, 20. See also "Memorandum from the African Party for the Independence of Guiné and Cape Verde (PAIGC) to the Portuguese Government," in Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 167.

52. See Kandji, Verchot, and Mackensen, *Climate Change and Variability in the Sahel Region: Impacts and Adaptation Strategies in the Agricultural Sector*.

53. Castro, *Cannibal Metaphysics*, 89. For an alternative possible framework for connecting coloniality, environmental history, and ecopolitics, see Cajigas-Rotundo, "La Biocolonialidad del Poder: Amazonía, biodiversidad, y ecocapitalismo" in Grosfoguel and Castro-Gómez, *El Giro Decolonial*.

54. See "National Liberation and Culture," in Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 142.

55. See Wood, "Descolonizando las Historias Biopolíticas con Amílcar Cabral."

56. Goldstone, *The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions*, 211 and 405.

57. Cabral, *Análise de alguns Tipos de Resistência*, 11–12.

58. Coissoro, "African Customary Law in the Former Portuguese Territories, 1954–1974," 72–79. Conflicts among so-called African urban law, common law, customary law, and canon law continued to belabor Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique despite dilatory, top-down reformist efforts such as Adriano Moreira's Decree-Law of 6 September 1961, which revoked the Native Statute.

59. Cabral, *Análise de alguns Tipos de Resistência*, 29. Cabral elaborates on the reason for this stance elsewhere in the following terms, "While the fall of fascism in Portugal might not lead to the end of Portuguese colonialism—and this hypothesis has been put forward by some Portuguese opposition leaders—we are certain that the elimination of Portuguese colonialism will bring about the destruction of Portuguese fascism." Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea*, 18.

Translator's Note

The challenge of translating *Análise de alguns Tipos de Resistência* in large part pertained to its genre as a transcription of oral directives. Unlike Cabral's polished political, diplomatic, or agronomic writings published elsewhere, this text is more colloquial in tone. I have tried to preserve this tone, only making slight grammatical or typographical adjustments where a sentence or passage's sense would otherwise be lost, or where an excessively literal translation would sound far too formal in English. In many places, I was compelled to decide how and where to disarticulate run-on sentences and whether or not to adjust sentence fragments. While I have largely attempted to preserve the flow and rhetorical repetition of the original transcription, at times I found it necessary to introduce alternative, varied forms of punctuation for the sake of clarity and readability. The paragraph breaks correspond to the original. All of the text's endnotes are my own, added in order to provide relevant background, clarification, and/or contextualization.

Dan Wood
Philadelphia, 2015

Part II

Analysis of a Few Types of Resistance

Chapter Three

Political Resistance

The present volume consists of Amílcar Cabral's directives to the participants in a Seminar of Cadres of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), held in November 1969.

We can compare our resistance, comrades, to the following, for example: a family, a village of our land, needs to cultivate rice; it has two wads of rice; it knows that if it sows these wads, there will be a shortage, because the rice won't be able to be eaten. But the family scatters a wad, sows it, and if it works it well, afterward ten, twenty, or thirty of the same wads can be harvested, according to the terrain. This is similar to the resistance of a people, comrades.

We all had our life; anyone of you could have been in your house, with your family—under colonialism, certainly—but in your house, with your family. Others were maybe lawyers of the Portuguese, as there are other lawyers, doctors of the Portuguese, as there are other doctors, engineers, as there are others, farmers, carpenters, tailors, indigenous colonial soldiers,[1] soldiers, etc. But we decided to plant that seed in our heads that one plants in the land to give birth to new plants. A disaster can occur of course. It cannot rain, for example, and all the seeds dry out. We lose the seeds, we don't get anything, and we remain hungry in the bargain. We can refuse to store anything of our labor, and plagues, birds, and monkeys can spoil all of the culture.[2] The resistance of a people demands courage so that we can transform ourselves into seeds to create a new cultivated land that will thus give happiness to this people, in freedom. That is the risk, the so-called risk of resistance.

Some remain behind, but every day more must grow, and others will go to the front. And only those who will be capable of making their work grow more every day will win the resistance.

The fight of a people, the resistance of a people, has various forms. As I already told you, our resistance began quite some time ago. Since the day that the Portuguese had the idea of dominating us, exploiting us, our resistance began in Guinea. Our resistance in Cape Verde began since the day that the social situation clearly demonstrated that—dependent on the Portuguese colonialists—our people in Cape Verde were exploited, humiliated, exported like animals, dying of hunger.

Resistance by each one, as one could. Resistance in emigration: our Manjacos who go to France, to Senegal, our Balantas who leave from the Mansoa area, who first resisted and passed through the area of Bofá, Coia, etc., in the Republic of Guinea. All of this is also resistance, comrades. Resistance of one or another who has the courage to deal blows to indigenous colonial soldiers and is afterward beaten to death; resistance of those who flee when the district officers call for them. Individual resistance, in all manners and forms. But others also unite to make resistance, on the basis of race, on the basis of local associative organizations of women, on the basis of families, or on other bases. In a land, resistance is only clearly defined when some of the people's children become cognizant and clearly understand the path that they should follow for resistance.

Resistance is a natural thing. All force that exerts itself on a particular thing gives rise to a resistance, that is, a counter force. And the counter force to the colonial and imperial force is the movement of national liberation. This can only be resolved with political effort, or, in certain conditions, it can take the form of armed struggle, which is our specific case. And so little by little, in the context of this general resistance, various types of resistance are defined. It's fundamental that every militant or leader becomes clearly aware of those types of resistance. But it's more important still to know why we resist, for what end we make resistance. We should know the objectives of resistance well.

Resistance is the following: to destroy one thing for the sake of constructing another thing. That is resistance. What is it that we want to destroy in our land? The colonial domination of the *tugas*.[3] Only that? No. At the same time, we don't want any other type of colonial domination in our land—any other type of foreign domination whatsoever. We want our people to direct its own destiny through its children in Guinea and Cape Verde. That is what we want in the first place.

But, on the basis of our Party's life, we want to destroy every possibility of those who could liberate our land (or any others) only to come abuse our people tomorrow. Our objective cannot be to go and tend to the governor's palace only to do in our land what the governor would like to do. Nor with the house of the district officer or administrator. Our objective is to break with the colonial state in our land to create a new state—different, on the basis of justice, work, and equality of opportunity for all the children of our land, in Guinea and Cape Verde.

We want, therefore, to destroy everything that would be an obstacle to the progress of our people, all the relations that there are in our society (in Guinea and Cape Verde), be they against the progress of our people or against the liberty of our people. At the end of the day, we want the following: concrete and equal possibilities for any child of our land, man or woman, to advance as a human being, to give all of his or her capacity, to develop his or her body and spirit, in order to be a man or a woman at the height of his or her actual ability. We have to destroy everything that would be against this in our land, comrades. Step by step, one by one if it be necessary—but we have to destroy in order to construct a new life. This is the principal objective of our resistance.

If we in fact want to liberate our people, we cannot accept all the abuses, all of the privileges of large or small groups in our land tomorrow. We are not going to liberate our people only from the *tuga* colonialists, no, but from everything that damages our path to progress. We must destroy ignorance, lack of health, and every kind of fear, little by little, step by step.

If today in our land, in our struggle (and maybe still tomorrow for a long time), we understand that there would be people afraid of a *polon*,[4] for example, or afraid of animal horns, sooner or later, when all our people know how to properly read and write, attend school often, and to really learn what fear is, what life is, what nature is, to understand what a *polon* is, what lightning is, what lightning bolts are, what the moon, stars, and much more are, then we will have in our land the certainty that no one will be afraid of animal horns or of the wide eyes of the sorcerers in our land, comrades.

When we achieve this, we will have truly liberated the people of our land. Because the greatest pressure that exists over a people is not that of the colonialists, comrades; it's not a shortage of work, it isn't "fear." A fearful people is an enslaved people. Fear of starvation, fear of not having work, fear of diseases, fear of a beating, fear of being deported

to São Tomé, fear of being unjustly imprisoned. Yet still more, fear of charlatans, fear of those who cast lots, fear of speaking with Moors, fear of spirits, fear of the dark forest, fear of lightning bolts, fear of lightning. For a people to have such fear is unfortunate, comrades.

We're a people with so much fear, yet a people capable of taking up arms to fight against the colonialists, giving them a hard time in their land. Look at the contradiction that exists, comrades. That clearly shows us that we're capable of everything. And that's exactly the objective of our Party: to develop all of our capacity. Our resistance is searching for this: to eliminate all that impedes us from having this capacity.

Although today we still accept it a little, in our land tomorrow we don't want children to be afraid of their parents. No, they should have respect, not fear. In our land we don't want our children to be bound up in order to hit them. This is weakening our people, it's cutting short our people's path, comrades. We don't want anyone in our land to be bound in order to be hit anymore. Those who are criminals, who don't care, will be judged and if necessary shot, but not treated like dogs. We don't want human beings to be treated like dogs in our land anymore.

And our work is to destroy, in our resistance, whatever makes dogs of our people—men or women—so as to allow us to advance, to grow, to rise up like the flowers of our land, whatever can make our people valued human beings. This is our work, comrades. If you won't understand this, you can't understand anything.

That's why we sacrifice, that's why we're fighting. We should be cognizant of what we want to destroy and to construct in our land. That's the first circumstance for a resistance to advance seriously. This is why it's fundamental that we be fully aware of certain problems. For example: Who are we, who is our enemy? There is a lot to explain to ourselves. But we should know from where we're leaving, from what point we set out for this struggle, for this resistance. I already explained this to you here a few days ago, which concerned what we were before the resistance, before the organized struggle. And we have to clearly define the manner in which we make resistance, given the political, economic, cultural, and social situation of our land.

Our resistance proceeds under various forms, comrades. First of all and at the end of the day: *political resistance*. That is why we began by creating our Party, a political instrument. But there are also other types of resistance that are fundamental elements of our struggle, comrades: economic resistance, cultural resistance, and armed resistance. There

exist at least these types of resistance, and we have to develop them more every day. Our struggle has been the development of these, even if we haven't been conscious of the fact. This is what the struggle has been, comrades.

For this reason and from the very beginning, our Party program clearly defined what the objectives were that we had in view. Fighting, taking up arms, and going on strike are too easy, but fighting with arms in one's hands isn't enough. It's necessary to struggle with political consciousness in one's head.[5] It's necessary that we be aware that it's the consciousness of a man that guides the gun, and not the gun that guides his consciousness. The gun counts because the man is behind it, grasping it. And it's worth more the more the consciousness of the man is worth, the more the man's consciousness serves a well-defined, clear, and just cause.

We have to clearly define our political consciousness, because the enemy exerts political pressure in order to destroy our political resistance. As much inside as outside our land, we have to clearly define our political resistance, what we should do. There is a lot we need to define. Whoever doesn't know that, if they don't know, it's because it didn't concern them to know it well.

The first condition for political resistance, comrades, is to unite people. We already talked about that with the issue of Party principles, and our political resistance was already in large part defined: to unite, to create national consciousness little by little, because we departed from a point in which we didn't have a national consciousness, in which we were divided into groups as much by our history as by the work of the *tugas*. Civilized and indigenous, people of the forest, Balantas, Pepéis, Manjacos, Mandingas, etc. Our first task is to create a national consciousness, the idea of national unity, in a certain number of our people, as much in Guinea as in Cape Verde. For this very reason our Party was clear: national unity in Cape Verde.

In order that we serve and unite all the people, we should seek the most that we can. But as I already told you, we must unite without opportunisms, negating opportunism, because our resistance isn't resistance in service of a clique or for making new bosses; it is not the resistance of Cabral who wants others to serve him. If I had wanted, in 1960 when I was head of all the "movements" of Dakar, I could have united all of them behind me. Likewise with our comrade Luís Cabral, when he left and arrived in Senegal, they reunited and posed a problem to him: leave the PAIGC, work with us, and become our boss. He

responded saying that they shouldn't have told him that because he was with the PAIGC. Since that day they were his enemies. Even individuals that hung out at his house before then became his enemies. We don't accept opportunism, comrades.

National unity, yes—but against all traitors, against all opportunists, against everyone immoral. We can't forge national unity with lying thieves, with criminals. We make national unity with a sure objective: to combat the enemy, to struggle against the enemy, but also at the same time to struggle against all the negative factors in our midst. This is a fundamental aspect of our political resistance that the comrades need to understand in its depth to be able to orient their work, whether as militants or as leaders.

We need to remain vigilant in order that we not permit anyone to divide our people. As I told you, we have to clearly define what a "people" is in the current phase of our history. And I repeat to the people and to every child in our land of Guinea and Cape Verde who wants to run with the Portuguese colonialists—no more. He wants to do this, but he is of our people, and we don't want anyone to divide our people. Vigilance: because the one who divides our people is worse than the *tuga* enemy who will certainly go away.

In our political resistance, we need to constantly elevate the consciousness of every militant engaged in the struggle or in the Party. We need to demand of each a surmounting of his own work and thoughts. Only thus can we cultivate every value of our land, or what is of most worth—men and women.

We have to struggle to apply the principles that we establish and about which we are talking here in order that everyone may have the possibility of advancing, whether men or women. Whoever refuses this is betraying and sabotaging our political resistance. And we have to organize again and again. That's why our Party began organizing itself immediately, first clandestinely in groups of three, in cells, in cities, and afterward in small groups in the forest, where it was possible to be clearheaded and necessary to stay hidden. Afterward, villages were organized, and we advanced little by little, forming Party Committees, Zone Committees, Regional Committees, and Interregional Committees.

Little by little, we transformed our Party administration, organizing it better at every turn and in accordance with the reality of our struggle in order to improve our political resistance. And every day, every hour, we seek to make clear the "why" of our struggle and what it is we want,

so that everyone advances knowing full well what we're doing and for what reasons we're doing it. That's the necessary ground for us to be able to politically resist the maneuvers and propaganda of the enemy and for us to be able to make advances in our political resistance—which is the fundamental resistance, comrades, in the context of our general resistance.

We already discussed many times that every day we must instruct the masses of our land, telling them the truth above all, and never telling lies or deceiving anyone; we have no need to deceive anyone. And we're ruining our political resistance to the degree that we trick and lie. If there are difficulties, say it clearly; if we're winning, say it clearly; if we're losing, say it clearly. Because in every struggle there are not only victories. If there were only victories, no struggles would exist anywhere. There are victories and defeats, hopeless difficulties at times, but we keep moving forward. We have to search, to instruct the masses of our land, clearly showing them the intention of the enemy and not allowing the enemy to delude them. This is a fundamental task for us, comrades, and unfortunately some comrades have forgotten it.

In the context of our struggle's concrete situation, in the context of the realization of national unity in Guinea, we should make more of an effort to win over our brothers who some leaders turn from our struggle, above all between the Fulas and between a few Manjacos. For these reasons our Party established an entire politics and distinguished between the population and its leaders. Treat the population well, take the high road, and don't do them harm. For this very reason, when we began the struggle in Gabu at the outset of 1965, we gave orders to our command during one month to not so much as hit the people of our land, who, deluded by the *tugas*, had taken up arms against us. We spoke, we discussed, and a few comrades would even die without dealing a single blow. Comrade Lúcio could speak to us about this; he helped. All this to win over others, to reinforce our political resistance, to improve our unity in the context of our action.

In Cape Verde, while we know that our struggle exists fundamentally to serve those who are suffering, who don't have land to cultivate, who don't have jobs and are contracted to die in São Tomé; that our struggle is for those mothers who haul sacks on the piers of São Vicente, who die of hunger beside their children in times of crisis; while we know all that, we give orders to get the maximum number of people for our struggle. Even those who are on the side of the *tugas*. To the well-employed children of Cape Verde, living well, we state clearly:

"The land is yours, join us so we can advance." We do this because the first step of political resistance is to join together the maximum number of people possible for the struggle.

It's the same thing in Guinea. Our struggle in Guinea isn't for me. From a material point of view, it consists in improving life. If sometime in my life, to have again in our land, in Guinea and Cape Verde, the life that I had before. . . . And even if the directors of our land tomorrow in Guinea and Cape Verde live as well as I lived in Portugal, this will mean that our country is very rich. We should be vigilant to not allow our directors to live like that because it is an extravagant life for a country that still has much work to do. In the first place, our struggle is for our people of the forests—people who lived for centuries and centuries in a village without knowledge beyond 5 kilometers of their house, people who do not know what a school is or what medication can cure the illnesses that fill the body.

Our resistance in Guinea consists in ending all abuse, as much in the forests as in the cities. We must end abuse so that the children of our land will know their profession as it should be, and so that no foreigner direct our land. Yet knowing this or despite this, we seek to join everyone with us, people of all social categories. Even today I tell you, as I told Jaime Pinto Bull, to leave the *tugas* and come with us.[6] As well as in relation to Cape Verde, I clearly told Júlio Monteiro, Aguinaldo Veiga, Antero Barros, and many others to abandon the *tugas* and to take off with us, since the land is theirs too. We're not the only ones who have the right or the duty to fight for our land. Our land comes to all of us. That is the path of political resistance—for those who actually want to struggle or strive to serve their people and not to serve their stomach.

In the context of our land's political resistance, we should do everything so that our land's forces are actualized for the political resistance. Our party does a lot; maybe it could or should do more, but it has done much. And our struggle's victories, successes, continuity, and contemporary perspectives show us that our Party achieved great victories in this sense. All the while there are traitors in our land, there are still people who come from the *tugas*—dogs of the *tugas* in our land. And there are even still people among us who will head to the *tugas*' side tomorrow because their ambitions, delusions, vanities, and vices don't permit them to endure the exigencies and rigors of our Party's work.

Political resistance also has to be great in the exterior sphere as well. In our conditions, the principal objective in the exterior sphere is to

garner the political support of everyone in order to reinforce our political resistance.

Our Party worked and fought a lot to garner that political support as much in Africa as in the world. Since 1960, we of Guinea and Cape Verde have been lucky because I myself was appointed to begin denouncing Portuguese colonialism in the world by the votes of all the comrades of the Portuguese colonies who were with us. And it was in February 1960 that we held the first press conference in the international sphere—in London—unmasking Portuguese colonialism. Here we, one of the Portuguese colonies' descendants, wrote the first pamphlet against Portuguese colonialism. It was published in English in Britain under the name Abel Djassi.[7] There in the international and exterior sphere our political resistance began to take form, still within the context of the Portuguese colonies, but slowly marching toward the context of Guinea and Cape Verde, that is, toward our Party's context.

The principal objective of political resistance in the exterior sphere is to win over allies, to win political support, and to politically isolate the enemy. That's why from 1960 onward, while we prepared our people for armed struggle, we began frequenting international conferences and meetings, setting out the problem, fighting to be heard, multiplying our action, seeking all the necessary support, and wanting to isolate the enemy in the world.

Another problem is how to isolate the enemy itself in relation to its people. Thus, since the beginning, in the context of our political resistance, we have remained clear that we don't struggle against the Portuguese people. Everyone in our Party knows that. We do not struggle against the Portuguese or the Portuguese people; we struggle against Portuguese colonialism, against the Portuguese colonialists. We are fighting to clear out the Portuguese colonialists from our land. Yet we were even clearer: we in Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC, don't struggle against Salazarism or fascism in Portugal. That's the work of the Portuguese, not ours. That's the important point in order to isolate the *tugas* from their own people.

Within Guinea, we have been able to isolate them a little. We saw that, in the beginning of 1959, with the August strike of 1959 and in the Pidjiguiti massacre,[8] some civilians took up arms against us, even though in the war the Portuguese civilians didn't want to take up arms. Various civilians came over to our side. It's a great success of our Party, and they know full well that we are not against them. This is

what it means to isolate the enemy from his own people, from his own folk.

And in Portugal today, day-by-day, favorable opinion of the PAIGC is constantly on the rise, comrades. You cannot even imagine the great respect for our Party in Portugal. There is more respect for our Party from some *tugas* in Portugal than maybe from some of you seated here. You'll forgive me, but it's true. And every day opinion against the colonial war in our land resurges more, because our Party has been able to work on that aspect of political resistance that consists in isolating the enemy, distinguishing it from its people, and isolating it in relation to its people.

It could be better, but the time hasn't arrived for everything to be very well. We defend our position in relation to the Portuguese people. We define the way to treat prisoners of war and to treat deserters in order to constantly win over the Portuguese people, cutting them off from our enemies who are the Portuguese colonialists. And today we know that the best propaganda already accomplished by our Party, by our struggle, by our resistance, was accomplished by the Portuguese deserters—even by the Portuguese prisoners. This is one of the great victories of our struggle. There were even Portuguese deserters who, after we sent them away, wrote to us asking about the acceptance of naturalized children in our land, because they wanted to live working for the PAIGC. That shows us how much success we had in such work. From the beginning of our struggle, even with documents that the comrades may recognize, we addressed ourselves to the colonialists of our land, telling them clearly: "You are the wheel of the old colonialist car that wants to continue exploiting our people." Even they have a place in our land if they want. We want to make a land where anyone, from whatever part of the world, can live, work, and live properly, provided that they respect the right of our people to direct itself. That was the first reason that demobilized many *tuga* civilians and colonialists—to deny the colonialist's path.

And there was a point around 1964, if the authorities would admit it, that they were all gone. But in the context of our struggle, while armed and in order to respect the correct form of our political consciousness, we refused every sort of abuse against the Portuguese soldiers. If one of our comrades one time committed crimes like those committed by the *tugas* against us, he didn't obey the Party's orders.

In the beginning of our struggle there were comrades who, in our resistance's general type of framework, suggested committing certain

atrocities. But we refuse that. In our struggle there aren't those things that occur elsewhere in Africa, whatever the Africans' reasons might be: killing women, killing white children only because they're white. We refuse that now and always. Why? Because we want to forge a political resistance to serve our people; we don't want our people to be bloodthirsty; we don't want our people to spill blood for the sake of spilling blood. Blood will be spilt, but in the political action that serves our land's future.

Anyone we kill is killed because he has taken up arms against us, against the rights of our people. We give the order that anyone who took up arms but has deserted will no longer be considered an enemy: he is a human being who should be treated well. Fortunately, our comrades have known to respect this, as it should be. And if one or another doesn't respect this, he is sabotaging our Party's work, our political resistance.

In the context of our political resistance, our work with other peoples of other Portuguese colonies is very important. We already told you that, of the movements of the Portuguese colonies, none tends to this as much as our Party. From the outset we always laid out this problem: we're only one, and we struggle together because the enemy is only one. There were highs and lows in other movements in relation to our conjuncture; there were betrayals in other movements, but the PAIGC was always loyal to unconditional solidarity with other movements of the Portuguese colonies, comrades. But there were still comrades of our Party who posed the problem to us: "But why should we support CONCP [The Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies] alone? We responded that we support it because it was in our interest; it wasn't only the interest of others but ours as well. It was necessary to sacrifice cadres to work for CONCP since others provided no one. In a similar vein, against everyone and everything, we defended the necessity of joining all the students of the Portuguese colonies in an organization (UGEAN [The General Union of Students of Black Africa]). Fortunately, our disciplined comrades understood this well.

We only refuse one thing: we don't join ourselves to false movements in the Portuguese colonies. We don't join ourselves to movements that don't advance and that deliver themselves to the imperialists, because we don't want a new type of domination in our land. We unite with those who in our analysis show us that they're pure and have the intention to struggle properly—and still today we don't regret this

position. That, comrades, is one of the essential elements of our political resistance, our unity, our comradeship, our collaboration, and our intimate linkage with the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and São Tomé.

We ourselves, as the PAIGC, work a lot for the unity of the movements in Mozambique, for the creation of FRELIMO [The Mozambique Liberation Front]. But we of the PAIGC helped to form the MPLA [The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in Angola too. There is no sort of vanity in this, and this is even publically known. Those of Angola know it. In order to serve the interests of our people, comrades, we run risks in Angola, in clandestine meetings. At the moment that various Angolans were already prisoners of PIDE [The International and State Defense Police] it was necessary to go to Angola and assemble together. We arranged a contract as agronomists, went to Angola, and took the opportunity to meet comrades and to discuss with them the new path that we should all follow in the struggle for our lands—lands under the control of PIDE, comrades. We did all this after the other tasks that we had already accomplished in Angola. For what? To serve the people of Guinea and Cape Verde, comrades. We were not delusional enough to serve the Angolan people, although from our human conscience, we would do as much as we could to serve in Angola and Mozambique as in Guinea or Cape Verde. And the only truly conscientious member of our Party is the one capable of serving in any land, combating the same enemy. We always defend with the utmost force the necessity of the union between us, between the movements of the Portuguese colonies. And fortunately, after all of the difficulties, all of the problems, today we're all in agreement and that's very important. One more large victory against Portuguese colonialism, comrades.

And together we prepare ourselves to realize that dream of our Party, which is to put all of the students of the Portuguese colonies into one organization. That would be another great victory in the plan of our political resistance, because the enemies of our people—of today or tomorrow—are also among our students, looking to conquer them in order to confound the life of our people.

In the context of our political resistance outside of our land, we constantly reinforce and develop our relations with Africa. In the first place, we struggled with a great deal of courage in Conakry, for example, to win over the friendship, the esteem, and the solidarity of the Republic of Guinea. That was a fundamental aspect of our political

resistance, comrades. And that achievement in that phase of our struggle was probably the best, most transcendent victory of our Party, which means that it had the most consequences, even beyond what most can imagine. We dug deep and had patience, determination, and persistence in winning over the people of Senegal, despite all of Senegal's resistance, disavowal, and creation of "movements" against our Party. And after so many years of work, we arrived at an agreement with the Governor of Senegal. This is a great victory in the context of our political resistance, and one that we have to reinforce more each day. But we're already at a different level because today the situation is different.

We've sought, in the African context—given our possibilities, of course, and insofar as we have time and our circumstances allow—to reinforce friendship with other independent African States. We have won over a profound friendship with a few African heads of state for our Party. We cannot forget the profound friendship that connects us to Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Tanzania, and Congo-Brazzaville, to cite a few. We want to develop friendships with the Ivory Coast and Tunisia, and our Party is still dedicated to advancing more in this area, with all the independent African States. This is an important task for our political resistance.

And we have managed—through our valor, our work, the tasks and victories of our resistance—to win over all the peoples of Africa in the context of the OUA [The Organization of African Unity] and to assert ourselves (which is to say our Party, our people) as the primary movement of African liberation. This constitutes a great victory in the political arena, comrades, in regards to our plan for political resistance. And we always work to reinforce our friendship and our collaboration with other African liberation movements. We have great unity and confidence in the movements of South Africa that struggle against colonialist racism. Let's not forget the movements of Rhodesia, of South West Africa, and (before they were independent) of Zambia and Kenya. I work persistently to collaborate with them, always consciously avoiding opportunism, knowing how to choose with whom we should form friendships. Because whoever does not know how to choose friends correctly, on the basis of a criterion that one respects, chooses partners in crime, not friends.

And in our Party, one of the most significant victories of our political resistance—through intense labor and many years—was to demonstrate the value of our struggle to the progressive forces of the entire

world, principally the socialist community. We showed them the value of our labor and the seriousness of our Party. While we were winning over their trust, their consideration, and—even more—their admiration, the point was (from our political consciousness and the victories of our political resistance) to gain their assistance in our struggle.

Similarly, our Party has known how to forge political resistance against Portugal's allied countries. We've never gone out to the outside world deluded that we were fighting against every capitalist country. We've never done that. We have combated Portuguese colonialism, and that is our task.

We posed the problem clearly as much to the Americans as to the German, English, and French: we told them that we were not fighting against them but against Portuguese colonialism. And if they don't join us or if we don't obtain anything from them, it's not our Party's fault; no, the fault lies with them because, due to their imperialist interests, they have their commitments to the Portuguese colonialists, and these interests carry more weight than the human interests they could have for our struggle.

We've achieved victories all the same. We've already seen that Western countries sometimes abstain from voting either in favor of or against Portugal. That is already a great victory for us, comrades—a great victory. For example, we get to go to some countries and to conduct press conferences, to pose our problems, and we obtain, above all, the support of these countries' anticolonial forces. That is important, comrades. As much in America as in England, Italy, France, etc., the truly progressive forces have a great admiration for the PAIGC, comrades. Only those who know nothing of our relations or of all the correspondences we receive don't know that.

But ultimately we obtained a great victory. A Western country that had dealt with Portugal in the commercial context has put itself entirely on our side: Sweden. And today Sweden forcefully assists us. This year we're going to begin to receive that assistance, not in money, but in goods, medicine, and school supplies. And this will help our people in the economic and cultural spheres. Comrades, this is a great victory for us and the opening of a great rupture in Portuguese alliances. Colonialist Portugal is quite aware of this, and became furious.

The Soviet Union assisted us, but Portugal did not become as furious in this case; Portugal protested, but not much, because they knew it couldn't be otherwise. The same happened with China and Cuba. Portugal knows that we receive arms and other things from Cuba, it knows

that there are Cuban doctors who help us—it knows all that quite well. It isn't the time to capture a Cuban, and they know that. But Portugal didn't make the same commotion; it didn't become as furious as happened with Sweden.

Just when Sweden said it would help us, the *tugas* immediately became furious, called their ambassador, cut commercial relations, put people in the street to demonstrate, and prohibited workers from unloading Swedish boats. Portugal did this because it knows the force that this alliance represents for us. They know that it is a rupture in their Western alliances. They know that this can serve as an example for progressive forces, for example, from America, England, and France—that these forces can rise up and decide to ask their rulers to assist the African liberation movements. They have fear of that precedent, comrades. That could give you an idea of the great victory that our Party realized this year, in the work of our political resistance and in the international sphere.

In sum, comrades, our political resistance should orient itself around three fundamental points: 1) to realize national unity in our land and to place it entirely in the service of the struggle, in the service of our people, under our Party's flag; 2) to isolate the enemy from all of its allies, from all of its collaborators, from all those who offer some support against our struggle—without forgoing our principles; and 3) to orient our struggle in such a way, to work so well, that we should never forget that our struggle is fundamentally political, and that we must assure the victory of our political resistance.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. *Cipaios* were indigenous soldiers or officers working for the Portuguese colonial state.

2. *A cultura*. Culture here is meant in the sense of "tillage," though its other sense as a set of social practices might allow one to read Cabral's analogy at another level.

3. *Tugas* here is a polysemantic, colloquial term. It can refer to Portuguese colonialists, Portuguese persons in general, or any white person. Given that Cabral is often careful to distinguish the immediate agents of colonial exploitation from the mainland Portuguese population or all white persons in general, the first sense is likely intended. See Gérard Chaliand, "Les Maquis de Guinée 'Portugaise,'" 1869.

4. A *polon* was a tree regarded as sacred in Cape Verde; many of these trees perished due to droughts. See Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 56.

5. I translate *consciência* as consciousness, though the reader should bear in mind that the term, as in French, also means conscience.

6. Jaime Pinto Bull served as a deputy in the Portuguese National Legislative Assembly in Lisbon and also operated as vice president of the reformist movement for

independence União dos Naturais da Guiné Portugusa (UNGP) under his brother, Benjamin Pinto Bull. Later, in 1966, Jaime Pinto Bull was president of the Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné-Bissau (FLING). Lobban and Mendy, *Historical Dictionary*, 107.

7. Cabral is referring to the text he wrote pseudonymously, "The Facts about Portugal's African Colonies," translated with an introduction by Basil Davidson. It can be found in *Unity and Struggle*.

8. Pidjiguiti (or Pijiguiti, Pigiguiti) was the site in Bissau on the Geba River estuary where dockworkers assembled, protested, and were shot by local colonial police officers. The workers had gone on strike over wages on 2 and 3 August 1959. At least fifty people were reported killed, with many wounded. A number of scholars identify this massacre as a turning point in PAIGC tactics away from urban demonstrations to the armed mobilization of rural peasant masses. See Lobban and Mendy, *Historical Dictionary*, 264; Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 16; and Dhada, *Warriors at Work*, 4–5.

Chapter Four

Economic Resistance

In our afternoon session yesterday, we considered our resistance as a response to Portuguese colonial domination in Guinea and Cape Verde. We also demonstrated to the comrades what this consists of, namely, what are the principal aspects of our resistance and how, from the beginning of our struggle until today, we have followed a straight line in responding to the necessity of resistance in accordance with our land's concrete situation.

Yesterday we spoke about political resistance, and we saw that beyond this there are economic, cultural, and armed resistances. Each of these resistances exists and has continued to advance more each day since we began our struggle, even if many of our comrades aren't aware of this.

Today we're going to talk a bit about another important aspect of resistance, which is economic resistance. As you comrades know, our struggle is a political struggle because we seek to conquer the rights of our people who should be free, sovereign (which means self-directing)—conquering our land's national independence. But on the basis of this truth there is the following truth: colonialism is primarily an economic domination. Colonialism or imperialist domination in the first place seeks to dominate other peoples economically. To this end, it redoubles political domination and prolongs the forces of the imperialist or colonial State in our land, which it wants to dominate economically. For this very reason, we should say that the first objective of our

resistance and struggle, at bottom, is to liberate our land economically, although beforehand we have to pass through political liberation.

This means that a land is only truly liberated if it manages to throw off foreign domination of a country's economy—if we in fact manage to liberate the economy of our country from all foreign exploitation. This is liberation of a land dominated by colonialists. This means that every land has its natural resources and its population, which is a land's greatest richness. The population, to the extent that it develops its capacity for labor, for production of its already-real or potential natural riches, and for the means of production—all of this is subordinated to imperialist domination, isn't free, and doesn't develop freely in the epoch of colonial or imperial domination. To actually win independence consists in being able to freely develop that set of things called the "productive forces" of a land. Therefore, you see that, at bottom, our resistance functions to resolve an economic problem, although it has to pass through politics, and politics is always very important. This is the great importance of our economic resistance.

As I told you before, every struggle—and principally our struggle for liberation—has two aspects that should always be held together: destruction and construction. We saw this clearly in political resistance: we have to destroy the Portuguese State, we have to destroy the political ideas that the colonialist *tugas* put in our people's heads, and we have to destroy or surpass—furthermore—the political misconceptions that might exist in the heads of our people, our population, the classes and ethnic groups of our land, since these misconceptions can be harmful to our people's advance along the path of progress.

We need to construct a new State in our land based on our people's freedom, on democracy, and on work for progress. We have to construct our people's national consciousness, constantly developing our population's political consciousness. We have to construct all of the political means, political systems, and necessary political organizations in order to defend the conquest of our national liberation.

Economic resistance also involves destruction and construction. Our objective in economic resistance is to destroy the exploitation of our people by the Portuguese colonialists. This means that from the outset our struggle had to be guided down the path of completely stopping the Portuguese colonial regime's exploitation in our land. We know that exploitation in our land operates principally through the almost forced acquisition of the agricultural products from our people in Guinea and through the prices established by dealers of the colonial

State. Through the obligation to cultivate peanuts in our land, which are bought at an established price by the *tugas* who exploit our people, considered in conjunction with serious economic calculations regarding the cultivation of peanuts, we arrive at the conclusion that this is forced labor. We arrive at this conclusion because for a family that cultivates however many acres of peanuts, what it gathers and sells and the money received at the end of the day do not suffice to pay a salary. Even less can this support the people of a family during a work year. In other words, we reach the conclusion, for example, that our people worked for free for the Casa Gouveia, Casa Ultramarina, and other traders that buy peanuts, because it is certain that the money earned by means of peanuts is used to pay the family tax, to get some fabric for one's wife, or to buy something else small. But if one did the math correctly, we see that in agricultural exploitation this money earned does not pay the price of those peanuts' cost, including salaries and other relevant expenses. Well, this is what we want to destroy. We had to destroy this; we had to destroy those exploitative economic relations of the colonialists over our people. And we also had to destroy other bases of economic exploitation, despite having taken on an administrative air—for example, the payment of unjust duties and various types of taxes on our people by the Portuguese colonial State.

Our objective in Cape Verde is primarily to destroy the exploitation of our people by the regime of great estates that don't give land to our people. Our people have to be tenants, whether they produce or not; they have to pay rent, living in misery, submitted to hunger, and even subjected to being sold or contracted as forced laborers for other colonies. We should destroy this.

We have already been able to destroy much in Guinea, and there are still days, for example, such as those when Radio Bissau announced that a Greek ship with 3,000 tons of rice arrived in our port. So we already see in this a bit of the colonial regime's destruction because, as we know, our people were practically forced to sell the rice they produced to Ultramarina, to then be shucked and sold to the population. But now the *tugas* have to import rice. In the last year, they imported more than 10,000 tons of rice from Brazil alone, and this year they have already received 3,000 tons. And whoever follows the official statistics will see that the exportation of peanuts fell greatly. There is practically no exportation in our land today. Ships come with war materials, with provisions for troops, or with goods for the cities, and return almost

empty. They return principally with truck scraps or other materials that our combatants destroyed.

So we have already in large part destroyed, and we have to completely destroy, the entire colonial Portuguese economic system in our land. In order to construct what? We now have to begin to construct our own economy. And for some years here, we have begun to struggle very well in the political and military spheres, but a people cannot struggle seriously without satiated stomachs and good health. That's also a form of resistance. To actually resist without food or health is not possible. For that reason, we have to develop our economy, to see the best way to make our economy advance (even during the struggle), and to guarantee the minimal conditions so that we can guarantee the means of existence for our people and our combatants. And we have to pull together to improve the conditions of our people little by little, so that they feel that it's in fact worthwhile to sacrifice oneself in the struggle for our land's independence under our Party's flag.

To the extent that our Party will be capable (without us militants, leaders, combatants, and directors) to better our land's conditions of existence little by little; to demonstrate clearly that misery can end; to convince everyone in his or her conscience that if today there is misery, tomorrow it will end; and that this depends on our own labor—then we will be advancing in our struggle. This is because the one who trusts today, although he has nothing, if he labors well, tomorrow will have something. This person isn't wretched but already rich because he trusts and knows that the path is open. We have to do this most of all because we know that everyone who is in a miserable situation is easy prey and is easily caught up by the enemy, against the interest of our people. It's enough for us to remember, for example, to make a ratio between the following: which people in our land serve the *tugas* most? Among people who have means and those who don't have means, where are there most servants of the *tugas*? We see that it's among those who have had lesser means that there are more servants of the *tugas*. Even in Bissau we see that the *tugas* recruited many of their agents for PIDE [International and State Defense Police] from among the unemployed, the idlers, etc.

Faced with the necessity of our economic resistance, we have to pose a question clearly: what does our enemy do to destroy our economic resistance? Our enemy isn't fighting against us only with weapons, but also fighting against us economically. On one hand, in the sites where it still commands, the enemy struggles greatly for economic

development, saying that life will improve, giving employment to people to see if life will actually improve, looking for *bolanhas*[1] to cultivate, managing goods, etc. For example, everyone knows that in Cape Verde more merchandise and good things are arriving there now than ever. This is to avoid that continuous shortage that usually exists for nourishing revolts. Likewise, in Guinea today, various things that the *tugas* bought from us before—for example, rice—they now buy for significantly increased prices. This is in order to liquidate our economic resistance. The colonialists spread propaganda that they are providing large *bolanhas* in the area of Tite, the island of Bissau that is almost entirely transformed into these *bolanhas*, and are thus seeking the best way to economically elevate the managed region. They do so to ensure the people that life is improving and that it's not necessary for them to unite with those who are struggling. On the other hand, the *tuga* makes an effort to completely destroy the economy that serves as the basis of our struggle.

Bombings, napalm, assaults with helicopters to terrorize our population—so that our population even abandons our country for Senegal or for the Republic of Guinea: for the *tugas* this is all the better, because then that population doesn't work in our liberated areas, which would give us those necessary means to bear the struggle. But if that doesn't come to pass, if the population hides itself, not accepting what it wants, then they burn our crops and our villages, destroy everything, kill our cows or whichever animal gets in their way, and they'll kill you. And as the criminals that they are, they kill our population—children, women, the elderly, and countless able-bodied men. All that isn't only for the sake of war, no, but to destroy, to finish off our economic resistance, because the *tugas* know (as do we) that if we didn't have an economy, if we didn't have economic means within our land to sustain the struggle, if we didn't have food or the possibility of acquiring food for our people and our combatants, then there couldn't be a war, there couldn't be a struggle, comrades.

The enemy, therefore, does all that it can, and even in regard to medications and other woven things that we get for our people, for our People's Depositories, for the hospitals, etc. The enemy makes an effort to finish off and destroy this. One of the enemy's great losses in the economic sphere consists in the fact that we have been able to install People's Depositories in a few areas, bringing fabric, shoes, and other things that our people need. The *tugas*' desire is to discover this in order to burn it as quickly as possible. This is because he knows that

it's an economic force of ours and that it always appears as a new political force in the context of our struggle.

In order to avoid our economic resistance, the *tugas* are eager to burn our land completely—if necessary, to deploy scorched-earth policies, to reduce everything to ashes—only in order that we not succeed in our struggle. Therefore, we have to be vigilant in this regard, and we have to know full well what we should do in the face of the *tugas*' criminal intentions, which have been demonstrated in a few areas of our land. Our economic struggle must be serious.

That's why, since the outset, our Party has considered and sought to construct a program for our economic resistance. Of course, we have to adapt it to our conditions in the best way. And we should mobilize all of our forces for our economic resistance, especially the forces of our population and of our militants in villages and in our liberated areas. At the same time, we should continually reinforce the destruction of our enemy's colonial economy, while also making insurance plans to increase our production, as much in agriculture as in handicrafts. We should seek to destroy the economic means of the enemy, their cars, factories, storehouses, depositories, ships, and roads, in order to completely cut off their economic exploitation in our land.

You comrades saw that we even began with the sabotage of roads, bridges, and many other things. That was the first act of economic resistance (which is also political and military) that we mobilized against the colonial enemy. And in a given area, if the enemy had settled down in such a way that only if we burned everything could we make the enemy leave, we have the right to do so, because the land is ours. It's preferable to completely burn an area to throw out the *tugas* and afterward to work to reconstruct it than to not deal with them—the *tugas* remaining there eternally, dominating our people. We have to be aware of this, although in our struggle we have to establish tactics in such a way that we would be able to reduce the need to destroy things to a minimum, since even under colonial domination, it was our people who made such things.

That, by the way, has been the policy of our Party. We should comprehend, in the work of our Party, the great need to destroy all of the *tugas*' means of supplying provisions. That's why we insisted so much on attacks on ships on the rivers and trucks on roads, because ships and trucks furnish the war; but they also serve the enemy's economy. To the extent that we attack ships and trucks, we attack the enemy, as much from the military point of view as—and this is very

important—from the economic point of view. We should do as much as possible in our land, in our struggle, as we have tried to do, but we should grow stronger every day to elevate our economy, even in war. But we should elevate it to improve the living conditions in our land, and we should make the greatest possible effort so that every day we can depend less on things that come from outside our land, that is to say, in order to look for ways to be self-reliant.

Our Party gave important watchwords in order to develop our agriculture, to improve our production, to increase our agricultural production, to make other things like handicraft works (even to make more soap in our land), and to seek to develop all of the home-based industries of our population. All of this is in the watchwords of our Party. For what? To see if we're self-sufficient. Clearly our land has special conditions, unfortunately, that greatly limit the possibilities of our labor in this field. Our land has been very behind economically—so behind that we have had a fair amount of success in being able to apply these fundamental principles of our economic resistance—but this is no reason not to do the most we can. We can't pretend, for example, to rely entirely on the woven materials that our people have been accustomed to buying: shoes, necklaces—let's say—needles, sewing machines, etc., or those things that form part of our people's everyday needs created from all of this time of colonialism. We can't rely on these things alone because there aren't factories in our land to produce such things.

There are many agricultural cultures that never made such things, and we cannot rapidly make them in the midst of this war either. But we should be capable of beginning to make a few of them. We can't pretend to be self-sufficient in medical matters, not even simple medicine, but there are in fact things that we can do, for example: increase the production of rice; increase the production of manioc, potatoes, and other foods; and guarantee production in all of our land's areas that we control. We must greatly increase production. That we can do. And given our conditions of struggle, it's a fundamental basis for our economic resistance.

We should also, as I've already mentioned to you, seek to develop our handicrafts: jars, mats, clothes, bands, etc. Our Party has worked a bit in this area, but it hasn't accomplished what it wanted. This is because, in the thick of war and with our land's conditions, some Party leaders forgot the relevant watchwords—to develop and increase production, to multiply, diversify, and vary our land's agricultural prod-

ucts. Of course, we have achieved some successes. There were areas in which more manioc was produced than before, more potatoes than before, but we must recognize that this is far from being what it could be. If it's true that in some areas such as Quínara, for example, former populations didn't cultivate anything but today do so, it's also true that today other areas in which the population cultivated a lot cultivate less due to the war. The flight of a great number of our land's people for Senegal was, is, and continues to be a large blow to our economic resistance. It's a great blow to our economic resistance because all of those people are arms capable of working in the conditions of our liberated regions, and now they're going to work in Senegal, increasing Senegal's economy and diminishing our economy and economic resistance confronted by the Portuguese colonialists.

We should say clearly that, at all levels, some of the directors and leaders of the Party haven't put enough emphasis on our economic resistance. We always say that it's not only necessary that our people work, that the population work to produce, but that the combatants should also work to produce. We must mobilize all forces during the rain season so that the population works more and so that the combatants and militiamen cultivate. This was possible in a few areas, but in other areas, we should recognize that even the combatants who don't have much work to do, because the areas are liberated, don't cultivate, just wait for the population to feed them. And we have reached a point in some areas today, because of the shortage of rain in the last year, for example, that the population can't provide food, the combatants didn't cultivate anything, and they have to ask the Party management to send them food.

We should clearly tell our comrades that, if we have to nourish our comrades deep in the forest of our land in order to be able to fight against the Portuguese colonialists, then the Portuguese colonialists will remain in our land another hundred years. That would be the result, above all, of the lack of responsible comrades who were incapable of getting the combatants to cultivate at the most necessary time. There are still combatants who don't even help the population as we said that they should.

In the context of our economic resistance, we should orient our labor in such a way as to guarantee the war economy—in order to secure essential goods and supplies for our struggle's fronts, for our combatants, and for our people. Unfortunately, we have great difficulties in obtaining essential goods because, given our land's basic condi-

tions in which we destroy bridges, roads, etc., we don't have sufficient money, we don't have cars (nor is it possible to use cars today), and we can't establish the foreign trade that would allow us to buy things with the products that we sell abroad. Because of this, our population's supply of essential goods depends fundamentally on the gifts or donations that our allied friends send. At the same time, we should, as I told you, each day try to develop more respect for those who work, greatly raising the value of labor, convincing our land's children that working the earth shouldn't be disdained. On the contrary, it's the most pure, healthy, and valuable work in our land today. Unfortunately, many Africans have it in their heads that working doesn't count for much—working the earth only to extract things to eat even less so—because this is the work of the wretched. But in the context of our economic resistance, we must be capable of accomplishing great political work in order to constantly convince our people, our population, and every one of us that tilling the earth and cultivating plants isn't only for eating, but so that we can have many products to export, to sell, and to transform into other products. This is the most important, dignified, and elevated work in our land, comrades, whether in Guinea or in Cape Verde.

In the context of our economic resistance, we have to be capable today, and even more so tomorrow, of leading every social layer of our land—every ethnic group in Guinea, every race, as we're accustomed to saying—to produce more and to multiply production. We can't allow that an ethnic group of our land produces only rice; it must produce rice, corn, beans, peanuts, etc., including vegetables and other things, because it's necessary to improve our people's level of nourishment. Our land's entire population can produce everything, and we must do this and develop every type of cultivation everywhere in order to improve our people's level of production. And little by little, we have to stimulate, which means to excite or to give courage to, those who are most valuable so that they will constantly continue to produce more. We should cultivate our friendship, affection, and dedication so that the children of our land who we see cultivating their *bolanhas* with enthusiasm and dedication should have their name raised high, and we should offer them as an example to our land's other children.

Little by little, we have to establish every way of resolving the problem of our land's small farmers tomorrow, because, due to economic delays, Guinea doesn't yet truly have small farmers. In Cape Verde, the problem is different, because though there are many small

farmers, there aren't as many as desired, because the majority are sharecroppers or partners. The fundamental problem consists in guiding people to labor together in these conditions. In Guinea, little by little, we have to be capable of creating cooperatives, increasing (in the first place) the cooperation between families, and searching tomorrow for the best militants to stick together in the cooperatives in order to develop the cooperative system, which, as our idea, is the shortest path to develop our agriculture and our economy in our land tomorrow.

And right now we should begin with experiments vis-à-vis the colonial State's former properties. That's why our Party gave orders that those estates or gardens abandoned by the enemy or by those of our land who fled the war should be directed by our own Party—by Committees named by our Party to manage them. We should confess that in the majority of cases our leaders and comrades didn't attach as much importance to these works or to the Party's watchwords as would have been good. In large part, even today, the possible yield to be extracted from these gardens and estates isn't extracted, nor are they kept in the proper condition. Some of them are abandoned, full of straw; the plants disappeared and decomposed—beyond those that the *tugas* themselves shelled with bombs, destroying our fruit trees and other things that were there.

In the context of our struggle, we have to get the principal aspect of our economic resistance clearly into our heads. As you all already know, in the specific case of our economic resistance, it's agriculture. We have nothing more in our land. It's agriculture today, agriculture tomorrow, and maybe still agriculture later on. Right now we have to make the greatest effort to advance with our agriculture, elevating the political consciousness of our farming comrades, of our tilling patricians, showing them that the path of agriculture is the primary path for success and for our people's immediate advancement. But it's also the path that can open the opportunity of developing industry tomorrow for our people, creating an elevated living situation. But in the first place and in the midst of our African life, we have to extract the rightful yield from our agriculture, which still today is an agriculture economically behind. Our agriculture is simply one of subsistence. Everyone produces merely that which is necessary for one's own family to eat—agriculture without any parsimony, without the ability to save for tomorrow, sometimes not even saving enough for the sowing season. And in the colonial context, agriculture is purely for the exchange economy with the *tugas* who exploit our people. Producing peanuts,

gathering coconuts, wax, and honey to exchange with the *tugas*, or selling rice—and that's all. The money is consumed, and every year our land's children—farmers—are in the same wretched situation at the beginning of the year. They don't advance at all. This is characteristic of our agriculture.

In other lands, certain persons said that agriculture was the art of becoming poor, but happily, without a care. In our land, agriculture might be the art of remaining poor for all of one's life, if we didn't in fact change our land's type of agriculture, if we didn't make a true revolution. In our land's economic sphere, which has very good conditions for agriculture, as much in Guinea as in Cape Verde (despite there being periods of drought in Cape Verde), there is no reason whatsoever for agricultural disaster in our time, with so many of today's conquests in science, which should be at the disposal of all of the world's people.

Only after advancing well and in fact with our agriculture can we extract proper yield from our land. We're certain that there are lands of ours that can produce two, three, four, or ten times what they produce today if techniques were improved; if they selected seeds; if they took care of plants properly; if they worked really well. Many of our lands, if they had compost or fertilizer and if they joined agriculture with raising cattle, as they should, would then allow us to increase our production in an extraordinary manner. And, within the agricultural context, we can do all of this, that is, greatly increase the production of cattle, livestock, and poultry of any breed. This is possible by really working with willpower, if we in fact really dedicate ourselves, and if everyone dedicates herself or himself to labor with willpower. We can't advance in our land if we raise chickens in the forest and gather them only when it's necessary to eat or to sell them. That's not raising chickens, it's collecting chickens, like those who collect palm nuts or bellows in the forest.

We have to really improve all of this in order to be able to think about making our land advance in other spheres—in the industrial sphere, for example. And we should put the problem as concretely as possible in Guinea as in Cape Verde: ranching, that is, cattle breeding, can be a large and important source of wealth, comrades. In the context of Africa in general, Guinea is a land that has one of the greatest densities of cattle. But Cape Verde, despite its droughts and occasional shortage of rain, still has possibilities today of exporting leather and hides, as much to Portugal as to other places. So we're seeing that right now, we should orient our life along this path; it's exactly from, on the

side of, and for agriculture that we are able to advance and to develop our cattle breeding.

Unfortunately, due to this war and during our struggle, we haven't given due attention to this work. We haven't controlled our wealth in cattle. A large part of our wealth in northern livestock fled with the refugees to Senegal, much to the satisfaction of our Senegalese brothers. Others fled to the Kundara region. The *tugas* have eaten our cows in a crazy way, even exporting our cows. But we as leaders and directors haven't given that sufficient attention. We haven't worked together with our population to show them the importance of conserving our wealth in cattle. Fortunately, the local authorities and indigenous colonial soldiers hardly ever eat our small goats or chickens today. But what have we already done to properly sustain our animals, to take care of them appropriately, leading our people to care for and to treat them better?

The comrades, political, security, and health commissars, and leaders never give a day's thought to our general wealth in cattle, with exceptions of course. For example, there was a case in which one of our leaders wrote to me asking for milk because two calves were born and he had no milk to give them; this was in an area of our land where there are newborn calves everywhere. I wrote to him saying that he should look for cows to milk because I wouldn't send him any milk. And he got it. The comrades aren't disposed to thinking or to seeking resolutions to problems in that context as in other contexts, unfortunately. They only want what comes easy. But if we were to labor well, we could have milk at leisure in our land—we could even have cheese or make butter in the liberated areas, because this is in no way difficult. Anyone can teach another how to make butter somewhere.

In the rainy season, for example, one can't cultivate onions. But now in November, in the dry season, any army unit can set up some small plots for cultivating onions or garlic in the corner of their barracks. It's enough to designate two comrades to keep watch near the river in order to properly irrigate, as much in the Corubal as in the Canjambari or any other river. We can cultivate near a water source in the south of our land, in Cubisseco or in Quinara or in whichever strip of land. But no one does this, because they hope that the Party will send what is needed. They forget that we're losing our time, which is important to be able to facilitate the advance of our people, our struggle, and ourselves within the context of satisfying our needs.

We should confess that in this sphere our Party hasn't had great victories, except for the fact that, in a few areas, the number of *bolanhas* increased, the production of rice rose a bit, and a few other things (like manioc) were further cultivated. There was a certain success of political work in getting certain populations to cultivate a lot, but now we don't have any success in this work because our leaders haven't attached any importance to matters of our economic development (to the extent that we can). It's not for working miracles, but insofar as we can really work.

We are an agricultural country. We should lead everyone to produce: the population, troops, and even students should produce. We gave orders, for example, for every school to have its field of production. Rarely is there a school that makes its field of production. But the leaders pass by, look, and don't say anything; the directors pass by, look, and don't say anything. And the result is that it's even necessary that we send the boarding schools rice to eat. We can ask: "What are the children there to learn? What interest is there in seeking to learn how to read if they're not capable of cultivating a little piece of land?" We can't let our people fall into that kind of vice. We want to learn how to read, to learn everything, but we have to learn to work in order to sustain ourselves because no one in the world is going to give us food and a people incapable of producing its food on its own can't have anything else in life.

Of course, during wartime and the time of our struggle, we have to avoid every species of luxury, finery, and theatricality. And we have to be capable of properly saving and distributing with justice the little that we have for our People's Depositories so that the greatest possible number of people can benefit from the advantages that our Party created.

And right now we have to prepare our plans for our land's economy in independence. It's not only tomorrow that we should do it, but right now—all of us. The Party has to properly know the concrete possibilities of our land in every sector of the economy and to prepare plans—consciously, and even based on science—for the development of our land. If we were not capable of this, of concretely establishing our path to be able to advance in our land, of concretely establishing an economic politics for our land, then we are dying, growing tired, being wounded, and ruining our life for nothing—because we aren't capable, as I promised you, of extracting the necessary yield to make our people progress, and after the many sacrifices of this war.

Today, like tomorrow, we should orient our work in the sphere of economic resistance along these lines: increase our land's production and improve that production more each day. We must be capable of extracting from every piece of land the maximum that it can give. We should economize, which means to increase our gains and to reduce our expenditures. It's something that costs a lot for the comrades to get, even today when our Party has practically no revenue, unless they sell some kola nuts or some lizard or crocodile skins. Our Party has practically no revenue; our comrades don't have the least caution or pay the least attention to the fact that they shouldn't spend much. Everything that's given to the comrades to spend passes through their hands as though it were the water of the Corubal or Geba Rivers. We're going to spend, of course, and this won't stop—especially on things of great import to us, such as ammunition. Many arms are ruined through carelessness, and much ammunition has been lost from carelessness and overspending.

But that, we understand, is a new experience in the context of our land's new war, and we can admit certain difficulties and certain deficiencies. But for other things, like gasoline, medicine, even rice (for those areas that provide rice), the following occurs, as you comrades well know: a group of combatants has to bring rice to eat, because in the area where they're located (such as the border zone), there are no possibilities of getting rice from the population. So while we have rice now and provide rice for two months, suddenly all that rice has already been eaten in twenty days. How is this possible since we have no revenue? We must stop with this, comrades.

Another important aspect, obviously related to our economic context, is the issue of transportation. Today, it's difficult to discuss this problem because we're in the middle of war and we destroy the enemy's economy, destroying roads. And it would have been good were we to have destroyed even the enemy's possibilities of moving about on the roads and in rivers of our land. But we still don't destroy everything. On one hand this is good for us. On the other hand, this is bad for us, because if we want to develop our economy in certain areas we can't do this since we have no roads. We don't have time to tar roads, etc. But right now we should think about this impending problem for our land. And we have to seriously think about the advantages of defending the means of fluvial transportation. This means transportation via rivers, because our land in Guinea is rich with canals and waterways for the disposal of our products and for creating new such pos-

sibilities tomorrow. At the same time, we want to create possibilities that guarantee a link between our Bijagos Islands and the Islands of Cape Verde. Because a land can only really advance if its networks are like the circulation of blood within a human body.

The system of transportation and communications is as important for a country to advance as are blood vessels, arteries, etc. in a human body. We have to think about this from today onward, and we did think about it this year. That doesn't mean that even now we shouldn't do what is possible to guarantee the means of transportation. Our Party has done the most it can to have cars and boats to bring provisions to our people. Perhaps we're the only case of a struggle for liberation in which boats provide for some areas of the land. Our Party has been capable of guaranteeing this, despite all of the difficulties, despite all of the carelessness our comrades have with our material. But in our land, particularly in Guinea—where we are already at war—we should also be capable of guaranteeing the means of transportation. Can we not do this with roads? We have many rivers and we guarantee and build canoes. The *tuga* is well aware of this, and it's his great task to break our canoes. But we should be firmly resilient. First of all, we aren't going to let the *tugas* break our canoes. We're going to hide them—the ones that we use—whether for transporting our material or for transporting the goods of our personnel. We're going to properly use them and hide them. Unfortunately, when many of our comrades travel by river in canoes, they leave them right where the *tuga* himself can grab them and break them. There are a thousand ways to hide canoes. But if by bad luck the *tugas* break our canoes, we should get people to construct canoes, choosing people familiar with woodworking to do so. In Boé, for example, we never lack canoes. Why? Because we gave Idrissa one task, to make canoes. But during this struggle, in certain areas where the *tugas* break canoes, it has happened that rather than arranging for other canoes, some comrades (not all, fortunately) send us telegrams: "Cabral, the *tugas* broke the canoe." What can I do if he is the leader, he is there, and he manages the population and combatants? Why doesn't he arrange for people to make canoes?

Many comrades think that we have to arrange for boats, and we in fact do this. But boats can't solve this problem because we are not going to buy boats to station all over. We made an effort to arrange for outboard motors in some areas, and we still have outboard motors today. But the truth is that in some areas, like Quitafine for example, the comrades blew out the motors completely in a few days. I myself

left and went to Ghana to buy new motors, but they all blew out in less than a month because the comrades want to play with them rather than use them only at the necessary moment. And the comrades don't give any importance to a simple rule, which is the following: to use a motor, it's necessary to mix gasoline with oil. But no, if there's no oil they use gasoline and head off because they want to go for a ride. That, comrades, is our life's misfortune from an economic point of view. Afterward, they say that there are no provisions because there's no way to transport things. This can't be.

Another means of transportation that we could utilize a lot in this war is the bicycle, using it like the Vietnamese. While our land may have certain conditions, perhaps more difficult, our land nevertheless greatly resembles Vietnam. We started experimenting. We directed comrades to transport things via bicycle, but all of the bicycles completely broke in a few days. Still others stopped in the middle of the path, put the bicycle on their head, and carried it like this. Why? Because they were not used to it, they said. It's really difficult to pull a bicycle, but other peoples have proven by experience that a bicycle that is fixed up, works well, and has sticks to hold the load can carry 250 kilos. A man can hardly carry 20 kilos. We could furnish areas of our land—many areas—with bicycles alone. Of course it's difficult—sometimes it's necessary to traverse rivers, flooded places, etc.—but we can ride bicycles.

If we give a bicycle to a comrade to go, for example, from the border to Cububcaré, he can go by bicycle; but if he goes with a load, it's difficult, and that is the problem. The bicycle could be a magnificent means in our land, but it was necessary that our vanguard comrades, the most enlightened, provide an example of this, remain firm, and show what is possible so that we can imitate the Vietnamese people (who are able to carry loads great distances by bicycle alone, until they beat the enemy).

I remember, for example, a great act accomplished by our comrades in the south of our land. We wanted to carry heavy arms to Cubucaré and Tombali. There was a lot of difficulty lugging arms heavier than fifteen kilos. The comrades constructed a raft on the Balana River and came to the border looking for arms to bring. That shows that when we're willing, when we in fact decide to do something, we're capable. We are thus able to do great things. The Farim River has been blocked countless times. But the comrades are capable of breaking and passing through because it's necessary to do so, because a comrade leader

appeared and said, "Let's go, forward, hold tight!" But unfortunately, not all comrades are of this sort. Such comrades are necessary for the responsibility and the needs that we have on the path of moving our struggle forward.

This problem of transportation is an issue to which we have to call the attention of the comrades many times. No one can think that the Party management is going to send trucks to the land's interior. There are parts of our land in which we've already entered by truck, but this was a very special circumstance. It must be the Party leaders who are able to resolve the transportation problem. It's incredible, for instance, how Sector 2 of the Eastern Front can sometimes be without ammunition. But no other sector makes an effort to bring them ammunition, for example. There is ammunition—great quantities in certain areas—and there are only difficulties with ammunition because the comrades don't get up to go help the others to resolve this problem. Even with the issue of rice: in some areas rice abounds, in others there is little, but bringing rice over there is difficult because they don't put their heads together to find a solution to resolve this. Sometimes they do this, yes, and it's proof of what we're always capable of doing—if only we want to. It's a matter of willpower, dedication, interest, and thought to be transformed into action on the path of better serving our Party.

In order to advance with our struggle in the context of economic resistance, we should avoid excessively overburdening our people so they don't think that our Party also wants to exploit them. We always give our comrades watchwords not to abuse the goods, chickens, or cows of our people. If one were to give something, we accept it, but we shouldn't demand anything or take anything by force. Not even this has been well respected at all times. We should always be aware that those who try to exploit our people are criminal, favorable to the *tugas*, enemies of our people, and enemies of our Party. In these cases, it's necessary to know with clarity who committed acts against our people in order that they be convicted or even, if necessary, shot, whether this be a Party head or a leader. Our comrades have made a concerted effort to avoid abuses against our people. The Party directors and leaders have made a concerted effort to avoid this, but we have to be completely finished with all the abuses of our land. We have to remove the excessive burden on our people and we have to show them that we will never—not once—do them harm.

Furthermore, we have to encourage, finding ways of compensating—with praise, rewards, and decorations—the people of our land

who produce more. We want the following in our land tomorrow: that the names of only those persons who produce more be praised. Whoever produces more rice in our land, whether a person, a family, or a cooperative—those are our land's best people, whose names should be elevated with rewards. This goes for whoever produces more peanuts, more palm oil, etc., comrades. And we should firmly chastise those who don't work to produce what is necessary in our land in the context of our economic resistance.

Of course, we have other, very important problems for our future, such as: developing and stabilizing our land's market; developing the greatest exchange with other countries; and establishing, therefore, an entire system of foreign commerce. We have to thoroughly study the problem of prices in our land. Sometimes we're in this struggle and we think that it's only about killing *tugas*, fighting, and reclaiming the land. The biggest problems are still in front of us, comrades. We have to know who will direct our land regarding the issue of commerce. In our land, commerce is still in the hands of the *tugas*, and even importation and exportation are in their hands. That has to be clearly established in our land tomorrow. Our Party has to be capable of defining that clearly in order to avoid confusions. From the outset, we must break with every future tendency to exploit our people.

And right now we have to avoid all wrong ideas in the context of our economic resistance. One great error that we have committed in our land until today is the following: that no one pays taxes until they were liberated. This is an error. We should be able, after liberating an area like Cubucaré, for example, to immediately establish what sort of tax the people should pay. Though not even being in money, the taxes could be *in nature*, as they say, which means in products or produce, so that our people don't lose the habit of paying taxes, so that they don't think that when we reclaim our land then there won't be taxes. No land whatsoever can advance without paying taxes. That was an error. But it was a necessary error given our mentality, which was still not seriously nationalist. We still didn't have serious national consciousness. And in our land's context, if, at the same time that we liberate Cubucaré, we collect taxes, perhaps the population would still side with the *tugas*. This is why we committed that error. But we have to enlighten the people, telling them clearly, as we have always as a matter of fact done, that they don't pay taxes now but tomorrow they will have to pay them. A large part of our people know this, they have already comprehended it well. We should just explain to them that the tax they are going to

pay tomorrow is not like that of the *tugas*: neither in its basis, which means regarding the criterion or norm established for the payment of taxes, nor in its purpose, which means for what the tax serves. Taxes in our land have to serve to constantly elevate our people's standard of living in the economic, social, and cultural spheres.

We should always proceed with plans if we in fact want to win our economic resistance, which is against the *tugas* today and against underdevelopment and backwardness tomorrow. We should be realistically familiar with the conditions of our land in Guinea and Cape Verde in order to make concrete plans in advancing the development of our land. And we shouldn't proceed like one who enters a dark room, stumbling over everything, knocking over furniture, hitting one's head against the wall, without knowing what one is doing. That's very important for our victory tomorrow in the sphere of our economic resistance, comrades. Right now we should avoid—like tomorrow—the delusion of grandiose plans. We should do what is possible in every phase of our life, and we should know how to do it well.

We should combat all those who remain with crossed arms. Today, just as tomorrow, everyone who is able must work in our land. Whoever doesn't work doesn't have rights to anything in our land—it has to be like this. Those who have value work; those who are without value are so because they don't work. And the best are those who work most. It has to be thus in our land, and it should be thus in our struggle. In the actual, daily life of our Party, we should move those comrades who work the most to the front, and everyone should be certain of the following: whoever worked a lot yesterday has value and moves to the front. Whoever stops working because they already worked a lot yesterday isn't worth anything, was never worth anything. I always repeat: in our Party's work, everyone is like the stem of a banana tree; every year one must provide new bananas. Don't think that because a new stem was provided last year that we're all set. No. They are all able to provide more stems. Every stem of the banana tree that yields fruit has to be cut, because it's necessary for it to provide another stem, another plant for yielding more fruit. It's like this in the life of our Party.

No one think that it's possible to sleep in the shade of another who worked yesterday. There are various comrades within our Party who, because they worked a lot in the mobilization, because they worked a lot in the first guerilla phase, because they worked a lot with provisions at a certain time, because they were good guerilla or army directors, etc., draw back and shy away from arranging military maneuvers so

that they don't have to work much. They pass through life at a standstill, hidden in a base, or often even outside the land's borders. It can't be like this, comrades. No one gains anything in our Party if we stop constantly working, offering more sacrifice, and showing more willpower and decisiveness in our labor.

Another grave thing in our Party and in our struggle is the following: a few comrades who were wounded were still quite competent—the majority were still quite competent, thank God. (We say thank God, but it's also thanks to our Party). Of 500 wounded comrades, for example, more than 450 or 480 are competent and so can return to fight, but there is a tendency today, comrades, which is the following: "I'm wounded, and now I'm going to make a big deal of my injury in order to stop fighting. I just arrived in Ziguinchor. I had good luck in arriving in Conakry—I didn't die; I was wounded a bit—now I'm done fighting."

No, comrades. That is demobilization and desertion. In any country where the people are aware, in any struggle in which the combatants are aware—taking a beating—it leads to more courage, fighting with still more willpower, because they not only defend their cause to which they firmly dedicate themselves, but they also have to make the enemy pay for the wrongs they've done. In other countries, there are combatants with legs cut off who request special legs in order to return to the fight again. In other countries, there are political commissars, for example, who in the middle of war are injured in the arm, and the doctor says that they have to rest six months for the arm to heal. They ask for their arm to be cut off since this will allow them to be healed in fifteen days and be able to continue fighting. This is because a political commissar only needs his head—he can work even without his arms. In our land, there are political commissars who, if they have the good luck of injuring a finger, find a pretext for stopping, for not continuing any longer.

Fortunately, comrades, the majority of our people aren't like this. Fortunately, there are many comrades who have bullets in their bodies, who are sticking it out in our work, and who we sometimes have to convince to leave the fight. There are comrades who have already been wounded three, four times who are sticking it out in the struggle—every day with more enthusiasm, with more courage. Those are the owners of our Party, comrades; those are the true children of our people; those are truly the owners of our land's future. Those are the new directors, and I tell them, in particular: "Comrades, you're my strength. A few of you are seated here. You're all of our strength, and you're the

ones who justify all the sacrifices we make in order to move forward." There are comrades who were already wounded (for example, one who is not here, comrade Kemo), without having been cured yet—and when there was an attack, he returned to go attack. Isn't this right, comrades? We sent him to Europe to be treated, and his only desire was to return quickly. And in fact, on the day in which I went to that land to go see him, by chance, he was in the airport to come back—directly to the forest, without asking for anything or discussing anything. Because there are others that—when they're wounded or sick—find an immediate occasion to demand things from the Party; they ask, for example, that the Party pay them. Those comrades who in fact demand nothing, providing sacrifices, their strength, their energy—those comrades aren't only waging an armed or political struggle, but also greatly assist our economic resistance in the face of the enemy who we want to destroy economically.

We want to really avoid all needless waste, that is, wasting things that we can save. We should avoid that, particularly with food—even, for example, in the school, in the home. In other places, a lot of food or rice remains, and other people come looking for the remainder in order to raise pigs. This is because we don't make the effort to sufficiently measure the rice that arrives for the comrades in order to save it for our Party. The comrades in Conakry or in Ziguinchor that use cars make excessive trips when it's possible to resolve their problems with only a few trips. In addition, there are those who have to make trips and can go at the same time with another person, but refuse, and even hide themselves to go later. They don't know that that only wears on our cars, wastes gasoline, and creates problems for the Party.

In our economic resistance, we have to combat every form of troublemaking, theft, corruption, and corrupt persons who take advantage of opportunities to rob so much money that the Party puts in their hands for administrating a home, a boarding school, or any other thing. For example, they gather cows and take them to be sent abroad for sale. That's a form of theft as well. We should combat this with force, comrades. We should elevate the respect and consideration for those comrades who to this day and in this Party have not been capable of doing anything of the sort; on the contrary, they have maintained their clean behavior and sought to help others to remain clean as well.

We Africans are famous for our underdevelopment, of which there is no one to whom ultimate responsibility is given over means, money, and other things who doesn't in turn rob. And the things that have in

fact happened in independent African countries arouse great fear in us. But things that have also happened even with some of our very own comrades—that frightens us greatly, comrades. We should remind the comrades, leaders, and combatants that it's also stealing when, for example, we rightly take things from the enemy in war but don't talk to the people in the villages about the things taken. Rightly taking things from the enemy in war but hiding them, keeping them—that's not just. That's robbery and to begin doing the work of thieves.

Our combatants are honest people—serious, decent, dignified, and our people's best children. So, when in war our combatant grabs a watch, a bracelet, a golden necklace, or any other thing taken from the enemy, he should show it to the boss, let him deal with it, and not keep it. This is because if he does otherwise, he isn't yet a combatant for the liberation of his land but a highway robber. A few comrades didn't understand this; they didn't understand—when they bring something dangling on their chest that was taken from some village, or from some encounter with the enemy—the extent of their disrepute in the face of those in the Party who are serious. Many comrades didn't understand this, but it was a matter of disgrace for them. Even watches—of course if an individual grabs a watch in a war, it's for him, but he first has to show the boss, who will later tell him he can keep it. And if he already has a watch and wants to keep the other, he should pass the first to a comrade who doesn't have one. But no, there are comrades who take things and keep quiet, and thus they show that their consciousness hasn't understood the value of their work, the very sacrifice they are making. He places his value below the value of some watch, though tomorrow he could have as many as he honestly wanted. We have to combat all of this, comrades.

And in our economic sphere, as in other spheres, we have to combat tendencies toward extremisms, for example, when comrades say: "We're going to give our people forced labor." No, comrades. We're not going to compel the people by force to cultivate this or that thing, no. That might work, but we don't want it; we don't want extremism—that's a misunderstanding of our struggle's present and future. And even in the framing of our future, in the planning of our life tomorrow, we have to avoid all extremism, all exaggeration—above all the mania of too many progressives. For example, there can be comrades right now who put the problem in the following way: "In our land, agriculture is something backward, everyone wants to leave agriculture behind. England developed, though few people work in agriculture.

France advanced to the extent that it reduced its farmers and increased its industries. We see that countries advance by heavy industry, therefore, after independence, we in Guinea and Cape Verde should work only in industry and cease with agriculture." But we should also be vigilant in avoiding those errors contrary to these. There are those who think: "We should leave our land as it is now, because it's good like this. We're Africans; we should have our own moderators, people who work the land, people who work in commerce, etc. Because it's thus that we're good Africans with our traditions and our customs: the Balantas grow rice, the Fulas grow peanuts; the Felupes grow rice, the Manjacos grow peanuts, rice, and other things; the Bijagos collect coconuts, the Cape Verdeans produce corn until they die of hunger when there's none left." No, none of this. This is the opposite extremism. In today's terms, what I said first can be called the left's deviance, and what I said now is the right's deviance. This doesn't mean that the middle is better. There are many people who deem that the middle is good, but this isn't true. What is good is knowing how to join things from one side and the other in order to move forward. Joining things from one side and the other and seeking the just path in a land doesn't mean staying in the middle—one can't do anything in the middle. But that's a more complicated discussion to which we will return on another occasion.

Thus, we have to be in the sphere of our economic resistance as in other spheres—moving beyond our weaknesses and continually elevating all of our forces. We must combat our weaknesses to elevate our forces. This is our discussion for today about our resistance in the economic sphere.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

1. *Bolanhas* are riverside "marshes typical of coastal Guinea. Given proper drainage and tidal irrigation, the *bolanhas* are well suited for rice agriculture." Lobban and Mendy, *Historical Dictionary*, 101.

Chapter Five

Cultural Resistance

We have to remember that it's not enough to produce, to have a full stomach, to practice sound politics, and to make war. If a man, a woman, a human being does all of this without advancing as an intelligent being, as the foremost being in nature; without truly feeling every day that knowledge of the environment and of the world in general increases in one's head; without, that is, advancing in the cultural sphere; then all that one does—producing, practicing sound politics, fighting—hasn't worked at all.

In our specific situation, we have to give great attention to our *cultural resistance*. From the beginning, our Party has given great attention to this, and in this sense, it took the necessary measures—from the Cassacá Congress onward[1]—while even before this we had advised that in order to advance in our struggle we should make cultural resistance. Actually, we should state concretely that the creation of our own Party, which planned and advanced our struggle of national liberation, is a fact of culture. It's a clear test of our cultural resistance, because we want to be ourselves—Africans from Guinea and Cape Verde and not *tugas*. Our culture isn't the culture of the *tugas*, although today our culture might have some influence from the culture of the *tugas*. Thus, all of our combatants, leaders, and cognizant militants should know clearly that our struggle is also cultural resistance, if not the primary mode of our cultural resistance—armed struggle.

We should work a lot to extinguish the colonial culture in our heads, comrades. And whether we like it or not, in the city or in the forest,

colonialism inserted a lot of things into our heads. And our task should be to remove what isn't useful and to leave what is good. This is because colonialism doesn't only have things that are useless. Therefore, we should be capable of combating colonial culture and leaving in our heads that aspect of human, scientific culture that the *tugas* brought by chance to our land and also placed in our heads.

To give a concrete example: I am African, and it could happen, as it still does with other Africans, that I convince myself that in order for certain things to occur in my life that it be necessary to satisfy the will of a "spirit." And the spirit said that what I asked for in our conversation could only be realized if I take a little girl who just turned three years old as alms to kill, to make a sacrifice—and then, all that I want could be realized. That still exists in Africa, and if we look closely, people who believe in such things might still exist in our land. I remember a comrade named Alfucene who we sent for the struggle in Gabu (you remember, Lúcio?). One day he found me to tell me that the "spirit" in Gabu didn't want us to fight there unless his son was sacrificed. I interpreted this in the following manner: he was native to Gabu and looking for a way to be in charge, because he wanted to be the chief in Gabu; and so, he wanted to show that the "spirit" was interested in his son, thus, that he should be the boss. I told him: "Comrade, if that's how we're going to struggle in Gabu, let's go look for that 'spirit' until we find it and kill it, because it's a 'spirit' from the *tugas*—it was the *tuga* who put it there, it's not from our land."

But it could be that I, as an African, still have this in my head. At this very moment while I'm speaking like this, in some lands of Africa there are children who are dead in order to satisfy the will of a "spirit." I never had such things in my head. I grew up in Africa, but I learned the following: The most wonderful and delicate things in the world are children. We should give to children the best that we have. We should educate them so that they're raised with an open spirit, so that they understand things, so that they're good, and so that they avoid every type of evil. So we should never do them any harm at all, much less kill them. Thus, I have the obligation to defend my land against all those people who have that aspect of culture stuck in their heads.

But, as an African, I also had much contact with the *tugas*. And it's possible that I had gotten it into my head that I'm the son of civilized folks, that I'm civilized; I went to school, I never lived in the forest (which is filthy), and that I had a reasonable home, even though my mother was poor. I could have thought that I had nothing to do with the

people in the forest, that those of the forest were distant brothers, and that I was superior to them. This is the colonial mentality; it's to copy the mentality of the *tugas*, the colonialists. We have to combat this, whether it's in my head or in anyone else's head.

I gave you concrete examples, therefore, of what we should preserve from our contact with other realities and what we should eliminate from the contact with our own reality. So the comrades have already understood what our cultural resistance is. Our cultural resistance consists of the following: while we liquidate the colonial culture and the negative aspects of our own culture in our spirit, in our midst, we have to create a new culture, also based on our traditions, but respecting everything that the world has won today for serving people.

There are many people today who think that, in order for Africa to resist culturally, it's always necessary to do the same things that have already been done for 500 or 1,000 years. Yes, Africa in fact has its own culture, and that is our precise opinion. Some aspects of that culture are eternal, they never end; they can transform along the way, but will never run dry. For example, our types of dance, our own rhythm of Africa. But no one thinks that the drum is only from Africa; no one thinks that certain styles of clothing—straw skirts, palm leaves, etc.—are only from Africa; no one thinks that eating by hand only happens in Africa. All of the world's peoples go through this, and there are still peoples in the world—in Brazil, for example—who are worse off than us in this, as in Indonesia, Polynesia, and East Asia.

Many people think that in order to defend African culture, in order to resist culturally in Africa, we have to defend the negative things of our culture. No, in our opinion that's not the case. Rather, culture is also a product of a people's economic level. Our opinion is that eating by hand, manners of dancing, and even singing certain types of tunes depend on the life led by a people from the point of view of producing (i.e., producing riches, producing things for them).

That's why the Balantas' tunes are different from the Mandingas' tunes, for example. Analyzed thoroughly, the Balantas' tunes are those of people from the plains. When we compare the Balantas' tunes with those of Europe, we see that they're similar to Alentejano tunes—slow in chorus. This is because there are certain types of economic existence and geographical environments that give rise to certain types of songs. The people who live in the mountains have certain types of songs; those who always live with cattle have their type of dance; those who live alone in the forest, without cattle, have yet another type of dance.

Those who live in the desert, where there are giraffes and other things, have another type of dance. This is the case whether in Africa, in Asia, or in America.

And our type of relations with nature is like our economy, our economic development. Whoever believes that a cow is a god raises it up when he or she dances. The dance itself presents the cow as God. But whoever believes that God is hidden in the forest has a dance that respects the forest, and the songs evoke a special kind of music with special words in regard to this. This is illustrated in every part of the world where there is such a concrete economic situation and a given situation of relations with nature. Those who are still afraid of lightning, floods, and thunder have songs and dances that are of a certain type. There might be one or another difference, but they're similar. Of course, if we compare our dances with the dances of Europe, of the cities, etc., we see that they're dissimilar, that they're ultramodern dances. But if we compare our dances with folklore, that is, with the arts and customs of Eastern European peoples or, even more, with those of Asia, we find a few dances that are very similar to ours, comrades.

So our point of view is that we should make resistance in our culture in order to conserve what is in fact useful and constructive, but in the certainty that—to the extent that we move forward—our clothing, our manner of eating, our manner of dancing and singing, and everything else has to change bit by bit. This is even more the case in regard to our minds, our sense of relations with nature, and even our relations with each other.

For example: we Africans are in a situation such that we need security because we still have not tamed nature. So we need what is called *organizational security*.[2] Organizational security is better the greater the number of people who are near us. If I were alone in the woods, I would be afraid, so being there with various people would be better. But that organizational security has a contradiction, which is that some don't even trust those who are around them. There is such a great need for security that we always need someone together with us; but as security isn't guaranteed and is so great, one begins to distrust those who are with us. Now, this happens in our midst, even with a person in whom we trust. Yesterday, we trusted her, but today when she comes to give us a hand, we distrust that hand. One gives them a hand, but always without trust. There are still those who go right away to wash their hands for fear of something bad. Some even distrust others' eyes.

And there are people among us who always take advantage of this in order to stare into our eyes. Take Luciano, for example—strong, valiant, truculent, sometimes a leader of our home during the time that we prepared the comrades. There was a poor man lying down in Conakry who, like the Moors at the time, had the crazy idea of going off with the opportunists. The truth is that he was bad news, and Luciano was afraid of him—he only wanted to hit him. One day this man came to the edges of our home, and Luciano went toward him, messing with him, etc. This man took out his set of animal horns, pointed them at Luciano and yelled, "Ah!" And Luciano returned later, now afraid of animal horns.

Comrades, we laugh about this now, but many of the comrades who are seated here are still afraid of animal horns. Today, we laugh and are afraid. (Don't think that when the children from São Vicente arrive with their delusions, or when those of Praia or the Cape Verdean woods arrive, that they aren't afraid too, afraid of Moors, for instance. Once when I got sick, my mother took me to a Moor because she thought that perhaps someone had done evil to me. Fear of card reading, fear of hair—they make amulets of hair to cast off evil.) But we're certain that, in our land tomorrow, the children of our people in Guinea and Cape Verde, in the woods, will no longer be afraid of animal horns. First and foremost, horns are something rich in calcium that grow on the heads of certain animals, comrades. If we burn them, they have a special aroma as a result of proteins and other chemical products that they have. Animal horns don't do anything. But as much as I yell today no one hears me—I don't believe you all. That's why I'm not going to go to the trouble of fighting you on this. I only tell you to hold tight in the struggle and to work a lot, because the children of your children won't believe in that if we in fact complete our duties in relation to our people, as we should. Even the Swedes, those two you saw—the fathers of their fathers also believed in animal horns. And, in their land, the ancient Swedish form of burial was the same as the manner of burying people in our land today. The manner of burying kings in the times of ancient Sweden was the same as the burying of our kings too; they went into the grave with all of their things and at times their wives, killed to place in the same grave. The Vikings, who were the ancestors of the Swedes, didn't go into battle without an amulet. One day when we were in Cuba, Osvaldo and I were sitting down to watch a film about Vikings on television; I enjoy seeing films about Vikings and Osvaldo was up for it.[3] Suddenly, warriors appeared and Osvaldo said, "Hey, comrade, they have their own period for wearing amulets!" Well,

of course; no one thinks that we Africans know a lot or that we can only wage war because we have amulets. The Vikings liked to use amulets. The Franks, comrades, the people of ancient France, fought against Caesar of Rome everywhere only with amulets. Likewise with the ancient English and the American Indians. In China, Mao Tse-Tung had the great task of ending issues with amulets, yet even today, sorcery in China hasn't ended. There are ethnic groups in China that have sorcery. If you read the works of the Vietnamese, you'll see that sorcery exists in Vietnam as well. One of the great Vietnamese leaders said that they had to accept their peoples' amulets in order to lead the struggle. With those who scratch their heads, we also have to think before we do anything with them. We participated in ceremonies with them, but with the certainty that it was wrong—we only need to engage such things rationally to avoid misfortunes.

No one thinks that we're better than others because these things exist among us, because we're Africans, or because we know of amulets that others don't know about. They knew of these things but have since forgotten. Like our garb for dancing—everyone in the world used garb for dancing, and there are those who still use it all over. Boubous and Ghanaian style garb are similar to garb in Rome. You see films about the Romans, and their clothes are called "togas," but togas are clothes like any other. Sandals and garb—nothing more. But today there are people who walk in garb as if in fact only Africa had garb, as if it were only Africa that knew about such clothes. It's a reflection of the state of economic development, nothing else. It's good, and it's ours, but we're not now going to think that it's only ours. A day will come when the children of our children's children will have to forget all that. Unfortunately, we may not live long enough to be able to see it. Like today when we see things about the Vikings, we think that they were crazy, we don't understand that the Vikings lived their own life and in a different time. They never took a step without consulting a sorcerer first. The king always went around with the sorcerer at his side. In ancient times, before going into combat, the Romans would open the stomach of a chicken to see if the time was right to make war or not. There were even people called "augurs" who the chiefs consulted in order to know if they could go to war or not.

In ancient Greece, which was the center of world civilization, there were sorcerers who lived in the mountains called "pythonesses" who were consulted to know the destiny of war, of persons, etc., and the people brought them offerings because God was within them. It's like

our "spirit" of Cobiana, comrades. But that was 3,000 years ago in Greece. Even more so in Egypt. In ancient Egypt, all of the pharaohs had their sorcerers, and God was an ox, "Apis," who was untouchable because the cow was sacred, as in India even today. They don't eat cows in India; there are people who die of hunger in front of their cow because they can't kill it, because the cow is God. They bring the cow to the river to wash it, and everyone enters the water with the cow in order to bathe themselves in the water of God.

We have to have a good grasp of this in order to forge our cultural resistance on that real basis of our cultural resistance. We should clean our land of every noxious influence of colonial culture, comrades. And the first act of culture that we should instigate in our land is the following: the unity of our people, the necessity of fighting and developing in every one of us a new idea, which is *patriotism*—the love for our land as a single entity. That is the first part of culture that we should give to our land. And we should demonstrate the value of resisting the enemy, the stranger in our land. We pull together our forces in order to not allow our people, our land's children, to be stepped on, humiliated by other people. Understand clearly that we, in our land, have rights equal to those of any other people in their own land. That's a great advancement of our culture, if we manage to do it—and we will do it before long—our own war will accomplish this in our land.

Moreover, comrades, we have to elevate in the spirit of each, above all in the spirit of every combatant, the value of *heroism*—in order to be capable of having courage to rigorously fulfill the words of the Party. If it's necessary to kill the enemy in a given location—to go kill him oneself—that is culture, comrades. When a man is capable of doing that, he is in fact cultured. And to the extent that a group of men such as those here who find themselves before a given reality are capable of uniting together as if they were a single man, those men are very cultured.

Consider this, for example: Our Mandinga population, for example, has many feuds between themselves, and talk a lot; some are crazy enough to think of themselves as better than others, pushing and pulling, robbing, until some say that when Mandingas say one thing, they are thinking exactly the opposite. That's why it seems to be a divided population. But in a cultural act, such as praying, they seem to be a single person. In other ethnic groups, for example, coming before a "spirit" is pointless. For example, if we say the following to a Balanta or a Manjaco, "Listen, Bobô is a good guy," he'll later say that he's a

friend of Bobô and repeat the same thing to others. Some believe him and others don't. But if we say that a "spirit" of Cobiana says such a thing, even if they were in the Soviet Union or any other place, everyone believes—Mandingas, Mancanhas, Pepéis, Balantas—everyone. You see, therefore, how, facing a cultural situation, a people is capable of joining together, even being a people as divided as our people were.

This is why, when we say that we're capable of joining together to resist our enemy, we're increasing our culture. This is also a proof that we in fact have culture. And we have to be capable, as the Party, as a political organization, to continually raise in the spirit of our people in Guinea and Cape Verde this concrete idea: the only child of our land is the one who is patriotic—and moreover, in this phase of our struggle, he who has a love for our Party. That is culture in our land today. It's not fundamental in our culture today to teach reading and writing or to make it to second grade—that's also necessary, we already spoke of it. What is fundamental is to really learn what our Party wants, what we want and what we're searching for, what we're doing, what our struggle is, and where we're going. This is what's important, comrades—to be capable of giving one's life. Whoever is capable of giving their life for the Party without asking for anything, that person is now cultured in our land.

And in the face of this struggle, we can compare, for example, diverse races of Guinea in order to see which is more cultured or less cultured. Sometimes, those who know more about certain things appear to be less cultured. And whichever Mané or N'Bana, there in the middle of the forest, who hangs in there with their work is more cultured than an Alvarenga or any other well-educated person who continues to follow the *tugas*. This is because the former corresponds to that relation of man in society and of man in relation to nature that serves the interest of his people, in order to gain a greater standard of living tomorrow. This is culture, comrades: to really understand the concrete situation of one's land to transform it in the direction of progress.

We should instill, place in the spirit of everyone, the certainty of our victory. That's a cultural act as well, comrades: for everyone to hold on, to not give up at all, to not despair in the face of any defeat (because there are no struggles that don't have defeats). In our struggle there are also defeats, but that's a part of struggle—that's why it's a struggle. But we should continually elevate the trust in our victory. We should do everything to dishearten the enemy, to dishearten the enemy's

agents, to show them that there is no way—they will certainly lose. That is culture, comrades.

And, on the basis of the love for our land and for our people, on the basis of the love for our Party, we should develop our dances, our tunes, our types of music, do theater, and even acrobatics, impressions of other people, etc. For example, when we imitate the colonists, Mr. So-and-So, etc., that's important. We should develop all of that in the service of our struggle, in the service of our cause today, with a content—that is to say—with new facts and words.

This is the great value, for example, of the tunes of the Balantas, Beafadas, Mandingas, Creoles, Mancanhas, Pepels, and others, or of the *mornas* and *coladeiras*[4] that they already made on the basis of our struggle, raising up our Party and the name of our courageous combatants, singing of our weapons, battles, attacks against *tuga* planes, etc.—showing the long path of our people in this war. That is our culture; that is what we should develop today.

In line with this, we should of course advance in order to open the minds of our people in relation to literature, science, etc. This is because we know that it's not the illiterate who can make a good land. It's necessary to have people who can read and write. All of those people who know how to read and write should teach those who don't know. Much time has passed since our Party issued this watchword[5] and much time has passed since our Party began to create schools, to improve preparation for professors, to form frameworks so that we can advance along the path of the scientific knowledge of life and of the world.

Whether our new culture is in or outside of school, we have to place it in the service of our resistance, in the service of compliance with our Party program. It has to be that way, comrades. Our culture should be developed at the national level of our land, but without disparaging (or considering as lesser) the culture of others, and, with intelligence, availing ourselves of the culture of others—everything insofar as it's good for us, everything insofar as it can be adapted to our living conditions. Our culture should be developed on the basis of science, it should be scientific—which is to say, not involve believing in imaginary things. Tomorrow our culture should avoid instances where anyone of us thinks that lightning is a sign that God has become enraged or that a thunderstorm is the sky's voice when a furious "spirit" speaks. In our culture tomorrow, everyone should know that, while we dance when there are thunderstorms, a thunderstorm occurs when two clouds clash,

one with a positive electrical charge and another with a negative electrical charge; and when they clash they cause a flash, which is lightning, and a noise, which is the thunder. As when one grips two electrical wires, positive and negative, and touches one to the other, there is a flash. That's what lightning in the sky is—electricity in the clouds. The noise that is called "thunder" is the meeting of two clouds.

This is so much the case that, given the speed of sound in air, when one hears a thunderstorm, one can calculate where one cloud meets another, because light moves faster than sound. Watch for lightning and after a bit you hear the noise: if it were, for example, 5 seconds, we can calculate where the two clouds meet and how far from us, because the speed of sound in the air is 340 meters per second. So, if in the moment that one sees lightning one begins to count by seconds, for example, by multiplying 5 by 340, one gets 1,700 meters. That is to say, it was at a distance of 1,700 meters from where we are that the two clouds met and caused a thunderstorm and lightning.

The thunderbolt is nothing more than an electric spark, which due to special conditions comes down to earth and which can come with enough force to destroy a bit, just as, by the way, we can make anything explode indoors with an electric current. Or then you see it strike with less force, entering some place, happening and then disappearing. This can even happen to a human body, which disappears into the ground because the earth is also electrically charged, just as opposite electric charges can produce sparks. This is why they put lightning rods on top of houses, in order for the lightning bolt to enter there and pass directly into the ground without doing anyone harm.

Comrades, we have to base our culture on science. We have to rid our culture of everything insofar as it is antiscientific, if not yet today, then tomorrow. But if we work well today, we have the certainty that tomorrow that will be possible.

Our culture has to be popular, which is to say, culture of the masses: everyone has a right to culture. Moreover, we respect those cultural values of our people that deserve to be respected. Our culture cannot be for an elite, for a group of persons who knows a lot, who knows things. No. All of the children of our land, in Guinea and Cape Verde, must have the right to advance culturally, to participate in our cultural acts, to demonstrate, and to create culture.

We should place the comparative situation of the city and the countryside deeply within our spirit. We should note that, while day by day foreign customs develop in our cities—some good, others bad—our

general tendency is to take advantage of the bad ones: alcoholism, prostitution, banditry, scams, assaults, robberies of a certain type, etc. Life is more pure in our forest, although by that I don't want to say that there might not be people who steal. But there is a great difference between a thief in Bissau and a Balanta thief who steals anywhere else. In general, the Balanta thief steals—after the colonialists came, so already with colonialist influence—but he steals in general without interest in keeping what he stole; that which interests him is the act of stealing. This is the very reason why he often robs something, gives it to another, and never sees that thing again—because in Balanta customs, pilfering is a sport to demonstrate one's ability, one's intelligence. If I have glasses, I guard them well, but another person thinks like this: "I'll play around with him until I'm able to snatch them without his notice." That person demonstrates that he has a great capacity, more than my own: the capacity to trick me. That's the significance of Balanta robbery: to steal as an intellectual exercise, as an exercise of physical and intellectual capacity without any interest in possessing what was stolen. This is the reason why, when a young Balanta reaches the moment to celebrate his passage to adulthood, he can count the number of robberies he performed in order to show his value and abilities. And the great men laud this, are happy, treating him as if he were their son, because he's a person of high caliber. Robberies in the cities, no. A thief from the city steals in order to allow his people to eat or so that he might enrich himself. Aside from this, there are other types of thefts in business that are legal—legal theft.

We should know how to compare our forest with our city in order to avoid all the impurities of the city coming to the forest and to direct all the purities that can exist in our forest to our cities. I repeat that this doesn't mean that there aren't likely bad things in the forest. There are a lot of bad things, even issues of sacrifices, of beating children, etc. The manner in which they beat children in our land is hideous. We have to combat that as well. We can't set out from the principle that the forest is pure, that it has nothing bad about it, that the city alone is bad. No, there are bad things and good things as much in the city as in the forest, only, comparatively, the city is less pure than the forest. And we have to make our countryside progress more each day, as much in the cultural sphere as in other spheres.

From today on, comrades, we have to develop as an entire people, as combatants, as militants, and as a population in this consciousness: when a human being is laboring at something, he should do it well,

perfectly, as quickly as possible, and in the simplest way possible. We should develop our spirit and the idea of perfection in the spirit of our people. We still don't have a very good sense of perfection. Look at that curtain—there isn't one comrade who would be capable of seeing that and lifting it to set it straight. It's not a problem for us if a nail that's put in the wall or clothes that are made remain crooked. We don't have a good idea of perfection. We have to combat that spirit and infuse in our people the spirit of perfection. If we're launching an ambush, we're going to do it in the best way possible. A comrade who went abroad for preparation or who already has sufficient knowledge knows how to launch an ambush: he should put such a weapon in such a location, another weapon in such a location, so many men there, so many over there, so many on reserve, etc., attacking the enemy at such a point. How many comrades do that? How many? When they do it well, the results are extraordinary, but the comrades in general don't remember that.

This is as true of an ambush as going to regions where one must speak. In a meeting, a comrade has to speak, but without taking any appointments at all; he's just there in preparation. He can have recourse to a lot of conversation, but he has to study a bit, to remember things. Today there is a meeting with such a village, and it's necessary to sit down and to think about the problems with that village, taking the necessary notes. He's a political commissar, the Party trusts him, and he is the Party in that moment; he shouldn't converse just for the sake of conversing. It's necessary to study, which doesn't mean preparing a whole speech—it's not worth it to give a whole speech to our people in the forest. At times it is worth it, but it's necessary to take notes on all of the problems, to think about all of the problems that they are going to discuss. This is very important. We need to deal with meetings of leaders in which everyone wants to go to the meeting but nobody knows what they're going to do there.

Or at times they hold a meeting in the following way: various leaders meet in the north or in the south of our land in order to decide what? The watchwords of our Party. There are comrades who send me meeting reports, and when they leave to see what the others decided, they're things already in the Party's watchwords that they didn't read. But, on top of this, they made fewer and worse decisions than were already made. When a meeting of leaders is held it's in order to deal with the following: to what extent have we already accomplished the Party's watchwords? Take notes and discuss. Or if one or another problem

emerges in the Inter-Regional Committee, take notes beforehand to discuss it.

Perfection in our work—this is very important—but perfection even in our manner of dressing. I tell the comrades over and over to fix their collars and to tuck in their shirttails. A people that is fighting for its independence, for its dignity, from today on must proceed with clean feet. When one walks in the mud—patience—but when we get out of the mud, we're going to wash our feet. Clean clothes are only one way; undress, tie on a piece of cloth, wash up, and you will become clean. Comb your hair, and if there isn't a comb, make a comb from a stick if necessary, if you're not able to buy one. But there are comrades who seem to have pride in their uncombed hair. It seems like an unimportant thing, but it's very important. For our dignity, in order to open new paths of life, the way in which we behave has great importance.

Before, the *tugas* said that we were quite filthy; but when we dressed well, they called us doctors—"black with a doctor's ways." That was the *tugas*' position. But we don't have that complex; we're against everything dirty, we're against filthiness. For example, I marvel at how some comrades are as capable of lying down in a bed as on the ground. Fortunately, all aren't like this. But it doesn't matter if the bedroom is full of trash or clean. Even leaders amidst a mess, for example, are not capable of getting up to clean. They're capable of giving their life for their land, and they're not capable of cleaning the ground. They're not capable of sweeping, of straightening up the yard, of making any sort of small garden, when despite all of the work there is time for this.

There are comrades of ours in the land who made their base beautiful, well put together, and even being against the bases, I never told them anything because I saw an effort, a will to arrange. But others don't want to know. When a man or a woman wants to give their life for a cause, they have to be clean, in a clean environment, to make all of those around them clean. Because only in this way can their spirit be cleaner each day.

We have to have a notion of time in our culture, in our action. We weren't the ones who invented the watch, but we have to have a notion of time, comrades. We, in general, our comrades, don't have this—contrary to our people, who know very well what time is, who know that if they don't cultivate until a determinate time, then things turn for the worse, that one has to sow so many days after the first rains. If not, then this is bad. They know that so many days after a plant grows on

the edge of the house, or rice in the nursery, these have to be taken to the *bolanha*—if not, things don't work out. They know that so much time after opening a *bolanha*, after clearing the mangroves, they can begin to plant—and not before this—because it still has salt, etc.

Many of our comrades today don't have the slightest notion of time. If it's necessary to get up at five in the morning, they get up at nine; it's necessary to launch an ambush beginning at four in the afternoon, but they don't arrive there that day—only showing up the following day and verifying that the *tugas* have already passed by. It's necessary to attack some barracks at six in the evening, but they arrive in the late hours of the night. Or again, if the attack were for midday, they arrive in the afternoon and leave it for the following day. They arrive the next day in the same conditions. Our comrades missed attacks or ambushes only because of tardiness countless times. Some instances of being late are justifiable, because our conditions are difficult, but others are only late from a lack of interest, lack of consciousness, lack of order and of decision.

Sometimes one gives a comrade a mission to quickly take a letter to some location. Along the way, he finds some reason to have fun for three or four days, although it takes one day to arrive. It can't be like this. One cannot win a war this way, much less construct a land.

We must have a notion of time. The security, political commissar, etc. comrades have to be on time everywhere. Let no one come to me saying that he doesn't have a watch, and that's why he can't be on time. We don't need watches to arrive on time. We can decide to meet each other while the sun is high. There's sun in our land. When the rooster sings for the first time, one has to get up. When the sun is fully up we have to go. A watch isn't necessary in order to respect time, comrades. Watches are for helping comrades a bit more. Our people lived during centuries without watches, but they did what they could, given the economic conditions in which they found themselves. It was not the watch that made the people of Europe advance, no. They went to work on time and advanced much, thus they created the watch—the modern watch, because everyone had the ancient watch. It's enough to impale the ground with a stick, and, according to the place of the shadow, one can know the hour. This is a sun watch. The shadow of a person can be a watch, because in the morning the shadow is to one side, and in the afternoon the shadow is on the other side. Many people think they lose their shadow at midday, because it is under their feet; but the sun is full and above us.

We have to work a lot, comrades, in order to take advantage of time. We have to seek to be practical in our work; we have to instill the idea of practicality in the spirit of our comrades. It's necessary to stop complicating things, or to lose the magical interpretation of reality in our spirit. That is to say: We still have certain ways of thinking—that if we sit down and discuss a matter in which all are in agreement, we think that the thing is already done. We remain content, as if we had in fact done the thing, as if it were then necessary to throw a party because the discussion was really good. But the discussion finishes, and everyone leaves satisfied with life because they're going to do a good job. But they don't try to do it because it's only in their head.

But if we observe closely, we see that that corresponds to our own life: we're convinced that Moors or sorcerers are capable of pointing a finger at us and making us fall over. Sooner or later, we'll see that it's a lie, that it's not capable of anything. But that's in our head, we think of it and we believe. And many other things besides these. Likewise, we think about an ambush and we are very satisfied, but we don't take a single practical measure for everything to run well, without flaws, because everything is good in our head—because we believe in our magical interpretation of reality.

We have to combat this in our midst, and we all have to do so, as a few of our comrades do. We have to discuss, but also to correctly put it into practice, properly, without errors, because our misfortune is beginning and not ending. When we start some work, do it with complete enthusiasm. For example, we're going to make an underground storehouse to guard our material. We begin it with enthusiasm, but after a while, we stop and people forget. Look at how many things in independent Africa have begun but have not been finished. This is because, for us, it is enough to have a thing in our head, and soon one doesn't think of it anymore. We have planned out so many things in our struggle—in the political sphere, in the military sphere, in instruction, in health—that we don't do. We begin, but if a single difficulty arises, we don't advance. We have to combat this with vigor, with great vigor.

We can give examples of many things that were begun that weren't finished. The peoples who began something and didn't finish, the organizations that began something and didn't finish, did so for either of two reasons: either they recognized that it wasn't worth doing, or they weren't capable of finishing it. If they recognized that it wasn't worth doing, then they're doing something that they shouldn't be doing—they certainly studied the problem poorly. Before we begin to do something,

we should study it well—in order to know if it's worth doing or not—and not begin to do it to put it aside later. This is a loss of energy and a waste. Or at times it happens that one can't finish. But whoever can't finish a thing that they began to do is unfortunate in life, because they can't do anything. We have to combat this, comrades.

Thus, perfection, making good use of our time, and having practical sense with our accomplishments (the capacity to bring every work, everything that we have to do, to completion) are very important—fundamental in our culture, comrades. These are new elements for our land's culture. Because even if an entire week were necessary to launch a well-planned ambush, we should do this, whether it takes an entire week or an entire month. We have to organize our troops in such a way that a group would always be on that road, patrolling, moving, etc., but it always has to be like this. If we know that the enemy should pass there, we shouldn't leave; it's necessary to complete the task. Not, as I told you, arriving, planning a great ambush, then waiting one, two, three, or four hours, and the enemy doesn't come. Some say that they're coming, others that they're not coming, and they finish by heading out. Afterward, the enemy passes and goes to supply their barracks. It's the same thing on the rivers. The time of attack has to be the appointed time. If not, then why have an appointed time? An attack was appointed for five o'clock, but five, six o'clock, even another day passes, and the attack isn't carried out. Why are the comrades playing around? For what? We appointed it for five o'clock, after having the certainty that it's even at five; we appointed it at ten after we had the certainty that it could be at ten. Moreover, knowing the enemy as we should know it, we know which time is the best to attack. We should take maximum advantage of this.

We should be capable of issuing our resistance's propaganda; this is also a cultural act. We should do so by every means that we arranged. That's the very reason why one of the greatest victories of our Party is our *Rádio Libertação*, our newspaper, our press, our information, as much within our land as abroad. We all know the strength, the value that our Party's broadcasting station has, which issues propaganda for our people and which we should be able to improve every day, because that's an essential element, an essential means for our propaganda, for propagating our resistance.

And, in the context of our action, we should raise high the flag against illiteracy in our land. We're happy because many comrades have already improved their knowledge in this struggle. Many grown

men of our land learned to read and write, and even more young guys. Today, it's rare for a bigroup to show up that doesn't have anyone who knows how to read and write, but before there were many who didn't know how to read or write. There were many bigroups in which almost no one knew how to read and write. We should reinforce cooperative learning every day.

But there are many comrades who have reached the second grade, the first grade, the second year, and even doctors, who can pass days on end with other comrades without doing anything, or even resting during spare time—lying down or telling stories—without remembering to say: "Comrades, you don't know anything. Come here and I'm going to teach you. Or if you know a bit, come so I can teach you more than a bit." But the comrades don't think about this. They prefer to tell stories, to stroll through the forests, or in Conakry, or in Ziguinchor, or in Dakar.

We should work hard to construct our life in our land, comrades. For example—and the Party has already begun to do this—we should spread among our people the idea of cleanliness, of hygiene as they say. Our people are clean—they like to bathe, they always like to brush their teeth, but not everyone. There are those who don't like these things much, and can indeed bathe, but they get themselves into the mud afterward because of certain things. We have to work to show our people that their life, the prolongation of their life, also depends a lot on the cleanliness of their house. If a people lives mixed up with filth and other things, it's bad, because this environment is good for those insects that do harm to humans—they grow at will—for those flies and other insects that bring diseases. We should explain the norms of hygiene to our people. This is a fundamental aspect of our cultural resistance.

We began with our health brigades, but to where did these lead us? We accomplished little work in relation to what was necessary to do. But the political commissar should be an agent of hygiene; the commander of the armed forces should be an agent of hygiene. Wherever one arrives, one should demand that they clean themselves. But even in Boké, for example, or outside a home, the leading comrades who pass by encounter everyone dirty and don't say anything. Only one or another worry about cleanliness. It can't be so dirty; it's necessary to clean, to sweep. We have to develop this in our spirit, comrades: cleanliness, hygiene.

Every leader or militant of the Party should be an agent of hygiene in our land. Wherever one arrives, he has to demand cleanliness, and as a good leader, he should be the first to grab a broom if necessary, in order to clean, in order to show the others that he's not embarrassed, that he's fighting for his land, giving his life for our struggle, but that he's not capable of living amidst filth, because no one gets to cleaning because to clean is to be demoted. How is it that this can indicate to our people the actual path for rising up, to get out of filth?

Because if we want an answer to our struggle, if we can say that our struggle in Guinea and Cape Verde is in order to do away with all wretchedness, then we can also say that it's in order to do away with all messes. We have to put an end to all messes and promiscuity in our midst. When we've put an end to this, we will have already advanced a lot in our struggle. Indeed, we have told the comrades to convince our people to make latrines, for example. That's not to say that latrines are what exemplify progress; no, the latrine is no progress. A people that addresses their basic needs in the forest can be more advanced than a people who has latrines. But to the extent to which latrines have been made, they should be advancing in other fields, because when one moves this place of business farther away, they are preventing sicknesses among our people. Because we know that there are places where, for a person to pass, he has to hold his nose, otherwise . . . But in other African countries, it's also like this; even in a few cities, there are places where to pass by it's necessary to hold one's nose. Filth on every side. We who are ready to die in a struggle, for the progress and happiness of our people, have to be capable of cleaning, because it's easier to clean than to die.

Of course, we have to throw away everything in our schools insofar as it was made by the colonialists, everything that exemplifies the colonialist mentality. We have already begun to do it—editing new books, speaking of our Party, of our struggle, of our land, of the present and future of our people, of our people's rights. There are comrades who think that in order to teach our children well we shouldn't speak of our Party. What history! A pedagogy that wants that is no pedagogy at all. Pedagogy for us is that which teaches our children about our struggle, the rights of our people, the Party, the Party anthem, the value of our Party, beyond the ABCs, *The Cat and the Fox*, *The Wolf and the Kid*, etc.[6] But the Party should be present there as well: the direction of the Party, the Party directors, the force of our struggle, the force of our people, the force of our Party, the duties of our people.

At school in my time, they taught the birth of Jesus Christ, that the Virgin Mary had a baby while remaining a virgin, and I even respected that, and even seemed to understand it in that time. They taught the miracle of the ascension in the books espoused at that time, miracles like the miracle of roses and whatnot. If in that time they taught miracles to children, why can we not teach our land's greatest miracle—that men and women reunited to mobilize our people for struggle, to put an end to suffering, to misery, to wretchedness, to blows, kicks, forced labor, etc? Who isn't capable of understanding that? Any little kid is capable of understanding that.

And we should make a professor of every Party leader and every Party militant who is knowledgeable. Comrades, it's not only a professor from the schools who has the obligation to teach; anyone—a commander, member of the Party management, political commissar, security commissar, nurse, anyone—has the obligation to teach, to always teach, speaking or clarifying, explaining, helping. Only thus can we move forward. We should not only leave the work of teaching to professors. We should take advantage of every conversation with a comrade—and the comrades who deal with me a lot, who know me well, know that it's like this, that I typically act like this in life—every conversation with a comrade, no matter at what level it may be, should be made into a study, a lesson. One or another learns. All of our conversations have to be a lesson—thus can we buy time and advance. But if we merely sit around telling stories about some sacred tree from Mansoa, or somewhere else, without thinking about learning, we lose time and we don't advance, comrades.

We should avoid the superiority complex of those who know something and the inferiority complex of those who don't know. This is because a person who is capable of teaching shouldn't distance themselves from anyone, especially from our people now. On the contrary, one should constantly immerse himself more among our people. I explained to the comrades, for example, to the comrades who go to study and return: "Until now there have been two tendencies—one is from those who come, who infiltrate our people, but get so muddled with our people that they only make the same mistakes as our people. Others come as graduated engineers, and later they want to be directors. 'Was it Bobô Keita who ran things? But how, Bobô isn't at my level; I'm an engineer and he hardly went to school, he had to wait outside, he only committed errors, he messed up our Party work, ruined everything, etc.' Those are the two extremes that we don't want." What we want is

for those who left to study, who acquired more knowledge, to respect our directors, because they are in fact the directors, even if they didn't go to school. But if one saw some deficiency, one should delve into the middle of the comrades in order to help to constantly raise, to improve the level of our things. This is what it means for a person to know more, who understood more than others and who comes to help us. Mingle with and muddle around with yourselves, but don't forget that it's necessary to help rise up more each day.

We should combat everything insofar as it may be opportunism, even in culture. For example, there are comrades who think that in order to teach in our land it's fundamental to still teach in Creole. Then others think that it's better to teach in Fula, in Mandinga, in Balanta. This is very pleasant to hear; if the Balantas hear this, they will be very happy, but it's no longer possible. How are we going to write in Balanta now? Who knows Balanta phonetics? One still doesn't know, and it's necessary to study first, even Creole. For example, I write, "*n'ea na bai*." Another can write, for example, "*n'ka na bai*." It makes no difference. One can't teach like this. In order to teach a written language, it's necessary to have a certain way of writing it so that everyone writes in the same way; otherwise it's a diabolic mess.

But many comrades, with a sense of opportunism, want to move forward with Creole. We're going to do that, but after studying a lot. Now our language for writing is Portuguese. That's why it's worth it to talk to each other here as much in Portuguese as in Creole. We're not better children of our land if we speak Creole—that's not true. But the child of our land is the one who abides by the Party's laws, the Party's orders, in order to serve our people well. No one should have a complex because one doesn't know Balanta, Mandinga, Pepel, Fula, or Mancanha. If one knows, even better, but if one doesn't know, one has to make sure that others understand, even if by gestures. But if one is working hard in the Party, one moves forward. Because who knows more Manjaco than the traitor Joaquim Batican? Who knows more Fula than the traitor Sene Sané; who knows more Fula hypocrisies than the traitor Tcherno Rachid? Comrades, be patient; but who knows more Balanta than the traitor Fuab? We have to have the courage to report clear things to the comrades. Our values all right, but without opportunism.

We have to have a real sense of our culture. Portuguese (the language) is one of the best things that the *tugas* left us, because language isn't evidence of anything, but an instrument for men to relate with one

another, a means for speaking, to express realities of life and of the world. Just as man invented the radio to speak at a distance, without speaking with language but only with signals, so too through the time of his development man began to speak—the necessity to intercommunicate made him begin to speak. He developed vocal cords, etc., until he could speak. And as language depends on the environment in which one lives, every people created their own language.

If we notice, for example, the people who live near the sea, their language has many things related to the sea; for those who live in the forest, their language has many things related to woodlands. A people that lives in the forest, for example, doesn't know how to say "boat," isn't familiar with boats, and don't live on the sea. For example, in the language of certain European peoples, they say things about the sea or about navigation in Portuguese because the Portuguese live along the sea. Everything has its reason.

Language is an instrument that man created through labor, through struggle, in order to communicate with others. And this gave him a great new strength because no one was closed in on himself anymore; they began to speak with one another—men with men, societies with societies, people with people, country with country, continent with continent. How wonderful! Language was the first natural means of communication that existed. But the world advanced a lot; we didn't advance as much as the world. Our language remained at the level of that world to which we arrived, in which we live, whereas the *tuga*—although he was a colonialist living in Europe—had a language that advanced a good bit more than ours, being able to express concrete and relative truths, for example, with science. For example, we speak like this: the moon is the earth's natural satellite. "Natural satellite"—they say this in Balanta, they say it in Mancanha. It's necessary to talk a lot in order to say it; it's possible to say it, but it's necessary to talk a lot until it becomes clear that a satellite is a thing that revolves around another—whereas in Portuguese one word suffices. Speaking like that, any people in the world understands. And mathematics: we want to learn mathematics, don't we? Take, for example, the square root of thirty-six. How does one say square root in Balanta? It's necessary to tell the truth in order to really understand. I say, for example: "the intensity of a force is equal to mass times the acceleration of gravity." How are we going to say this? How does one say "acceleration of gravity" in our language? It doesn't exist in Creole; we have to say it in Portuguese.

But for our land to advance, every child of our land in the next few years has to know what the acceleration of gravity is. I won't explain this now because there's no time and we have a lot of work. But comrades, tomorrow, in order to seriously advance, not only the directors but also all of the nine-year-olds have to know what the acceleration of gravity is. In Germany, for example, all the children know this. There are many things that we can't say in our language, but there are people who want us to put the Portuguese language to the side because we're Africans and we don't want a foreigner's language. Those people want their mind to advance; they don't want to make their people advance. We of the Party, if we want to lead our people forward for a long time to come—to write, to advance in science—our language has to be Portuguese. And this is an honor. It's the only thing we can appreciate from the *tuga*, because he left his language after having stolen so much from our land. Until an actual day in which, having deeply studied Creole, finding all of the good phonetic rules for Creole, we could begin to write Creole. But we don't prohibit anyone from writing in Creole. If someone wants to write in Creole, if someone wants to write a letter to their love in Creole, they can write it. It's only that in the response one sends, one is going to write in a different way, but making oneself clearly understood. But for science, Creole doesn't yet suffice. Even in Balanta. I remember a comrade of ours, who unfortunately died—Ongo. We would write in Portuguese, and then switch to Creole, and he would write in Balanta. This is because it's possible to write in Balanta—a person who knows enough Portuguese is capable of writing Balanta. They say, for example, "*Watna*," or at times "*n'calossa*." I know how to write it but I write it in my way; yet another person writes it in their way. Even "*djarama*" in Fula can be written with a *d* and a *j*, or it can be written only with a *j*, but we read "*djarama*" because the *j* at the beginning of the word is equivalent to *dj*. But we have to set up a rule as in Mandinga or in other languages. It's necessary to first set up a rule. It has to be like this, comrades, because we have to take absolute advantage of other peoples' experiences, not only our own experience. But if we want to employ that experience in order to utilize it in our land, we have to utilize the expressions of other languages. Well, if we have a language that can explain all this, let's use it; it does no harm.

For us, using Portuguese—like Russian, French, or English—doesn't matter, as long as it serves us, just as using tractors from the Russians, English, Americans, etc. doesn't matter, as long as they serve

us in cultivating the land while gaining our independence. That's because language is an instrument, but it might happen that we already have a language that works and that everyone understands. So we're not going to make everyone learn Russian. It's not worth it, especially since we have the Creole language, which is similar to Portuguese. If in our schools we teach our students how Creole comes from Portuguese and from Africa, anyone will know Portuguese much more quickly. Creole impairs those who learn Portuguese because they don't know what linkage exists between Portuguese and Creole, but if they become familiar with the linkage that exists, this facilitates in learning Portuguese.

We have to end all of our people's indifference in cultural matters with steadfastness in our decisions and in our determination to do things. We have already managed to combat this. And we should not avoid something because it's from a foreigner, or again, because it's foreign; if it's already good and we have to accept it immediately, then it's not worth refusing. That's not culture. It's crazy, it's a complex—be it one of inferiority or stupidity. Faced with things from the foreigner, we should know how to accept what is acceptable and refuse what isn't useful. We have to be capable of raising criticisms. And if you will notice, in a part of our action our struggle has been the constant application of the principle of critical assimilation, that is, availing ourselves of others, but criticizing what can be useful for our land and that which cannot. Accumulating experience and creating.

These are a few aspects of our cultural resistance in the cultural sphere, of which I wanted to speak to you comrades.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. The Cassacá Congress was the first Party Congress of the PAIGC held from 13–17 February 1964 in "the liberated zones in the southern front at Cassaca. Some of the notable positions taken at this Congress were: 1) an enlargement of the Central Committee from thirty to sixty-five members; 2) the establishment of the following seven departments: armed forces, foreign affairs, cadre control, training and information, security, economy and finance, and mass organizations; and 3) the formation of the *Forças Armadas Revolutionárias do Povo* (FARP) (q.v.) as well as People's Stores and an expansion of medical and educational services." Lobban and Mendy, *Historical Dictionary*, 252. The Congress also dealt with some of the major issues arising from militarism, ethnic localism, and various cultural factors. See Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral*, 77–83.

2. While *segurança orgânica* here refers to collective, organizational security, this type of security should not be taken out of the context of "nature" as Cabral uses the

term. The form of security under discussion is not only "organizational" but also harbors "organic" connotations in this context.

3. Cabral is likely referring to Osvaldo Vieira, who was the commander of the liberated eastern front of Boé beginning in 1968 and part of the elected executive committee of the PAIGC political bureau. See Davidson, *No Fist Is Big Enough to Hide the Sky*, 39–42; 55–56.

4. *Morna* and *coladeira* are types of music and dance from Cape Verde.

5. This is likely a reference to the general watchwords provided at the Cassacá Conference in 1964, published in 1965. See "Improve Our Knowledge and Defend our Health," in Cabral, *Unity and Struggle*, 242–45.

6. *O Gato e a Raposa* was one of Aesop's fables, and *O Lobo e o Chibinho* (or *Lobu ku Xibinhu*) was a children's story originating from São Nicalau, Cape Verde. See Hamilton, *Voices from an Empire*, 256.

Chapter Six

Armed Resistance

Comrades:

A part of our work yesterday and today was dedicated to clearly putting forward the problem of our resistance in general, as a response to Portuguese colonial oppression, and to define (although quickly) various forms of our struggle's resistance—every form being a type of response to a type of Portuguese oppression: politics, response: political resistance; economic oppression, response: economic resistance; cultural oppression, response: cultural resistance. We're only missing talking a bit about our armed resistance, which is a response to armed oppression, to colonialist aggression. The comrades clearly know about this in general; it's more visible than the other types of resistance.

We already talked about the beginning of our armed resistance. We told the comrades that our armed resistance, on one hand, is a political act because the war that we're waging in our land is a response to the *tugas*' war; but above all, it's the only way we found to win our political rights of self-determination, for our people to determine their own destiny and to advance like other peoples of the world in the path of progress. Even today you'll remember that our armed resistance is also an expression of our cultural resistance, because—with our armed resistance and risking our lives every day—we negate the situation of second-class Portuguese people, if not of third-class people or of the Portuguese dogs that the Portuguese colonialist foreigners would like to impose. We who, through the labor of our Party, acquire the awareness that we're a part of the African people, that we belong to this continent

called Africa, that—although we're men like all other men, profoundly tied to humanity—our destiny is first of all tied to Africa; and, as Africans and as men, we have the right to a dignified and free life, like the people of Portugal or any other people of the world. Our personality isn't confused with the personality of the *tugas*, although some of us may have children from *tugas*, or descendants from *tugas* mixed with Africans, and although we don't scorn the *tugas*. We want our dignity, our personality, not only in defense of our rights but also of that which is the legitimate basis of our people's culture.

We even show the comrades that, at the end of the day, our armed resistance can be interpreted as a prolongation of our people's resistance—in Guinea particularly, because Guinea was conquered by the *tugas*—to the war of colonial conquest which took almost fifty years in our land. Today we take up arms again, continuing the work of our ancestors, who didn't want to lose their right to direct themselves from their own life. In relation to Cape Verde, we can interpret our struggle—which is still political today, but possibly armed tomorrow, as well—as the prolongation of the resistance of those Africans, the children of Guinea or of any other side of Africa close to Guinea, who were taken to Cape Verde as slaves and who, as slaves, resisted and suffered, negating and fighting against the *tuga* slave drivers who sold them in America, in Brazil, and in other parts of the world as if they were insects.

Thus we should conclude that the primary aspect of our armed resistance is the prolongation of a struggle, in the sense of the defense of our dignity as Africans. We have, therefore, a tradition of struggle in order to defend our freedom, the rights of our society, and our own history in order to follow the path of progress like any other people in the world.

We know who we are; we already spoke about this a lot. We clearly defined our situation geographically, economically, culturally, and socially before and after the *tugas* arrived in our land—that is, before the colonial situation and after the colonial situation.

We're part of a set of peoples of the African continent who—from the moment that the path from Asia (from the Orient) through the Mediterranean was closed off by the Turkish Empire, which conquered Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia Minor—encountered Europe, because Europe (surrounded by the Turks) needed to open new paths in order to reach the riches of Asia that they were used to buying, negotiating over, and exploiting. From this moment on, and because

they were situated at the tip of Europe upon the sea, the Portuguese in particular initiated their so-called discoveries (navigations). The *tuga* crazily thought himself to be God, who parted the seas in order to discover lands, in order to discover new worlds. This is a lie. The *tugas* headed out to sea, first, because they are seaside; secondly, because Portugal was poor and had a lot of people to employ as sailors—contrary to other countries in Europe, which had fewer people available for life on the sea; and thirdly, but fundamentally, because Europe had the absolute necessity of heading out to sea to look for a path to the Indies. No God outlined a way to the sea for the *tugas*. It's enough to see that, after this finished, the *tugas* became poor, wretched, and had a smaller navy than any other country in the world that didn't have a navy. We should put this clearly—which were the facts that led to our contact with the *tugas*.

At the outset, the *tugas* had contact with African peoples on the basis of equality and, in a few cases, even on the basis of the inferiority of the *tugas*, because a few African countries at that time were truly more developed than Portugal. We already told you that the king of Ghana, for example, or of Mombasa or Malindi, on the East African Coast, and the king of the Congo were a bit frightened at the misery of the *tugas*—with the presents that their king gave them compared to the presents that they could give to the king of Portugal. There are beautiful letters that the kings of Portugal wrote to the kings of Africa, to petition good relations with them, lauding them, offering themselves with respect. And this has already been demonstrated; the Portuguese kings always gave their hidden orders, recommending that their people take note on the best way to trick, to steal, etc. The *tugas* had relations with us, Africans, commercial relations on the coast of our African lands, on the basis of equality and of respect. Even after a good while, in Guinea for example, there were signed agreements between the Pepel kings and the Portuguese for business. And in order to trade in our land or in other parts of Africa, the *tugas* paid taxes, like other countries as a matter of fact, which later transformed into colonialist and imperialist countries.

Little by little, Europe transformed itself, it advanced from the commercial point of view, it developed industrially—above all, England—and new needs were created in Europe, with the great development of capitalism. Accumulation of capital, the need for new raw materials so they could develop even more and so they could respond to Europe's miseries, and, at the same time, the necessity of markets so they could

sell things that Europe produced. Before this, because of the wars that existed in Africa, even between Africans themselves (our land's area was also an area of many wars, above all from Futa-Djalon inland, where various aristocratic-military African states fought among each other in order to conquer terrains for pasture, farming, etc.), there were many prisoners of war who were used as slaves. Even in Africa, the social and economic system was one of slavery, although with its own characteristics, and different from slavery on other continents.

The system of slavery still exists today in Africa. While things have gotten a little better, the boys of a small territory's leader are no more than slaves, comrades. The boys of some of our land's "greats" in the forest are like slaves. They're given food, they have children, but all of the children are raised by that same "great" man! Their children's children are always servants. This is called slavery. So for we Africans, regarding our idea of slavery, we were open to arranging slaves for other people.

At that time, America had been discovered, and sometime later, it began to be colonized: Brazil, in South America, islands like Cuba, Jamaica, the so-called West Indies, some countries in Latin America, above all in Central America, and—as I said—North America, colonized by the English. In Brazil and in the southern part of North America where the climate was a bit harsh, even quite abnormal, agriculture took a path requiring serious labor. And the Europeans who left Europe in order to go colonize were really thin because they were expelled from Europe, persecuted because of their religion, because of the class struggle in Europe. So these people, not wanting to pick up a hoe to cultivate the earth, went out around the world to procure people to cultivate for them. Africa was an open field for this because slavery existed in Africa and Africans were accustomed to buying and selling slaves. And so, the *tugas*, navigators of the Atlantic Ocean, and others like the French, the Dutch, etc.—accustomed to pirating on the sea—instead of stealing by sea or on land, instead of pirating, began to buy or to hunt slaves in Africa in order to sell them in America or the New World. A new type of commerce began: slavery.

Slavery lasted for quite some time, during which more than one hundred million Africans were sold around the world, many of whom in large part—according to investigations—died in the middle of the ocean, or from frailty, or in shipwrecks. African men and women were carried to different points of the world, above all to America.

After a while, quarrels began between the English, and also a few other countries of Europe, on one hand and America on the other hand, due to economic competition. This is because America raised itself up on the basis of capacities—those of slave labor—whereas in England, for example, which did not have slaves, it was necessary to pay a salary for a hard day's work. Thus in England there arose the idea of ending slavery, not as a feeling of humanity, but as an economic necessity for combating the advance of America's development.

Great theories were thrown around that slavery was a crime against humanity. It's true, it's a crime, but it was a crime a long time ago.

"It's necessary to end slavery, great propaganda, international meetings, etc." . . . until they reached the point in which slavery was prohibited. But Portugal, which was already stubborn in that time, was continuing with its business of slavery for quite some time, with a good-sized repository of slaves on the Cape Verde Islands in the Atlantic Ocean. Others were taken to Portugal. In Portugal, there are places that have black names because there were many slaves there. For example, there is the *Poço dos Negros*, because there were many blacks guarded as slaves there, and after the end of slavery, they became free, continuing to live in Portugal. Even in the Alentejo, there is a village where there are many mulatto persons, descendants of Africans that Marquês de Pombal sent there in order to populate the Alentejo.

Combating slavery in Europe, the ideas of slaves' freedom advanced in America and slavery was prohibited in the world. In North America, the North was industrialized and the South produced raw materials on the basis of the slave labor force. In order to defend the industrial and economic interests of the North, the idea of putting an end to slavery arose in order to remove the great lords—masters of the lands and slaves of the South, the capacities of life that harmed the interests of the industrial masters of the North. Thus Lincoln, president of Northern America, decided to put an end to slavery. There was a war due to this. The South immediately declared that it no longer made up part of the United States, that it didn't want any federation whatsoever, and that it was going to be an independent State, keeping its slaves. War arose, a hard war, between Americans and Americans—saying that it was due to the slaves, because the North wanted to liberate the slaves. Lie. The North wanted to put an end to the prerogatives of the South, which had slaves and they didn't have them.

And if we study this well, we'll even notice that the Europeans' origins in North America were of one sort, and in the South they were

of another sort. Names of the lands in North have a certain origin, and in the South, they have another. In the South, there are terms from France and from other countries. Because Americans, as you all know, aren't from America. Americans, in fact, are the Indians, almost all of whom were killed by Europeans. The so-called American Indians were not Indians at all, they were "red skins" that were called Indians because when Christopher Columbus discovered America, he thought that he had arrived in India; and when he saw people he called them "Indians," and this name stuck. But they aren't Indians at all.

Comrades:

A new phase in the world arose, in which slavery came to an end. The world became transformed with this. Nevertheless, capitalism developed a lot in Europe, with great accumulations of capital, industrial development, the need for raw materials (as I told you), the need for markets. And so some of the more developed European states settled on the following: to take Africa, in fact, to put an end to the history of small business, small contracts, and respect for the Africans. European states—England, Germany, France, and Belgium, for example—began to quarrel in order to see who was going to take Africa. They looked for ways to partition Africa: first on the basis of the companies that were created, after that by means of the States themselves, and then through colonial wars of occupation. The history is long, I'm not going to narrate everything, but that's how our lands became colonies—occupied by colonialists.

But from that moment on, whether or not we were developed or advanced in relation to Europe, our history stopped. We began to be dragged by the history of European countries. Our history, our freedom, and the freedom of our productive forces were taken and stifled by the colonialists.[1] They clearly had great ease with this course, because we were always divided. You know that in Guinea, for example, the *tugas* fought against us, one by one, defeating us one by one, race by race, and utilizing some races against others. We can say that, if by chance some Manjacos hadn't helped the *tugas* against our own Manjacos, perhaps it would have been difficult for the *tugas* to conquer the Manjacos. We can say that, if the Fulas hadn't helped the *tugas* against the Pepels, and above all if Honório Barreto hadn't tricked the Pepels of Bissau, serving the *tugas*, then perhaps, comrades, the *tugas* wouldn't have settled in our land.

Many people don't quite understand the role that Honório Barreto played in the conquest of Guinea by the *tugas*. Honório Barreto: son of

Lady Rosa de Cacheu, wife of João Barreto of Santiago, Cape Verde, sergeant of a troop of Portuguese men, black, born in Guinea and descendants of Cape Verdeans, a mixture between Cape Verdeans and Manjacos. As a matter of fact, they say that Lady Rosa is the daughter of a Cape Verdean and a Manjaco, that she—Lady Rosa—was taken to Cape Verde, the master of Cacheu and of indigenous peoples of Africa from the side of Teixeira Pinto, Cacheu, etc. to the end of Casamansa, that is, until the river that in that time was called the São Domingos River and that is the Casamansa River today. She was so affectionate among the Africans that everything she said was accepted. She was practically the master of commerce. Her son, Honório Barreto, was educated first in Cape Verde and afterward in Portugal. He didn't finish his studies, was a good guitar player, a bit of a playboy, and he returned to Guinea in order to take care of the country's things. João Barreto had been a prisoner before this, because he launched a revolt against the governor who was there because he was a democrat (not for independence, but in favor of other Portuguese people who were democrats).

After the death of his father, Honório Barreto took care of the family's things, and he was the richest man in Guinea. Facing the revolt of the Pepels—in that time Guinea and Cape Verde had only one government with headquarters in Praia—the governor-general of Cape Verde and Guinea made a proposal to the queen (who was D. Maria in that time), in which they said that if she wanted Guinea to remain peaceful and Portugal to be a serious force in Guinea—to put an end to the wars—it was better to install Honório Barreto as governor. He wrote this to D. Maria, and said: "I have the honor to propose to our queen to choose as the governor of Guinea, although under my orders, the young man named Honório Barreto, learned, intelligent, who frequently attends school, etc., and who is as Portuguese as any of us. And I advise this because, being the richest person in Guinea, he has the greatest interest in conserving the presence of Portugal in Guinea."

The queen saw this, and Honório Barreto was named governor of Guinea. Honório Barreto established a working plan to conquer Guinea by the *tugas*: if he could really take Cacheu, Geba, and Bissau for the *tugas*, no one else would be capable of taking Guinea, and they could dominate all of the indigenous revolts. He saw this plan very well, with intelligence.

But when, for example, the Portuguese were gripped by anger at him because he was black and commanded, he played a great trick. He abandoned everything and returned to his property in Cacheu and

closed himself up in his house. When the Portuguese had difficulties with the indigenous peoples, they went to call for him in order to avoid the Pepels revolting against them. He returned. One time, for example, the king of Intim, whose name is N'Dongo, one of the strongest Pepel kings, surrounded Amura, São José de Bissau's fortress, with his people. And it was in that way that the Portuguese died of hunger there inside—no one could leave. The ships didn't arrive in Bissau, Honório Barreto was in Cacheu, and they went to call for him. People from Cape Verde, *tugas* who were in Cape Verde, came to call for him. He accepted this and came to speak with the Pepel king and promised him that his rights would be respected, that Portugal would in no way take his land, and that he would pay him taxes, etc. A written contract was even drawn up. Meanwhile, the *tugas* arranged that great forces would leave from Portugal, from Lisbon, for Guinea. When they arrived, they massacred the Pepels on a large scale.

Another time, in a contract to not bother the *tugas* that Honório Barreto made with the ruler of Djeu de Rei, that island in front of Bissau, the following promise was made: that king wouldn't meddle with the *tugas*, he wouldn't make war against them. The *tugas* were going to give him so many firearms, so many iron bars and liters of sugarcane per year. This is in a signed contract, archived in Lisbon, which I read. I am giving you an idea of how Honório Barreto in fact knew how to serve Portugal well.

With his plans, he was in fact able to place Guinea in his hands—to deliver it over or not to the *tugas*, according to what he might want. Because in that time, in which he had Guinea completely in his hands, the English and the French (who also wanted Guinea) appeared as well. The English wanted Bolama, and the French wanted to come down from Casamansa, descending and taking everything. Honório Barreto was a great Portuguese "patriot." He resisted with strength, accepted neither promises nor offers that the French and English made to him, and he guarded all of Guinea for the *tugas*. The *tugas* are right to put a statue of Honório Barreto in our land. Without Honório Barreto in Guinea there wouldn't be any *tugas*. This is true. But we should have respect for Honório Barreto. We can criticize him in his attitude, but he was a man of valor. For that time, with that mentality, as an individual who left our people but who was educated by the Portuguese, among the Portuguese, speaking Portuguese well, playing his guitar, singing *fado*,[2] etc., he didn't have anything else to do if not this, comrades. This was his job and he did it well, thus he was a man of valor. We

can't understand some of our lineages today without Honório Barreto, for example: like "Alvarenga"—because Lady Rosa called herself Rosa Alvarenga—João Barreto and Rosa Alvarenga bore the name "Carvalhos Alvarenga So-and-So Barreto," joining a whole two families, forming fine people of our land like our comrade Barreto seated over there. But today, in the face of this new phenomenon of the struggle of our people and for the independence of Africa—the independence of the whole world, with struggles of liberation everywhere—we can't understand how any descendant of Honório Barreto could still favor the *tugas*. If Honório Barreto could serve the *tugas*, then perhaps any one of us would have preferred to do it, if we had his education and if we had lived in that historical moment in which he lived. But today, Honório Barreto's descendants, whether or not they went to school, if they still favor the *tugas*, then those people don't yet have forgiveness.

Thus, you comrades see where we have departed from, and how we fell into the *tugas*' hands.

When it comes to Cape Verde, you comrades know, there was no conquest of Cape Verde. Cape Verde doesn't consist of islands that were "found" in that time by the *tugas*. After they happened upon the tip of Africa where today Dakar is located, and given its greenery—well, at the time it was discovered it was quite green, and it's a cape, that is, a piece of land that enters the sea from inland—they called it Cape Verde. Today, they call that tip Dakar. After a few days, heading out to sea, they came across some islands, and as they were close to Cape Verde, every island took its own name. That which was discovered in the month of May they called *Ilha de Maio*; that which was discovered on the day of St. James was the *Ilha de São Tiago*; that which had really salty terrain became *Ilha do Sal*; another, because it was long and beautiful they called *Ilha da Boa Vista*, etc.—according to the *tugas*' Christianity, according to their way of seeing. But you know that they call the region in which Dakar is located *Région du Cap Vert*. In Dakar, one sees a lot of things where *Cap Vert* is written, and people think that Cape Verde is there, and it's because of this that I'm giving you this explanation.

There was no one in Cape Verde at the time in which it was discovered. But there's a hypothesis in which Cape Verde had people before, particularly people from the African coast—as many Manjacos as Lebus, Lebu fishermen from the coast of Senegal—had reached as far as Cape Verde, navigating in their canoes. And today these canoes are tested, and they're able to navigate long distances, like the Nhominca

canoes, for example. Moreover, there is the historical hypothesis that Phoenicians were an ancient people who inhabited the land of the Lebanese (who we call Syrians) who are in Asia Minor and who made the so-called tour around Africa; they say that they got to Cape Verde and that they lived there.

The truth is that when the *tugas* came across the islands of Cape Verde in the middle of the sea, they didn't find anyone there. And when slavery thrived, they resolved to bring slaves there to make Cape Verde a repository of slaves. When slavery began to come to an end, every island was placed in the hands of an important white man—a Sir-Something-or-Other, as an administrative recipient, master of the island—who made it so that slaves would be exploited as slaves, or anyhow exploited as servants, as serfs in the house of the land's master. This was the point from where we started—the situation that the *tugas* created in Africa.

Knowing our starting point well, we have to know clearly where we are going with our armed struggle. Our armed struggle, we say, is a form of political struggle that seeks to liberate our land from imperialist-colonial economic exploitation. This is our fundamental objective: to liberate our land's productive forces from oppression, from imperialist-colonial domination. But one question: Are we doing this to return to where we were, to return to Cape Verde as slaves, or as serfs, or with people serving as servants? Are we doing this to return to the time in which the Manjacos and Pepels quarreled a lot, in which the Mandingas and Balantas didn't get along? This is a bit difficult. No, we're liberating our land to advance like other peoples of the world, for progress, for a life of dignity, for our land's unity—nationally—so we can help to raise up a new and better Africa. That's the objective of our struggle in the context of the world and of humanity, to which we belong as human beings.

In our struggle, therefore, any shot at Buba's barracks or a shot taken at some *tuga*—on the road or in an ambush—is a political act of great magnitude. We're serving humanity, comrades; we're serving our people, our land, Africa, and humanity. This is our responsibility to shoot, to wage war in our land—in order to liberate our people.

For this very reason, we have to orient our armed struggle in the best way possible, in accordance with our land's reality and in accordance with the experience of other peoples as well, as long as that experience can be valid for us. For this very reason, we have to avoid (and we do avoid) everything in our struggle insofar as it might dimin-

ish the dignity of the human being. In our struggle, our Party prohibits everything that might be a crime, everything that, in our spirit, might be hateful or a desire for blood. We spill blood, and we have hatred for the colonialist who dominates us, knowing what we're doing, clearly, in order not to confuse us, comrades. This is why we have difficulties with our brothers the Felupes joining us, because according to them, when someone is killed in war, it's necessary to cut off their head and ears. This is a bit difficult for us. It's easy for the *tugas*. This is why our war is very different from many wars in Africa, comrades. Our enemy—who is criminal in the worst sense, barbaric, from the worst kind of people, from the worst people to appear on earth—feels shame before the purity and elevated consciousness of our armed struggle for national liberation.[3]

In our struggle, we have to combat all false ideas, all ideas of opportunism, and we have to defend our Party line to the utmost, as you all know.

Our Party realized that it was necessary to mobilize and organize the people for struggle, and it mobilized the people. This had to be the first phase of our struggle, and we carried it out well, comrades. We created armed groups almost naturally, rooted among our people, supported by our people. These groups grew little by little. We acted against the enemy, developing our struggle step by step, creating new types of fighting groups, improving our weapons, and always supported by our people. We did the most we could to understand the war in every part of our land, and today only bringing the armed struggle to the islands remains: Bissau Island, Bolama Island, the Bijagos Archipelago, and the Cape Verde Archipelago. There is no longer anyplace in our land where we haven't waged armed struggle. Even in Bissau, we already attacked Bolama—the *tugas* said this on their radio.

Throughout our armed struggle and armed resistance, we have to be able to conserve our forces, but to also develop our forces every day. Those who wage an armed resistance but aren't able to conserve their forces and to constantly develop and grasp them will lose them, because one either develops and advances an armed struggle's forces or then they disappear. To always be in action is the best way to develop forces.

The armed struggle, armed resistance, is almost like gymnastics: whoever has the most strength can perform the most gymnastics, the most action, the most movement. Unfortunately, many of our comrades don't understand this and they're capable of wasting more and more

time without taking any action, thus killing our armed forces—because the less action a combatant undertakes, the more difficulties he has in undertaking other actions.

Step by step, we managed to lead our people to take up arms in three phases: first phase—a few of our people's children, whether in the forest or the city, as guerillas. Little by little, we increased the number of guerillas; we transformed the guerilla forces into a regular army. But afterward, even in the villages, we put arms in the hands of the people as a militia. And today, little by little, we should put arms in the hands of our entire people, our people in the liberated areas at least. The people in arms: that should be a fundamental characteristic of our armed resistance, of a people that struggles for its liberty.

What is the objective? To destroy the enemy's forces, to arrange all the necessary means to destroy the vital forces of the enemy. The war is hard; it's not pleasant, but no one wages war because of taste—only a criminal kills because of a taste for killing. But the war is for killing, comrades. Whoever kills more in the war and whoever makes fewer errors wins the war. That's why the objective of our armed resistance is to liquidate the enemy's vital forces. Our obligation is to liquidate the colonialist *tugas*. Whichever *tuga* might bear arms against our people—against our people's liberty—should be liquidated.

And through our struggle, we should orient our labor in such a way as to lose less of our strength. In fact, our Party has sought to use fighting tactics, beyond our general strategy, in such a way as to avoid as much as possible our comrades dying in war. In our war, we should do what is possible in every stage, but preparing ourselves today to do better in the following stage. This has been the norm of our Party. We've recommended maximum caution to our comrades in acting against the enemy in the moment in which we can actually act, because the land is ours. But we should always act because it's always possible to act in certain conditions that we ourselves can create.

As much as possible, we have sought to preserve, to conserve the life of our comrades. And we can say that a large part of the comrades that we already lost in our struggle was due to errors committed by their own comrades: errors of vigilance, errors of war calculations, or even disobedience of the Party's watchwords. Carelessness on paths that can be mined, carelessness crossing rivers that can have enemy boats. Countless times comrades arrive to cross a river, and instead of communicating with the (well-marked) other side, in order to watch out for the enemy, they arrive, get in a canoe, and cross over. Along the

way, they encounter the *tugas*. Even I, when crossing the Farim River, returning from the North of our land, before arriving to the other side, an enemy boat appeared in the corner of the river. When our feet touched ground amidst the mangroves, the boat came behind us. And we knew that comrade Luís Cabral had to get into the water, almost dying with other comrades, because the enemy boat was on top of them. And how many of our comrades lost their lives because of this? Only carelessness, inattention, uncertainty that one only does something well if it has been studied well. There's too much trust in luck!

There were comrades who died in bombardments, for example, due to inattention, carelessness with planes, and refusal to follow the Party's rules—to make shelters, to leave the bases. People die in war; it's normal to die in war. Whoever heads into war knows that they can live or die, but they'll die more or less depending on the errors they commit, depending on whether or not they follow the direction of the Party line (or of who directs the line) so that they can preserve their life. And preserving life doesn't mean cowardice, it doesn't mean denying the war. So many comrades already died outside of the war, during this struggle, but so many comrades have also already died abroad, and perhaps if they had been in our land they wouldn't have died. Comrades who are sometimes on the front lines for years one day drop what they're doing and go to their village. Just when they arrive, the *tugas* kill us. So we shouldn't be afraid of dying in the war, but dying with success, with utility, not dying for nothing only because one trusts luck.

We're proud of the fact that in the war, compared with other wars, whether in Africa or outside Africa, very few people have died—very few people in respect to those who could have died given our concrete conditions. Our Party has known how to orient the struggle, reducing to a minimum the loss of our comrades. And we have done the most we could for the recuperation of those who are injured. This is one of the strengths of our struggle. So we shouldn't only defend ourselves, always acting (because the best defense in an armed struggle like ours is action, the best defense is offense), but we should also defend all of our struggle's achievements. Although, we shouldn't confuse remaining attached to terrain only to defend a liberated area, instead of moving forward and attacking the *tugas* in their barracks. We should create our own means of defending liberated areas, but the liberated areas can't impede us from advancing on the enemy to strike them constantly.

To the extent that the war advances, our Party has been able to transform our war's structure. Our comrades should really bear in mind

what our struggle was at the outset. Little by little, we modified our guerilla groups, we created army corps or military units, we created commandos, and we began to coordinate the struggle in the framework of zones, of different regions. Before, for example, the Armed Forces command was the Party Committee, but to the extent that our Armed Forces grew, the war advanced and we had to separate the local directorate from the Party Directorate of Armed Forces, although those who directed the Armed Forces were also the Party leaders. We created a strike force, an army corps, moving through sectors of struggle, etc., and all this shows the comrades how our struggle has been dynamic. And one of the strengths of our struggle is the following: we've never let our struggle crystallize, that is, stop at a given stage of evolution. On the contrary, we've always known how to adapt the struggle to its new conditions. We've known how to move from the pistol to the mortar, but that was also modifying every structure until we reached the mortar. We've known how to change the types of struggle, moving to new battlefronts in the moment in which it was necessary to do so. Of course, sometimes—in our conditions—this was a bit late. But sometimes we commit errors, such as, for example, when we created overcrowded units that we called "sections," which we later had to reduce. *Vitorino*, for example, etc., which we later had to divide because there were too many people for the leadership at that time—we couldn't do it. We stuck with the bigroups.

But we should say that, in a war like ours, in a land like ours, the best way to fight is with few people divided into small groups. Consider the attack a few days ago in Pitche after the meeting we had with the comrades in Gabu. We were happy with comrade Baro Seidi, with the attack that he launched, but we told him that he could still do better. He actually got fed up at a whim—he and Buonte Na Sansa, who is his political commissar. After that meeting, he returned with his combatants and attacked Pitche with two groups of eighteen people, entering inside the *tugas*' barracks, grabbing the *tugas* inside the shelters, blowing up a few houses, etc. That is, we're still certain that, in this struggle, the best way to fight is with small groups and with a lot of courage, getting the most out of our arms, above all our small arms, comrades.

Unfortunately, since we've had mortars—as I already told you—the Infantry comrades take some liberties, and the *patchanga* bullets are rusting in the carrier.[4] But you see, the Party directorate was struggling—and you know what it was doing; for example, it was removing people from the infantry, bringing them to other army corps, and taking

them to other places. And our commanding and director comrades, fortunately, understand this clearly in order to help us. It's not worth it to have five bigroups to throw the *tugas* out of the Buba area or the Cubucaré area, when if we join two bigroups—two on one side and three on the other (making five)—in order to throw the *tugas* out of the Buba area or the Cubucaré area, we can then take them to the North in order, for example, to reinforce our action in the Manjacos' land or in Nhacra, which is incredibly important for us.

So we should do this at every step, yesterday as today and tomorrow, while our struggle lasts: coordinate our struggle, dominate our struggle completely, knowing what's going on. And we should do everything so that the relations between our Armed Forces and our people might be the best possible. We should convince our people—by our gestures, by our action, by our words—that our soldiers, our combatants are their children who struggle to defend them, who go out because of their heart and because of their gut in order to defend them, not to do them any harm.

Various comrades of the Armed Forces, even leaders, have harmed our Party and our struggle a lot, ruining the relations of our Armed Forces with the population. This, as I already told you, is a crime of treason; it's serving the *tugas*. We have to be hard in combating this, in all seriousness. And I can say the following to the comrades: no matter how much strength our Party has, if we don't defend good relations with our people every day, if we don't reinforce these relations more every day—through political work and concrete acts on the part of our Armed Forces—then our struggle will be condemned to failure.

Whether in recruiting new people for the Armed Forces, in obtaining the support of the population, or even in justifying our sacrifices, it's fundamental to constantly develop good relations between the Armed Forces and our land's population, comrades. That means that we're not going to do harm. Where do we have to do harm in order to advance? We have to do it with patience. But not in the interest of one, with the delusions of one who wants to fight, to deal blows or something. Everything in the interest of our own people.

As I said, it's good to really and clearly spread the idea of where we're going in every moment of our armed struggle, in every moment of our struggle's progression. Our objective is to remove the Portuguese colonialists from our land, in Guinea and in Cape Verde. Our idea, our goal, is not to "stick it" to the *tugas*, to throw them to the

ground like when we struggle with someone in a "brawl" in our land. Our objective is to remove the colonialists from our land.

You saw the case of the war in Vietnam, which led to the independence of the Republic of North Vietnam. When they ended the war, with the victory of the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu (where they surrounded and defeated almost thirty thousand Frenchmen), the French had 500,000 well-placed soldiers in Vietnam in every position. But due to the defeat at Dien Bien Phu (which was an enemy camp) and due to political pressure in the international sphere, France was obligated to concede. A few war officials became furious at this time, like General Salan and others. And why? Because the French still had a lot of strength—more strength than ever. Take the concrete case of Algeria. When Algeria reached independence through the negotiations in Evian, the French had never been so strong in Algeria: everything was partitioned, French troops were everywhere, hundreds of thousands of French troops over and above a million civilians, many with weapons in hand. But they gained independence because of political work, political pressure within the land, the great courage of the Algerian people, and the great sacrifice of peoples in the cities, comrades. For example, when the French prohibited all demonstrations in Algiers (whoever went out to the street would be killed), the Algerians—men, women, and children, young and old—rose up and went out into the street one Sunday with their flag held high. In one day, the French killed more than six hundred Algerians in the streets of Algiers. On the following Sunday, they went out again. Comrades, it's necessary to have courage. We have to feel good about our war compared to the Vietnam or Algerian war; we almost never die.

While we're waging war, our people in Bissau enjoy our victories. Madame So-and-So receives invitations from all over where we weren't accustomed to going—licenses to go to Portugal. Mr. Mamadu Djassi already appeared in the newspaper. Honorable Mrs. D. Mariama Camará—in Bissau enjoying our struggle's successes. In Algeria, while the combatants were among the rocks, in the forest, or in the mountains, the population rose up with force in the city, demonstrating without weapons, showing the French that they had to get out. And as that provoked assassinations and massacres, world opinion—even in France—rose up against the French government. We can say that one of the largest forces that won the Algerian war was also French opinion itself, and Algeria's children in France—who numbered more than 500,000 and who conducted sabotages even in France. But as you

know, many of them were also favorable to the French, to such an extent that the French killed Algerians as much in Algeria as in France. But they were forced by world opinion, by the courage of the Algerian people, by the sacrifice to which they had to consent, because in the Algerian war more than one and a half million people died for their independence, comrades. Two times the population of all of Guinea died in the Algerian war. Seven and a half years of struggle.

But the objective of a war of liberation isn't only for the enemy to ask forgiveness from us, to recognize that he lost. It's not that. It's for him to sit down and say that we're right,[5] that we can take our land. That's why we have to know where we're going with our war. And however much more we beat the enemy, in every little battle in which we confront him, all the better, because the day will come more quickly when he decides to get out because everything is already really bad. In our land, fortunately, the *tuga* knows that he lost, but he still doesn't leave. Don't forget: we still have to fight him. He knows that he has to hold on in order to also hold on to Angola and Mozambique; and he has to muster strength to hold on a bit, at least while we don't advance more with the struggle in Cape Verde. The day that our struggle begins in Cape Verde seriously—is stretched wider, with weapons in hand—on that day the war in our land will certainly end. But that doesn't mean that it might not end without a struggle beginning in Cape Verde; it might be finished. The truth is that, when we start a war in Cape Verde, the Portuguese will become even more confronted from every side.

Comrades, we can't repeat enough that the fundamental objective of our armed resistance is to realize that which we can't obtain only with politics. Thus, it's to open new perspectives for our people, in independence, in peace, in work, in justice, and for progress. We're convinced that it's our Party that can do this.

In the context of our people's destiny, which we ourselves are creating, in the context of the demands of our time's history, it's our Party that has the mission—through political, economic, and cultural resistance, and acting forcefully and necessarily in the armed resistance—to open this new path for our people, to guarantee for our people the necessary security and the certainty that it will live in progress. That is our mission, comrades, particularly of those comrades who are attaining more responsibilities in our Party every day.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Cabral further elaborates this theory of imperialism's stagnation of local histories in his speech in Havana. See "Presuppositions and Objectives of National Liberation in Relation to Social Structure," in *Unity and Struggle*.

2. *Fado* is a type of Portuguese music, typically acoustic, which expresses longing or melancholy. The term itself means "fate," and often deals with themes of fatefulness. See Elliot, *Fado and the Place of Longing*.

3. There is evidence that Cabral is not exaggerating here, but in fact setting forth a policy that proved fundamental in the psychological victories over the colonial military's morale. The PAIGC's clean war tactics should not be overlooked or brushed aside. See Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral*, 148.

4. This refers to the Czechoslovakian machine guns, whose breech had the form of a drum. These were the most used machine guns in the revolution prior to the arrival of Soviet machine guns. See Chaliand, "Les Maquis de Guinée 'Portugaise,'" 1883.

5. "*que temos razão*" This phrase can be translated as "being right" or, more literally, as "having reason."

Part III

Cultural and Political Struggle

Chapter Seven

The Role of Culture in the Struggle for Independence

PREFACE

Only the sincere wish to respond to the friendly invitation of UNESCO and a profound conviction of the importance of the topic proposed have enabled us to prepare this modest study at a time when our commitments in the arduous liberation struggle of our people demand that our time be concentrated on the study and solution of national problems. Rather than take up in a detailed manner the various points proposed for the discussion, whose timeliness and urgency are in no sense minimized, we have preferred to focus our attention on the importance of the role of culture in the preindependence or liberation movement. Since we have not had the time to gather together the books and documents, which would without doubt have given us a more solid foundation and richer content, we are by force of circumstances limited to drawing on our own experience and observations in our struggle and in the study of other struggles against imperialist domination. In the part dealing specifically with the role of culture in the liberation movement, we have taken up and developed some of the ideas and reflections put forth in the conference we attended in February 1970 at Syracuse University on the theme "Culture and National Liberation."

There is no need to point out that the conditions under which this paper was written, combined with the limitations of our knowledge, have made for shortcomings in it which we hope the reader in his

generosity will understand without necessarily excusing them. Still, if we succeed in convincing him (or in reinforcing his conviction) of the crucial importance of culture in the development of the liberation movement, this paper will have served a purpose.

Personally, we hope that UNESCO has not erred in confounding warrior with scholar; for the struggle for the liberation and the advancement of the people is, or should be, also a ceaseless enquiry in the domains of education, science, and culture.

June 1972[1]

INTRODUCTION

The struggle of peoples for national liberation and independence against imperialist domination has become an immense progressive force for mankind and doubtless constitutes one of the most essential features of the history of our times. An objective and impartial analysis of imperialism as a "natural"—in that it is necessary—historical *fact* or *phenomenon* within the broader context of the economic and political development of a major segment of mankind will show that for all the excesses and misery, pillage, crimes, and destruction of human and cultural values it has left in its wake, imperialist domination was not just a negative thing. The immense monopolistic accumulation of capital by a half-dozen nations in the northern hemisphere through piracy, pillage of the goods of other peoples, and indeed the very growth of capitalism on the basis of untrammeled exploitation of the labor of the peoples of these countries did not mean solely monopoly over the colonies, partition of the world, and imperialist domination.

Imperialist capital, in its insatiable quest for surplus value, released in the accumulating countries new energy for man's creative capacities; it effected a profound transformation in the means of production (the material productive forces), with accelerated progress of science, techniques, and technology, accentuated the socialization of labor, and enabled vast segments of the population to move a long way up the social ladder. In the dominated countries, where in general the historical development of the dominated peoples was arrested by this process, where they were not simply directly or by degrees exterminated, imperialist capital imposed new kinds of relations on the indigenous society, imparting to it a more complex structure, and engendered, fostered, sharpened, or resolved contradictions and social conflicts; it introduced

new elements into the economy through the circulation of money and the development of domestic and foreign markets, and in the guise of a new type of class domination (colonialist and racist), it gave birth to new nations based on human groupings or peoples at different stages of development.

To be sure, imperialism, as capital in action, did not achieve in the foreign lands under its domination the historic mission it accomplished in the accumulating countries. It is not a defense of imperialist domination to recognize that it charted out new horizons for the world, reduced the world's dimensions, opened up new stages of development of human societies, and, in spite or because of the prejudices, discrimination, and crimes to which it gave rise, helped us to acquire a more profound knowledge of mankind, as a totality in movement, as a unity within the complex diversity of its development.

Imperialist domination over several continents bred and deepened the clashes between both peoples and societies, sometimes gradual, sometimes abrupt, and on many different fronts. It was partly the physical traits of the populations which set off such conflicts, but they also stemmed from the stage or type of their historical development, the level of their productive forces, and the basic features of their social structure and culture. The practice of imperialist domination, whether it is affirmed or negated, required (and still requires) a precise knowledge of the *dominated object* and of the real historical (economic, social, cultural) conditions of that object. This knowledge must necessarily be formulated in terms of a comparison with the *dominating subject* and with its historical reality. And such knowledge is an urgent necessity for the practice of imperialist domination, a need resulting from the clash, generally violent, between two *identities* which are distinct with regard to their historical content and antagonistic in their functions. The quest for such a knowledge, whether for the purpose of affirming or negating imperialist domination, has contributed to a general enrichment of the social and human sciences, despite the one-sided, subjective, and prejudice-ridden character of most of the approaches and results obtained in this research.

Indeed, never has man been so interested in learning about other men and other societies as during the course of this century of imperialism and imperialist domination. Information, hypotheses, and theories in unprecedented number were accumulated in history, ethnology, ethnography, sociology, and culture on peoples or human groupings under the imperialist yoke. The concepts of race, caste, ethnicity, tribe, na-

tion, culture, identity, dignity, and so many others attracted the growing attention of those who study man and so-called primitive or developing societies.

More recently, spurred by the liberation struggle that is the negation of imperialist domination, one need became more acute: namely, to analyze and understand the characteristics of these societies as a function of struggle; to determine the factors that spurred them to struggle or restrained them from it, thereby exercising a positive or negative influence on their development. In general, all agreed that culture had a special role to play in this context, and one may affirm that any attempt to shed light on the true role of culture in the development of the liberation (pre-independence) movement should be a useful contribution to the general struggle of peoples against imperialist domination.

I

The fact that independence movements are generally marked from the very outset by a flurry of manifestations of things cultural has led to the observation that these movements are preceded by a cultural renaissance of the dominated people. The argument is even taken one step further, and it is said that culture is a method for collective mobilization, a *weapon*, that is, in the struggle for independence.

But in our opinion this concept, which we have formed on the basis of the experience of our own struggle and, indeed, of Africa's struggle, is a too limited, if not wrong, view of the fundamental role of culture in the development of the liberation movement. And we think that this limitation or misconception derives from an unwarranted generalization from a real but circumscribed phenomenon located at one specific level within the vertical structure of the colonized societies: namely, among the colonial *elites* or *diasporas*. A generalization of this sort overlooks or ignores one essential fact in the problem: the indestructible character of the cultural resistance of the people—the popular masses—in the face of foreign domination.

It is a fact that for its own security imperialist domination requires cultural oppression and endeavors to liquidate directly or indirectly the cultural fabric of the dominated people. But the people are able to create and develop the liberation movement only because they have kept their culture alive and vigorous despite the relentless and organized repression of their cultural life; with their resistance at the politi-

cal and military levels destroyed, they continue to resist culturally. This cultural resistance will at a certain point, determined by internal and external factors governing the development of the dominated society and its relations with the colonial power, assume new forms (political, economic, armed struggle) to directly challenge foreign domination.

Except for cases of genocide or the violent reduction of native populations to cultural and social insignificance, the *epoch of colonization* was not sufficient, at least in Africa, to bring about any significant destruction or degradation of the essential elements of the culture and traditions of the colonized peoples. The colonial experience of imperialist domination in Africa shows that (with the exception of genocide, racial segregation, and apartheid) the only purportedly positive solution found by the colonial power to break the cultural resistance of the colonized peoples has been *assimilation*. But the total failure of the policy of progressive assimilation of the native populations is patent proof of the falseness of this theory, as well as of the capacity of the dominated peoples to resist attempts to destroy or degrade their cultural legacy.[2]

On the other hand, even in settlement colonies, where the vast majority of the population remains composed of natives, the sphere of colonial occupation and, in particular, of *cultural occupation* is generally restricted to the coastal areas and a few circumscribed areas in the interior. The influence of the culture of the colonial power is almost nonexistent in the horizontal structure of the dominated society outside of the capital and the other urban centers. Its impact is significant only in the vertical structure of the colonial social pyramid, which colonialism itself created, and affects, in particular, a group we may call the "native petite bourgeoisie," in addition to a very small number of workers in the urban centers.

Thus the great rural masses, along with a considerable percentage of the urban population (on the whole more than 99 percent of the indigenous population),[3] remain untouched, or almost untouched, by the cultural influence of the colonial power. This is due partly to the necessarily obscurantist nature of imperialist domination, which demonstrates contempt for and endeavors to repress the culture of the dominated people and, indeed, has no interest in promoting the acculturation of the popular masses, which are a source of manpower for forced labor and the major victims of exploitation; but it is also partly due to the efficacy of the cultural resistance of these masses, who, subject to political domination and economic exploitation, find in their own culture the

only defense capable of preserving their *identity*. In cases where the native society has a vertical structure, this defense of their cultural legacy is further reinforced by the interest of the colonial power in protecting and reinforcing the cultural influence of the ruling classes, who are its allies.

What we have just said means, therefore, that in general there is no significant destruction or degradation of the culture and traditions of either the popular masses of the dominated countries (i.e., the laboring social strata or classes in the countryside and in the towns) or of the native ruling classes (traditional chieftains, noble families, religious hierarchy). Repressed, persecuted, humiliated, and betrayed by various social groups that have compromised themselves with the foreigner, taking refuge in the villages, the forests, and the minds of generations of victims of domination, culture weathers every storm until, encouraged by the liberation struggles, it can burst forth again in its full flower. This is why the problem of a "return to one's origins" or a cultural renaissance is not posed nor could it be posed by the popular masses: indeed, they are the bearers of their own culture, they are its source, and, at the same time, they are the only entity truly capable of preserving and creating culture—in a word, of *making history*.

To correctly assess the true role of culture in the development of the liberation movement, we must therefore (at least in Africa) draw a distinction between the situation of the popular masses who have kept their culture intact and the situation of the more or less assimilated, uprooted social groups that have been alienated from their culture or whose cultural education has quite simply been stripped of all native elements. In contrast to, or differently from, what occurs among the popular masses, the native colonial elites molded by colonization live materially and intellectually in the culture of the colonial foreigner (even though they may retain some cultural elements of the native society) and seek more and more to identify with him in their social behavior and even in their attitudes toward the values of the indigenous culture. Over two or three generations of colonization, a social layer forms, consisting of civil servants and employees in various branches of the economy (especially commerce), members of the liberal professions, and a small number of urban and rural property owners. This new class, the native petite bourgeoisie, molded by foreign domination and indispensable to the system of colonial exploitation, is situated between the laboring popular masses of the countryside and towns and the minority of local representatives of the foreign ruling class. Al-

though it may have relatively extensive ties with the popular masses or with the traditional chieftains, the native petite bourgeoisie generally aspires to a way of life similar to, if not identical with, that of the foreign minority; at the same time as it limits its relations with the masses, it tries to integrate itself with this minority, often to the detriment of family or ethnic ties and always spurred by individual ambitions. But it is never able, despite a few obvious exceptions, to surmount the barriers imposed by the system; it is prisoner of the contradictions in the social and cultural reality in which it lives, for it cannot flee, in the colonial peacetime, its condition of a *marginal* or marginalized social layer or class. This marginality is the stage on which the sociocultural drama of the colonial elites or native petite bourgeoisie is played out, both in the colony and among the diaspora, a drama experienced more or less intensely according to material circumstances and the level of acculturation, but always individually, never as a collective thing.

It is within the context of daily life and its dramas, against a background of confrontation, generally violent, between the popular masses and the colonial ruling class, that a sense of bitterness and *frustration complex* begins to thrive and grow among the native petite bourgeoisie, at the same time as it begins to feel a pressing need, which grows little by little in its consciousness, to contest its situation of marginality and to discover an *identity* for itself. As a result of the failure of its efforts to identify with the foreign ruling class, toward which it is impelled both by the essential aspects of its cultural education, as well as by its social aspirations, this need for liberation from frustration and marginality turns the native petite bourgeoisie toward the other pole of the sociocultural conflict within which it lives (i.e., the indigenous popular masses) in its quest for *identity*. As we have seen, the dominated society (dominated because it has been beaten, oppressed, and repressed both economically and politically) preserves the core of its culture despite all attempts by the colonial power to destroy it and continues its cultural resistance, which cannot be broken. The cultural domain is the only domain where the native petite bourgeoisie is able to satisfy this need for liberation and to find an identity, hence the "return to one's origins," which appears to be all the more urgent the greater the isolation of the petite bourgeoisie (or the native elites) and the more acute its sense or complex of frustration, which is the case for the African diasporas in the colonial or racist metropolises. It is no coincidence, therefore, that theories and movements such as *Pan-Africanism* and *negri-*

tude, two characteristic examples of the "return to one's origins" that rested on the postulate of a cultural identity among all black Africans, were first conceived in cultural spaces remote from black Africa. The quest of North American blacks for an African identity is another more recent and perhaps desperate expression of an attempt to return to one's origins, though it is also clearly influenced by a new reality, namely, the gaining of political independence by the vast majority of the African peoples. At the level of outward appearances, this aspiration is marked by the display, often ostentatious, of a more or less conscious desire for cultural identification.

But a return to one's origins is not, nor can it be, in itself an *act of struggle* against foreign domination (colonial and/or racist), nor does it necessarily mean a return to traditions. It is the native petite bourgeoisie's negation of the dogma of the supremacy of the culture of the ruling power over the dominated people, with whom it needs to identify in order to resolve the sociocultural conflict within which it is foundering in search of an identity. The return to one's origins is therefore not a voluntary gesture but the only viable answer to the imperious challenge of concrete, historical necessity, determined by the irresolvable contradiction that opposes the colonized society to the colonial power, the exploited popular masses to the exploiting foreign class; every indigenous social layer or class is obliged to define its position in terms of this contradiction.

When the phenomenon of "returning to one's origins" [‹‹retour aux sources››] goes beyond the individual case and begins to be expressed by groups or movements, the factors responsible for it, both internally and externally, the political and economic development of society will already have reached a level where this contradiction is transformed into a conflict (concealed or open), a prelude to the pre-independence movement or the struggle for liberation from the foreign yoke. Thus a return to one's origins is historically consistent only if it entails not only a real engagement in the struggle for independence but also a total and definitive identification with the aspirations of the popular masses, who contest not only the foreigner's culture but also his rule. Otherwise the return to one's origins is no more than a solution aimed at securing some temporary advantages and an expression, whether conscious or unconscious, of the political opportunism of the petite bourgeoisie.

It should be pointed out that this phenomenon of returning to one's origins, whether real or only apparent, does not occur all at once, wholly and uniformly within the native petite bourgeoisie. It is a slow,

discontinuous, and unequal process, whose development in each individual depends on his degree of acculturation, the material conditions of his existence, his ideological upbringing, and his own history as a social being. It is this inequality that lies at the basis of the division of the native petite bourgeoisie into three distinct groupings with regard to the liberation movement:

a. an initial minority which, even if it wants the end of foreign domination, clings to the ruling colonial class and openly opposes this movement in defense of its own social security;
b. a majority of vacillating or undecided elements;
c. a second minority whose members take part in the creation and leadership of the liberation movement and are its main source of life.

But this last grouping, which plays a crucial role in the development of the pre-independence movement, is not able fully and truly to identify itself with the popular masses (with its culture and its aspirations) except through struggle, and the degree of this identification depends on the form or forms of the struggle, the ideological content of the movement, and the level of moral and political consciousness of each individual.

II

The major problem of the liberation movement, namely, the identification of a part of the native petite bourgeoisie with the popular masses, presupposes one essential condition: *that in the face of the destructive activity of imperialist domination, the popular masses preserve their identity* as something different and distinct from that of the colonial power. It should be useful, therefore, to ascertain in which cases this preservation is or is not possible; why, when, and at what levels of the dominated society the problem of a loss or absence of identity is posed, and hence the need to affirm or reaffirm, within the pre-independence movement, an identity that is different and distinct from that of the colonial power.

The identity of an individual or a group is a sociobiological quality independent of the will of this individual or group but which has meaning only when it is expressed with regard to other individuals or other human groups. The dialectic nature of identity rests in the fact that it

identifies and *distinguishes*, for an individual (or a human group) is identical with some individuals (or groups) only if he (or it) is distinct from others. The definition of identity, individual or collective, is thus at once an affirmation and a negation of a number of characteristics defining individuals or groups as a function of *historical* (biological and sociological) coordinates at a given moment in their evolution. Indeed, identity is not an immutable quality precisely because the biological and sociological facts that define it are in permanent evolution. Neither biologically nor sociologically, no two beings (individuals or groups) exist in time that are absolutely identical or absolutely different, for it is always possible to find in them some traits that distinguish them and others they have in common. Moreover, the identity of a being is always a relative quality, an imprecise, even accidental thing, for its definition requires a more or less rigorous or restrictive selection of the biological and sociological characteristics of the being in question.

It should be noted that in the basic formula for defining identity, the sociological factors carry more weight than biological factors. Indeed, if it is true that the biological element (the genetic legacy) is the material base that is indispensable to the existence and evolutionary continuity of identity, it is no less true that the sociological element is the factor that, by giving it content and form, imparts an objective meaning to this quality, permitting the contrast or comparison between individuals and groups of individuals. Indeed, for a complete definition of identity a description of the biological element is indispensable, but this does not imply identification at the sociological level, nor that two or more beings that are sociologically of the same identity have a necessarily similar identity at the biological level.

This circumstance illustrates the supremacy of social life over the life of the individual, for society (human society) is a superior form of life; moreover, in assessing identity it is necessary not to confuse the *original identity*, in which the biological element is the principal determinant, with *present identity* [l'identité actuelle], in which the sociological element is the principal determinant. The identity that counts at any moment in the development of a being (individual or group) is present identity, and any evaluation of an individual or group made solely on the basis of original identity is incomplete, partial, and laden with prejudices, since it overlooks or neglects the crucial influence of social reality (material and intellectual) on the form and content of identity.

In the formation and development of individual or collective identity, social reality is an objective agent resulting from economic, political, social, and cultural factors that mark the evolution or history of the society in question. If one considers that the economic factor is fundamental, we can say that identity is in some way the expression of an economic reality. Whatever the geographic environment and the path of development of the society, this reality is defined by the level of the productive forces (relations between man and nature) and by the mode of production (relations between men or groups of men within the same society). But if we postulate that culture is the dynamic synthesis of the material and intellectual reality of society and expresses relations both between man and nature, as well as between the different groups of men within the same society, we can say that at the individual and collective level, and at the same time beyond economic reality, identity is an expression of a culture. For this reason, to ascribe, recognize, or affirm the identity of an individual or a human group is above all to situate this individual or group within a cultural context. Or to state a commonplace, the mainstay of culture in each society is the social structure. It is therefore admissible to say that the possibility for any human grouping to preserve (or lose) its identity in the face of foreign domination depends on the extent to which this domination destroys its social structure.

As regards the action and effects of imperialist domination on the social structure of a subjugated people, one may consider the case of classical colonialism that the pre-independence movement challenges. In this case, whatever the stage of historical development of the dominated society, the social structure may be subject to the following actions and effects:

a. *total destruction*, with immediate or progressive liquidation of the indigenous population and its replacement by a population with foreign roots;
b. *partial destruction*, with installation of a population, varying in size, of foreign origins;
c. *outward preservation*, resulting from the confinement of the native society to geographic areas or reserves, generally devoid of life chances, with wholesale establishment of a population of foreign origins.

The experience of imperialist domination shows that the complete destruction of the social structure, which brings about loss of identity, is only possible through the total liquidation of the native population or its reduction to a socially and culturally negative quantity. On the other hand, in the two latter cases, which are the most relevant to Africa, culture, and hence identity, may be preserved even if the social structure is in large measure destroyed. Naturally, the possibility of this varies according to the *type* of colonialization and the *epoch*. But it is true that political domination, economic exploitation, and cultural repression practiced by the colonial power have brought about a crystallization of culture and an exaggerated sense of identity among some of the dominated groups as a consequence of the arrest of the historical process by imperialist domination.

The basically horizontal nature of the social structure of African peoples, with its multiplicity or profusion of ethnic groups, has meant that cultural resistance and the degree of preservation of identity have been uneven. Thus if it is true that ethnic groups in general have been able to preserve their identity, and that, consequently, there has been no loss of identity on the horizontal social plane, one notes that the groups which have been the most *resistant* are those that have had the most violent clashes with the colonial power in the phase of effective occupation[4] or those that because of their geographic location have had fewer contacts with the foreign power.[5]

The colonial power finds itself faced with an insoluble contradiction in dealing with ethnic groups: it must, on one hand, divide or maintain a division in order to rule, and for this reason, it preserves and encourages separation and even conflicts among ethnic groups; on the other hand, in its endeavors to ensure the perpetuation of its domination, it must destroy the social structure of these groups, their culture, and, hence, their identity. It is obliged to adopt, therefore, a protective policy toward the social structure and to defend the ruling classes of the groupings, which (for example, the Peule nation in our country) will provide crucial support for their wars of colonial conquest; such a policy then favors the preservation of a group's identity.

As we have said, there are in general no notable changes of cultural import that take place in the vertical structure of the native social pyramid or pyramids (groups or societies with a state). Each stratum or class keeps its identity, which is uniform within the group but distinct from that of other social categories. On the other hand, in the urban centers, as well as in some areas in the interior of the country where the

cultural influence of the colonial power has been considerable, the problem of identity is more complex. While the base and the peak of the social pyramid (the majority of the popular laboring masses, made up of individuals of different ethnic origins, on one hand, and the ruling class, on the other) retain their identities, the central segment of the pyramid (the native petite bourgeoisie), culturally uprooted, alienated, or assimilated to a greater or lesser degree, finds itself engaged in a sociocultural conflict in its quest for an identity. It should be pointed out that although it is firmly united by a new identity, namely, the identity of a colonial power, the foreign ruling class is unable to free itself from the contradictions and limitations of its own society, which it then transports to the colonized territories.

When the pre-independence movement is set into motion by the actions of a minority of the native petite bourgeoisie allied with the popular masses, these masses have no need to affirm or reaffirm an identity about which they have never been unclear, nor could they ever be, nor have they confused it with that of the colonial power. A need of this kind arises only among the native petite bourgeoisie (the elites), who in this phase in the evolution of the contradictions of colonialism are forced to take a position in the conflict, setting the popular masses against the colonial power. However, the reaffirmation of an identity distinct from that of the colonial power is not a generalized phenomenon within the petite bourgeoisie, in contrast to what takes place when cultural identification is needed. It is only a minority that does so, while another minority affirms, often in the most shattering way, its identity with the foreign ruling class, and the majority, silent, wallows in indecision.

It is also noteworthy that even within the segment of the petite bourgeoisie that reaffirms an identity distinct from that of the colonial power, but the same as that of the popular masses, this reaffirmation takes place in a different way. One part of this minority, integrated into the pre-independence movement, draws on the artifacts of the foreign culture to express, above all through literature and art, more the discovery of its identity than the aspirations and sufferings of the popular masses from which it draws its material. And since it uses the written and spoken language of the colonial power for this expression, it is only rarely that it succeeds in influencing the popular masses, who are generally illiterate and used to other forms of artistic expression. This fact, however, does not diminish the value of the contribution of this petit bourgeois minority for the development of the struggle, since by reaf-

firming its identity it is able to influence some of the hesitant or indecisive members of its own social group, as well as an important segment of the public opinion in the colonial metropolis, particularly the intellectuals.

The other segment of the petite bourgeoisie that has been immersed in the preindependence movement from the outset finds that the best way for it to express an identity distinct from that of the colonial power is by direct participation in the liberation struggle and by immersion in the popular masses. This is why identification with the popular masses and reaffirmation of identity can be temporary or permanent, apparent or real, with regard to the everyday efforts and sacrifices required by the struggle itself; and this struggle, the organized political expression of *culture*, is at the same time, and necessarily so, a test not only of *identity* but also of *dignity*.

During the process of colonial domination, the popular masses, whatever the characteristics of the social structure of the group to which they belong, never cease in their resistance to the colonial power. In the first stage—the stage of conquest, cynically called "pacification"—they resist armed foreign occupation with arms in hand.[6] In the second stage, the golden age of colonialism triumphant, they oppose foreign domination by passive, almost silent resistance, but a resistance dotted with rebellions, mostly individual, rarely collective, especially in the workplaces and tax-collection centers (i.e., wherever they have social contact with the foreign or native representatives of the colonial power). In the third stage, the liberation struggle, the popular masses constitute the main force in the political or armed resistance challenging and eradicating foreign domination. This resistance, which extends over a long period and takes many forms, is only possible because the popular masses, who have preserved their culture and identity, maintain their sense of individual and collective dignity despite the torments, humiliations, and depredations they must often suffer. This is all the more true considering that the individuals or social groupings who place themselves voluntarily at the service of the colonial power do so, whether consciously or unconsciously, to the advantage of groups or classes opposed to the overwhelming majority of the popular masses.

The affirmation or reaffirmation of an identity distinct from that of the colonial power among the native petite bourgeoisie thus makes a unique contribution toward restoring their own sense of dignity. It should be pointed out that a sense of dignity among the petite bourgeoisie depends on the objective moral and social conduct of each individu-

al and on the degree of subjectivity in his attitude with regard to the two poles of the colonial conflict between which he is obliged to live out the daily drama of colonization. This drama is all the more intense in that the petite bourgeoisie, in performing its service functions, is forced into a state of permanent confrontation with both the foreign ruling class and the popular masses. The result of this situation is that, on one hand, the petite bourgeoisie is the object of frequent, even daily, humiliations by the foreigner, and on the other hand, it acquires an acute awareness of the injustices to which the popular masses are subject, as well as of their resistance and their spirit of rebellion. Hence, the apparent paradox in the challenge to colonial domination: it is within the native petite bourgeoisie, a social grouping created by colonization itself, that the first consistent initiatives are launched to mobilize and organize the popular masses for the struggle against the colonial power.

Throughout all its vicissitudes and all the forms it assumes, this struggle reflects the consciousness, or a becoming-conscious, of one's own identity, generalizes and consolidates a sense of dignity reinforced by the development of a political consciousness, and draws on the culture or cultures of the popular masses as a major source of strength.

III

A correct assessment of the role of culture in the pre-independence movement or liberation movement requires that a clear distinction be made between *culture* and *cultural manifestations*. As we have said, culture is a dynamic synthesis, at the level of individual or collective consciousness, of a material and intellectual historical reality of a society or human group and of the relations prevailing between man and nature, as well as between different social groups. Cultural manifestations are the various forms through which this synthesis expresses itself, individually or collectively, at each stage in the evolution of the society or human grouping in question.

Culture proves to be the very cornerstone of the liberation movement, and only societies or groups that have preserved their culture are able to mobilize, organize, and struggle against foreign domination. Whatever the ideological or intellectual characteristics of its expression, culture is an essential element in the historical process. It is culture that has the ability (or responsibility) to elaborate or enrich the elements that make for historical continuity and, at the same time, for

the possibility of progress (and not regression) of the society. Thus we see how imperialist domination, as the negation of the historical process of the dominated society, is also necessarily the negation of its cultural process. And the liberation struggle is also an *act of culture*, above all because a society that is truly in the process of liberating itself from a foreign yoke must make its way back along the paths of its own cultural heritage, thriving on the living reality around it and rejecting all baleful influences and all subjugation to foreign cultures.

The liberation struggle is essentially a political fact. Hence, only political methods (including the use of violence to eliminate the violence, which is always armed, of imperialist domination) may be used during the course of its development. Culture is therefore not, nor can it be, a weapon or a method for collective mobilization against foreign domination. It is much more than that. It is in the concrete knowledge of local realities, particularly cultural realities, that the choice, the organization, and the development of the best methods for the struggle lie. For this reason, the liberation movement must attach prime importance not only to the general mass characteristics of the culture of the dominated society but also to those of each social grouping. For even though it may have a mass character, culture is not uniform; it does not develop evenly among all the horizontal and vertical sectors of society.

The attitude and conduct of each grouping or each individual toward the struggle and its unfolding are, of course, dictated by economic interests; but they are also profoundly influenced by culture. One could even say that it is this fact (differences in cultural levels) that explains the varying conduct of individuals in the same social grouping vis-à-vis the liberation movement. This is the plane on which culture acquires its full significance for each individual: inclusion and integration in his social environment, identification with the basic problems and aspirations of the society, acceptance or negation of the possibility of transformation in a progressive direction.

Obviously, the multiplicity of social groupings, particularly ethnic groups, makes the definition of the role of culture in the liberation movement more complicated. But this complexity cannot and must not diminish the crucial importance of the *class nature* of culture for the development of this movement. The class nature of culture is, of course, most palpably evident among urban groupings and in vertically structured rural societies (within a state); but it must also be taken into consideration even in cases where the class phenomenon is still in embryonic form. Experience shows that confronted with the necessity

of making a political choice with regard to foreign domination, the privileged groupings, for the most part, place their immediate class interests above the interests of the group or society and against the aspirations of the popular masses.

In assessing the role of culture in the liberation movement, one must not forget that culture, which is both a product of and a determining factor in history, consists of both essential and secondary elements, strengths and weaknesses, virtues and faults, positive aspects and progressive factors, as well as factors of stagnation and regression, contradictions, and even conflicts. Whatever the complexity of this cultural panorama, the liberation movement must pinpoint and define the contradictory elements in order to preserve the positive values, bring them together into a *cohesive* whole in the struggle, and impart to them a new dimension, namely, the *national dimension*. It is only in the course of struggle that the complexity and import of cultural problems become clear in their full magnitude, which means that adjustments and corrections of strategy and tactics are frequently required in accordance with realities that can be brought to light only in struggle. Also, only struggle can reveal how and to what extent culture might be an inexhaustible source of courage, material and moral resources, mental and physical energy for the popular masses, but also, in certain respects, a source of obstacles and difficulties, misconceptions of reality, delinquencies in the accomplishment of one's duty, and limitations on the pace and effectiveness of the struggle in the face of the political, technical, and scientific demands it makes.

All this implies that there exists a permanent confrontation between the different elements of culture and between them and the demands of the struggle. Culture and struggle come to influence one another reciprocally. Culture, the foundation and source of inspiration for the struggle, begins itself to be influenced by the struggle; this is reflected in the conduct of social groupings and individuals, as well as in the unfolding of the struggle itself. Both the leaders of the liberation movement, for the most part from the urban centers (petite bourgeoisie and wage earners), and the popular masses (the vast majority peasants) improve their level of culture; they acquire more knowledge about the realities of their country, free themselves from class complexes and prejudices, extend the horizons of the world within which they develop, break down ethnic barriers, reinforce their political consciousness, become a more integral part of the country and the world, etc.

Of course, the struggle, whatever its form, requires the mobilization and organization of a significant majority of the population, the political and moral unity of diverse social groupings, the progressive liquidation of what remains of tribal and feudal mentality, and rejection of social and religious taboos that are incompatible with the *rational* and national character of the liberation movement; and it affects a number of other deep changes in the life of the populace. This is especially so inasmuch as the dynamics of the struggle also requires the practice of democracy, the exercise of criticism and self-criticism, an increased responsibility of the people in conducting their lives, literacy, the creation of schools and health facilities, the training of cadres from among the workers and peasantry, as well as a number of other achievements that entail a veritable forced march along the path of cultural progress. This shows that the liberation struggle is more than a cultural fact, it is a *factor of culture* as well.

Within the native society, the influences of struggle are reflected in many facets of these achievements and in the development and/or consolidation of national consciousness. The cohesive effect of the liberation movement at the cultural level leads to the creation of a slow but solid cultural unity, a symbiosis of sorts, corresponding to the political and moral unity required by the dynamics of struggle. Once group insularity is broken, racial (tribal or ethnic) aggressivity tends to vanish, giving way to understanding, solidarity, and mutual respect among the different horizontal segments of society, now united in struggle and in their common destiny with regard to foreign domination; indeed, these are feelings that the popular masses learn without much difficulty if the political opportunism inherent in the middle social layers does not interfere with the process. A strengthening of group identity and a sharpened sense of dignity are also evident. These circumstances do not at all impair the organization and movement of the society as a whole along the way to harmonious development within a new historical context, which now has acquired a national dimension; indeed, only an intense and effective political action, an essential element in the struggle, can define the trajectory and limits of this movement and ensure its continuity.

Among the representatives of the colonial power, and in metropolitan opinion, the first effect of the liberation struggle—which is an effective test of the culture, identity, and dignity of the people of the colony—is a general feeling of surprise, astonishment, and incredulity. Once this feeling, the product of prejudices or of the systematic distor-

tion that characterizes colonial information, is overcome, reactions will depend on political interests and political options and on the extent to which a colonialist or racist mentality has become firmly entrenched among the different social groups and the individuals comprising them. The progress of the struggle and the sacrifices imposed by the necessity of colonial repression through police and/or military action bring about a split between the colonial class and metropolitan opinion, reflected in differing and even divergent positions, and the emergence of new political and social contradictions.

Once the struggle has consolidated itself as an irreversible fact, no matter how extensive the means used to throttle it, a qualitative change occurs in metropolitan opinion, and little by little, a majority comes to accept the possibility and even the inevitability of the independence of the colony. This change reflects the recognition, whether conscious or not, of the fact that the colonized people in struggle have an identity and culture of their own. And this despite the fact that an active minority, clinging to its own interests and prejudices, can continue throughout the conflict to refuse the right of independence and to reject the equality of cultures that this right implies, even though at a crucial stage in the conflict this equality is implicitly recognized or accepted by the colonial power when, in an effort to divert the struggle from its aims, it tries to adopt a demagogic policy of economic and social progress and cultural development on the basis of the personality traits of the colonized people, while at the political level it adopts new forms of domination and control. Indeed, while neocolonialism is above all the continuation of imperialist economic domination disguised by an autochthonous political course, it is also a tacit recognition on the part of the political power of the fact that the people it dominates and exploits has its own identity, and that this identity requires its own political direction to satisfy a cultural need.

Also, in accepting the identity and culture of the colonized people, and hence its inalienable right to self-determination and independence, as a fact, metropolitan opinion (or at least an important segment of this opinion) achieves a significant cultural advance of its own, freeing itself from one negative aspect of its culture: the prejudice of the supremacy of the colonizing nation over the colonized nation. This progress at the cultural level may have some important, even fundamental, consequences for the political life and development of the imperialist or colonial power, as has been amply demonstrated by the facts of the

recent and current history of the popular struggles against foreign domination.

Genetic-physical and cultural similarities among several human groups or between different continents, as well as a more or less similar situation with regard to colonial and/or racist domination, have produced theories and movements based on the hypothesis that there exist *racial* or *continental cultures*. The importance of the role of culture in the liberation movement, an importance generally recognized or sensed, has helped to give this hypothesis a certain credence. Without wishing to minimize the importance that such theories or movements may have had or have as attempts, successful or not, to find an identity or as a means of challenging foreign rule, an objective analysis of cultural reality will show that no such racial or continental culture exists on any important scale. This is true, first, because culture, like history, is an unfolding developing phenomenon with intimate ties of dependence and reciprocity with economic and social realities, and with the level of productive forces and the mode of production of the society that has created it; and second, but no less importantly, because the development of culture is uneven across a continent or a race and even within a society. Indeed, the coordinates of culture, like those of any phenomenon in development, vary in space and in time whether they are material (physical) or human (biological or sociological). This is why culture, the creation of society and the synthesis of the compromises and solutions that society generates to resolve the conflicts that characterize it at each phase of history, is a social reality independent of the will of men, the color of skin, the shape of eyes, or geographic boundaries.

The correct appraisal of the role of culture in the liberation movement requires that the factors determining it be considered in their totality, as well as in terms of their internal relations; it requires a refusal to blindly accept cultural values without consideration of their negative, reactionary, or regressive aspects; an avoidance of any confusion between that which is the expression of a historical and material reality and that which seems to be the creation of a mind divorced from this reality or the result of some specific nature; that no absurd connection be drawn between artistic creations, however valuable they may be in their own right, and presumed mental and physical characteristics of a "race"; and finally, that one avoid any non-scientific or ascientific appraisal of the phenomenon of culture.

These conditions are necessary if culture is to play its due role in the liberation movement, and all the more so if that movement has clearly defined its aims on the path toward regaining the right of the people it represents and leads to have their own history and control their productive forces in order to bring about the development of a richer, popular, national scientific, and universal culture. The important thing for the liberation movement is not to test the uniqueness or nonuniqueness of the popular culture but to undertake its critical analysis as a function of the needs of struggle and progress; this means to situate it, free of inferiority or superiority complexes, within the context of civilization as a whole, as a part of the common legacy of mankind, with a view toward harmonious integration within the world of the present and of the future. The liberation struggle, which is the most complex expression of the cultural vitality of a people, of its identity, and of its dignity, enriches culture and opens up new perspectives for its development. Cultural manifestations acquire a new content and take on new forms of expression. They also become a powerful instrument of political information and education, not only in the struggle for independence but also in the broader battle for progress.

NOTES

1. This speech, published in French as "Le rôle de la culture dans la lutte pour l'indépendance" in A. Cabral, Unité et lutte, l'arme de la theorie, vol. 1 (Paris: Maspero, 1973), was delivered at the UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Questions of Race, Identity, and Dignity, Paris, July 3–7, 1972, in the absence of its author. The translation is by Michel Vale. [A number of necessary grammatical, terminological, and typographical issues have been corrected by Wood.]
2. As regards Portugal, the largest percentage of "assimilated" is 0.3 percent of the total population (in Guinea) after five hundred years of the civilizing presence and a half-century of colonial peace.
3. A minimum of 99.7 percent in the Portuguese colonies.
4. In our country the Mandjaks, Pepels, Oincas, Balantes, and Beafadas.
5. This is the case with the Pajadincas and other minorities in the interior.
6. A half-century of armed resistance in our country.

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CHAPTER 1: THE WEAPON OF *CRITICAL* THEORY

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CHAPTER 2: IMBRICATIONS OF COLONIALITY

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